


MEXICO PEACE INDEX 2022

IDENTIFYING AND MEASURING
THE FACTORS THAT DRIVE PEACE





Quantifying Peace and its Benefits

The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the world's focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress.

IEP achieves its goals by developing new conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness; providing metrics for measuring peace; and uncovering the relationships between business, peace and prosperity as well as promoting a better understanding of the cultural, economic and political factors that create peace.

IEP is headquartered in Sydney, with offices in New York, The Hague, Mexico City, Brussels and Harare. It works with a wide range of partners internationally and collaborates with intergovernmental organizations on measuring and communicating the economic value of peace.

For more information visit www.economicsandpeace.org

Please cite this report as:

Institute for Economics & Peace. Mexico Peace Index 2022: Identifying and Measuring the Factors That Drive Peace, Sydney, May 2022. Available from: <http://visionofhumanity.org/resources> (accessed Date Month Year).

CONTENTS

	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	2
	Key Findings	4
1	RESULTS	8
	Methodology at a Glance	10
	National Results	11
	2021 State Results	14
2	TRENDS	23
	Seven-Year Trends	24
	Homicide	26
	Firearms Crime	32
	Violent Crime	34
	Organized Crime	36
	Detention Without a Sentence	40
3	THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE IN MEXICO	42
	The Economic Impact of Violence in 2021	43
	Trends in the Economic Impact of Violence	46
	The Economic Impact of Violence by State	48
	Improvements and Deteriorations in the Economic Impact of Violence	50
	Government Expenditure on Violence Containment	52
	Methodology at a Glance	55
4	POSITIVE PEACE	57
	What is Positive Peace?	58
	Positive Peace in Mexico: Results from the 2022 Global Positive Peace Index	60
	Positive Peace by State: the Mexico Positive Peace Index	65
5	STRENGTHENING POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO	74
	Mexico Case Studies	75
	Jalisco: Culture of Peace, Citizen Security Reform and Alternative Justice	76
	Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Councils	76
	National Anti-kidnapping Coordination	77
6	METHODOLOGY	78
	2022 Mexico Peace Indicators	79
	Methodology for Calculating the Economic Impact of Violence	82
	Positive Peace Methodology	85
	Appendix A: MPI Results	88
	Appendix B: MPPI Results	89
	Endnotes	91

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the ninth edition of the Mexico Peace Index (MPI), produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP). It provides a comprehensive measure of peacefulness in Mexico, including trends, analysis and estimates of the economic impact of violence in the country. The MPI is based on the Global Peace Index, the world's leading measure of global peacefulness, produced by IEP every year since 2007. The MPI consists of 12 sub-indicators aggregated into five broader indicators.

Mexico's peacefulness improved by 0.2 percent in 2021. This was the second year in a row of improvement following four consecutive years of deteriorations. Twenty-three states improved, while nine deteriorated. Although a minority of states deteriorated, the deterioration in these states was large enough to almost counter the improvements in other states. This relationship occurs globally where countries deteriorate in peacefulness much faster than they improve.

In 2021, three of the five indicators in the MPI improved. Notably, both *firearms crime* and *homicide* improved, with the rates falling by 6.2 and 4.3 percent, respectively, and both reaching around 26 per 100,000 people. This marks the second year in a row of improvement for both indicators following steep increases between 2015 and 2018.

However, the longer-term trends indicate a marked deterioration in peacefulness between 2015 and 2021. Peace in Mexico has deteriorated by 17.1 percent with many crime indicators significantly higher than seven years ago. The homicide rate in 2021 was 76.3 percent higher than in 2015. While the trend in homicide has improved in the last two years, Mexico's homicide rate remained near historically high levels in 2021, at 26.6 deaths per 100,000 people, or over 34,000 victims. This equates to approximately 94 homicides per day.

Both the *organized crime* and *violent crime* indicators deteriorated to near pre-pandemic levels in 2021, after improving in the prior year. Deteriorations in the *organized crime* indicator were driven by increases in the rates of extortion and retail drug crimes, which rose by 11 and 6.2 percent, respectively. In 2020, *violent crime* was one of the indicators most affected by the restrictions placed on everyday activities caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, with the rates of assault and robbery falling steeply. The deterioration in *violent crime* in 2021 is likely associated with the lifting of public health measures and the return to pre-pandemic levels of mobility. In addition, the deterioration in *violent crime* was also driven by continued increases in reports of family violence and sexual assault.

Organized crime continues to be the main driver of homicide and gun violence in Mexico. Approximately two-thirds of homicides were estimated to be connected to organized crime in 2021.¹ Since 2015 the organized crime rate has deteriorated by 48.1 percent

and is mainly attributed to a sharp increase of 139 percent in retail drug crimes.

Recent violence in Mexico is linked to shifts in the organized criminal landscape characterized by the rapid and violent territorial expansion of certain larger cartels, predominantly the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), the proliferation of smaller crime groups and the diversification of criminal activity. There have also been major changes in the type of drugs that Mexican criminal organizations move internationally in the past decade, with the trafficking of marijuana plummeting while the trafficking of fentanyl has risen steeply.

The states that recorded the largest deteriorations in their homicide rates, such as Baja California, Guanajuato, Michoacán and Zacatecas, were home to ongoing conflicts between cartels. Gun violence tends to be most intense in these states where multiple criminal organizations compete for territory and key drug trafficking routes. Notably, fatalities attributed to cartel conflicts rose from 669 in 2006 to over 16,000 in 2020.²

As violence caused by organized crime intensified in parts of the country, there was a sharp increase in the number of people displaced by violence in 2021. Since 2016, over 117,000 people were internally displaced, with at least 44,905 of those displacements occurring in 2021.³ The majority of these displacements occurred in Guerrero, with more than 21,800 displacements, followed by Chiapas and Michoacán with over 14,900 and 12,900 displacements, respectively.⁴

Yucatán was once again the most peaceful state in Mexico, followed by Tlaxcala, Chiapas, Campeche and Hidalgo. In contrast, Baja California ranked as Mexico's least peaceful state for the fourth consecutive year, followed by Zacatecas, Colima, Guanajuato and Sonora. Reflecting the great divergence in violence levels across the country, the average homicide rate in Mexico's five least peaceful states was 73 per 100,000 people, compared to 8.2 per 100,000 in its five most peaceful states.

The largest improvements in peacefulness in 2021 occurred in Colima, Chihuahua, Tabasco, San Luis Potosí and Sinaloa. In contrast, Sonora, Zacatecas, Nuevo León, Morelos and Michoacán recorded the largest deteriorations. Notably, all five of these states have witnessed an incursion of the CJNG in recent years.

The killing of security forces, political figures and journalists remains a major concern in Mexico. More than 400 police officers were killed in 2021, with the majority – 52 percent – being municipal police officers, followed by state police, at 39 percent, and federal police, at nine percent. Violence against politicians and political candidates also escalated in the lead-up

to Mexico's midterm elections in June 2021, with 102 politicians and candidates killed between September 2020 and early June 2021. At the local level, 90 percent of assassinated politicians and candidates belonged to a party other than that of the mayor.

Mexico remains one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a journalist.⁵ Since 1994, 142 journalist and media workers were killed, with most of these murders not prosecuted.⁶ Within the first three months of 2022, seven journalists and media workers were killed in Mexico.⁷ Most journalists killed in the last few decades have covered issues related to organized crime, corruption and politics.⁸

In the past seven years, guns have become the primary means of homicide for both men and women in Mexico. Between 2015 and 2021, the proportion of male homicides committed with a firearm rose from 60.9 percent to 71.3 percent, while the proportion of female firearm homicides rose from 37.8 percent to 56.8 percent. Although the steep overall increase in male homicides follows trends in organized crime, female homicides have a weaker relationship with patterns of organized crime, with many stemming from intimate partner violence.^{9,10} According to available data, nearly one in five female homicides occur in the home, compared to one in 13 for male homicides.¹¹

The economic impact of violence in Mexico is estimated to be 4.9 trillion pesos (US\$243 billion) in constant 2021 terms, equivalent to 20.8 percent of Mexico's GDP. On a per capita basis, the economic impact of violence was 38,196 pesos (US\$1,884), approximately 2.5 times the average monthly salary.

The economic impact of violence improved for the second year in a row in 2021, decreasing by 2.7 percent or 137 billion pesos from the previous year. In 2021, decreases in crime such as homicides, kidnappings and robbery underpinned the improvement in the economic impact. Additionally, the Mexican government reduced spending on domestic security and the justice system, by 8.5 and 3.3 percent respectively, contributing to the lower overall impact. Conversely, military expenditure increased by 14.7 percent to nearly 167 billion pesos, the highest level of expenditure on record. The economic impact of sexual assault recorded the largest percentage deterioration of all indicators, increasing by 16.9 percent from the previous year.

IEP analysis finds that Mexico must increase its spending on the criminal justice system to effectively address violence. Mexico's spending on domestic security and the justice system in 2021 was equal to 0.63 percent of GDP, the least of any Latin American country or member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Further, spending on domestic security decreased by 37.2 percent from 2015 to 2021, after adjusting for inflation, while spending on the justice system decreased by 7.5 percent in the same period.

For such funding to be effective, institutional corruption would also need to be addressed. In particular, the municipal police and judicial system are viewed as the most corrupt institutions in the country, with over 65 percent of Mexicans perceiving them to be corrupt in 2021.¹² Analysis on the link between police wages, corruption and organized crime found that low police wages play only a small role in the high levels of violence in Mexico. Violence in Mexico is a reflection of a deeper level of corruption and administrative ineffectiveness, one that affects the judicial and political processes, and facilitates the operations of criminal organizations.

Mexico's socio-economic resilience, as measured by the Positive Peace Index (PPI), has deteriorated by 1.1 percent since 2009. This is in contrast to an average global improvement of 2.4 percent. Positive Peace is a measure of the *attitudes, institutions and structures* that create and sustain peaceful societies. At the national level, Mexico's deterioration since 2009 has been driven by deteriorations in three Pillars of Positive Peace: *Well-Functioning Government, Low Levels of Corruption and Good Relations with Neighbors*. At the state level, high levels of corruption and poor governance are statistically related to crime and violence.

Policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have also had a significant impact on Positive Peace in Mexico. The *Sound Business Environment* Pillar deteriorated by 2.1 percent from 2019 to 2020, reflecting business failures, unemployment and worker furloughs

as a result of public health measures and stay-at-home orders. Economic inequality also increased, with the indicator *exclusion by socio-economic group* from the Pillar *Acceptance of the Rights of Others* deteriorating by 2.6 percent.

Effective peacebuilding strategies will need to look at multiple dynamics and how they interact, and the Pillars of Positive Peace provide a systemic lens to analyze societal issues facing the country. Combating corruption and business, government and institutional inefficiency would not only reduce impunity and crime, but also free up funds and resources for much needed investment. In addition, showcasing and replicating success stories of peace and resilience-building programs could lead Mexico into a virtuous cycle towards higher levels of peacefulness. The 2022 MPI report aims to inform a strategic discussion among policymakers, researchers, business leaders and the general public, to help develop holistic peacebuilding solutions for Mexico.



Combating corruption and business, government and institutional inefficiency would not only reduce impunity and crime, but also free up funds and resources for much needed investment.



KEY FINDINGS

SECTION 1: RESULTS

- In 2021, peacefulness in Mexico improved by 0.2 percent. This was the second year in a row of improvement following four consecutive years of deteriorations.
- The improvement in 2021 was driven by three indicators: *homicide*, *firearms crime* and *detention without a sentence*.
- Twenty-three of Mexico's 32 states improved in peacefulness in 2021, while nine states deteriorated.
- While the vast majority of states improved in peacefulness in 2021, the national score experienced only a marginal improvement. This reflects the degree to which violence in a minority of states is driving elevated levels of violence in Mexico.
- The national homicide rate fell by 4.3 percent in 2021, marking the largest reduction in the homicide rate since 2014.
- Despite recent improvements, Mexico's homicide rate remains at historically high levels, with 26.6 deaths per 100,000 people, resulting in over 34,000 victims. This equates to approximately 94 homicides per day in 2021.
- In 2021, more than 44,000 people in Mexico were internally displaced by violence in mass displacement events. This is more than twice as many as 2016, the next highest year on record.
- The *firearms crime* score improved by 3.9 percent, driven by reductions in assaults with a firearm and homicides with a firearm, the rates of which fell by over six percent each.
- Violence against police officers, politicians and journalists remains a concern across Mexico. In 2021, 401 police officers, 102 politicians and political candidates, and nine journalists were killed.
- Colima recorded the largest improvement in overall score in 2021, driven by reductions in *homicide* and *firearms crime*. Despite this, the state remains one of Mexico's least peaceful.
- Sonora recorded the largest deterioration in overall score, driven by a 20.8 percent increase in its homicide rate.
- Yucatán remains the most peaceful state, followed by Tlaxcala, Chiapas, Campeche and Hidalgo.
- Baja California is the least peaceful state in Mexico for the fourth consecutive year, followed by Zacatecas, Colima, Guanajuato and Sonora.

SECTION 2: TRENDS

- Mexico's peacefulness has deteriorated by 17.1 percent over the last seven years. However, in the past two years, peacefulness in the country has improved by 3.6 percent.
- Public health measures and stay-at-home orders implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic coincided with some of these improvements, with a large reduction in opportunistic crimes recorded in 2020.
- Despite some positive gains, many crime indicators are still much higher today than in 2015. The national homicide rate has nearly doubled from 15.1 deaths per 100,000 people in 2015 to 26.6 in 2021.
- Eight states recorded improvements in their homicide rates since 2015, while the remaining 24 deteriorated.
- Over two-thirds of homicides since 2015 have been the result of gun violence. In 2021, 71.3 percent of male homicides and 56.8 percent of female homicides were committed with a firearm.
- The organized crime rate has deteriorated by 48.1 percent since 2015, attributed mainly to a sharp increase in retail drug crimes of 139 percent.
- In recent years, shifts in the organized criminal landscape have been characterized by the rapid and violent territorial expansion of certain larger cartels, proliferation of smaller crime groups and diversification of criminal activity.
- Organized crime continues to drive high levels of homicide in Mexico. The states that recorded the largest deteriorations in their homicide rates were home to ongoing conflicts between cartels. Fatalities attributed to cartel conflicts rose from 669 in 2006 to over 16,000 in 2020.
- The violent crime rate increased by 16.2 percent from 2015 to 2021, driven by widespread deteriorations in the rates of family violence and sexual assault.
- With the exception of 2020, the *detention without a sentence* indicator has improved in each of the past seven years. There were roughly 79,000 detainees without a sentence in 2021, compared to 80,330 in 2015.
- Zacatecas recorded the largest overall deterioration in peacefulness between 2015 and 2021, followed by Guanajuato, Colima, Baja California and Michoacán.
- Sinaloa has experienced the largest overall improvement over the last seven years, followed by Tamaulipas, Guerrero, Coahuila and Yucatán.

SECTION 3: ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE


- In 2021, the economic impact of violence in Mexico was 4.92 trillion pesos (US\$243 billion), equivalent to 20.8 percent of the country's GDP.
- This represents an improvement from the previous year, with the impact decreasing by 2.7 percent, or 137 billion pesos, from 2020. This was the second consecutive annual improvement.
- In 2021, the economic impact of violence was more than seven times higher than public investments made in health care and more than six times higher than those made in education.
- Mexico's spending on domestic security and the justice system in 2021 was equivalent to 0.63 percent of GDP, the least of any Latin American country or member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
- In 2021, costs associated with *homicide* represented 43.4 percent of the economic impact of violence. This was equivalent to 2.2 trillion pesos (US\$105.5 billion).
- A one percent decline in the economic impact of violence would be equivalent to the federal government's investment in science, technology and innovation in 2021.
- The annual economic impact of violence was 38,196 pesos per person, approximately 2.5 times the average monthly salary in Mexico.
- The per capita economic impact varies substantially from state to state, ranging from 12,064 pesos in Yucatán to 77,871 pesos in Zacatecas.
- In 2021, the economic impact of sexual assault recorded the largest percentage increase of all the sub-indicators in the model and now totals 511.9 billion pesos.
- Mexico has increased its investment in the military to address organized crime. Since 2015, military expenditure increased by 31.3 percent to reach almost 167 billion pesos, the highest level on record. This corresponds with reductions in spending on domestic security of 37.2 percent and justice of 7.5 percent.

SECTION 4: POSITIVE PEACE

- Mexico's national Positive Peace Index (PPI) score has deteriorated by 1.1 percent since 2009. This is contrary to the 2.7 percent improvement in the average national score for countries in the Central America and the Caribbean region over the same period.
- Positive Peace in Mexico steadily improved between 2009 and 2015, but then recorded substantial deteriorations between 2015 and 2020, undoing the gains of the previous years.
- The net deterioration since 2009 was driven by deteriorations in three Pillars of Positive Peace:

Well-Functioning Government, Low Levels of Corruption and Good Relations with Neighbors.

- Since 2009, the Pillar of Positive Peace to record the largest improvement was *Free Flow of Information*. This improvement was driven by national policies to improve Internet access and the use of information technologies.
- The *Acceptance of the Rights of Others* Pillar also improved substantially, mainly driven by Mexico's achievement of near gender parity in the federal legislature.
- The lockdown measures led to a reduction in GDP, increasing unemployment and disruption to education programs, which in turn caused a negative impact on the *Sound Business Environment* Pillar.
- At the sub-national level, the Mexico Positive Peace Index (MPPI) identified variations in societal resilience across the states. Querétaro, Baja California Sur, Aguascalientes, Sonora and Tlaxcala recorded the highest levels of Positive Peace in 2020.
- In contrast, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Morelos, Veracruz and Michoacán recorded the lowest levels of Positive Peace.
- Organized crime and drug trafficking distort the relationship between Positive Peace and negative peace within Mexico. Usually, high Positive Peace societies tend to be more peaceful. But in Mexico, the states with higher levels of economic, social and urban development – which typically exhibit higher levels of Positive Peace – tend to be more attractive and strategic for criminal organizations.
- The MPPI Pillars with the strongest associations with actual peace, as measured by the MPI, are *Low Levels of Corruption* and *Well-Functioning Government*. This suggests that corruption and administrative ineffectiveness are key drivers of violence in Mexico, as they contribute to impunity and reduce the amount of resources available to combat crime.



VISION OF HUMANITY


visionofhumanity.org

Explore the data on the interactive Mexico Peace Index map: see how peace changes over time, compare levels of peace between states and discover how the states fare according to each indicator of peace.


2022 MEXICO PEACE INDEX

A SNAPSHOT OF THE STATE OF PEACE IN MEXICO

MPI SCORE



RANK	STATE	SCORE	RANK	STATE	SCORE
1	Yucatán	1.254	17	Mexico City	2.426
2	Tlaxcala	1.517	18	Baja California Sur	2.478
3	Chiapas	1.613	19	Jalisco	2.496
4	Campeche	1.622	20	San Luis Potosí	2.730
5	Hidalgo	1.817	21	Nuevo León	2.802
6	Nayarit	1.869	22	Guerrero	2.862
7	Coahuila	1.967	23	México	2.904
8	Veracruz	2.028	24	Quintana Roo	3.052
9	Puebla	2.042	25	Michoacán	3.190
10	Durango	2.051	26	Morelos	3.299
11	Tamaulipas	2.064	27	Chihuahua	3.517
12	Tabasco	2.113	28	Sonora	3.524
13	Aguascalientes	2.150	29	Guanajuato	3.567
14	Oaxaca	2.290	30	Colima	3.989
15	Sinaloa	2.294	31	Zacatecas	4.227
16	Querétaro	2.348	32	Baja California	4.307



1

RESULTS

2021 RESULTS

- In 2021, peacefulness in Mexico improved by 0.2 percent. This was the second year in a row of improvement following four consecutive years of deteriorations.
- The improvement in 2021 was driven by three indicators: *homicide*, *firearms crime* and *detention without a sentence*.
- Twenty-three of Mexico's 32 states improved in peacefulness in 2021, while nine states deteriorated.
- In the past two years, more states have improved than deteriorated, with 2021 seeing the highest number of improving states since 2015.
- While the vast majority of states improved in peacefulness in 2021, the national score experienced only a marginal improvement. This reflects the degree to which violence in a minority of states is driving elevated levels of violence in Mexico.
- The national homicide rate fell by 4.3 percent in 2021, marking the largest reduction in the homicide rate since 2014.
- Despite recent improvements, Mexico's homicide rate remains at historically high levels, with 26.6 deaths per 100,000 people, resulting in over 34,000 victims. This equates to approximately 94 homicides per day in 2021.
- In 2021, over 44,000 people in Mexico were internally displaced by violence in mass displacement events. This is more than twice as many as in 2016, the next highest year on record.
- The *firearms crime* score improved by 3.9 percent, driven by reductions in assaults with a firearm and homicides with a firearm, the rates of which fell by over six percent each.
- Colima recorded the largest improvement in overall score in 2021, driven by reductions in *homicide* and *firearms crime*. Despite this, the state remains one of Mexico's least peaceful.
- Sonora recorded the largest deterioration in overall score, driven by a 20.8 percent increase in its homicide rate.
- Yucatán remains the most peaceful state, followed by Tlaxcala, Chiapas, Campeche and Hidalgo.
- Baja California is the least peaceful state in Mexico for the fourth consecutive year, followed by Zacatecas, Colima, Guanajuato and Sonora.

TABLE 1.1

Mexico Peace Index results, 2021

A lower score indicates a higher level of peacefulness.

MPI RANK	STATE	OVERALL SCORE	HOMICIDE	VIOLENT CRIME	FIREARMS CRIME	ORGANIZED CRIME	DETENTION WITHOUT A SENTENCE	OVERALL CHANGE, 2020-2021	
1	Yucatán	1.254	1.103	1.201	1.045	1.318	2.308	0.009	↔
2	Tlaxcala	1.517	1.482	1.304	1.342	1.226	3.409	-0.047	↔
3	Chiapas	1.613	1.475	1.864	1.472	1.560	1.959	0.003	↔
4	Campeche	1.622	1.518	1.500	1.584	1.785	1.994	-0.067	↔
5	Hidalgo	1.817	1.481	2.744	1.616	1.682	1.508	-0.057	↑1
6	Nayarit	1.869	1.868	1.309	1.557	1.573	4.901	0.044	↓1
7	Coahuila	1.967	1.257	2.570	1.178	3.251	1.653	-0.024	↔
8	Veracruz	2.028	1.770	2.388	2.040	2.181	1.620	-0.053	↑2
9	Puebla	2.042	1.683	3.432	1.821	1.583	1.502	-0.009	↓1
10	Durango	2.051	1.447	2.728	1.532	2.717	2.081	-0.020	↓1
11	Tamaulipas	2.064	1.964	2.656	1.730	2.201	1.355	-0.058	↔
12	Tabasco	2.113	1.898	3.023	2.076	1.755	1.567	-0.225	↑1
13	Aguascalientes	2.150	1.328	3.870	1.362	2.675	1.310	-0.099	↓1
14	Oaxaca	2.290	2.049	2.984	2.366	2.162	1.517	-0.059	↔
15	Sinaloa	2.294	2.013	2.793	2.077	2.762	1.351	-0.109	↔
16	Querétaro	2.348	1.457	3.079	1.472	4.139	1.259	-0.068	↔
17	Mexico City	2.426	1.599	4.394	2.075	2.360	1.414	-0.036	↔
18	Baja California Sur	2.478	1.354	3.143	1.209	5	1.504	-0.041	↑1
19	Jalisco	2.496	2.448	2.762	2.646	2.371	1.939	-0.070	↑1
20	San Luis Potosí	2.730	2.329	3.309	2.790	3.180	1.383	-0.152	↑2
21	Nuevo León	2.802	1.943	3.281	2.457	4.404	1.419	0.293	↓3
22	Guerrero	2.862	2.881	2.242	3.315	3.517	1.562	-0.093	↑1
23	México	2.904	1.796	5	2.330	3.569	1.243	0.037	↓2
24	Quintana Roo	3.052	2.926	4.384	2.723	2.799	1.520	-0.065	↑2
25	Michoacán	3.190	3.853	2.554	4.830	1.896	1.673	0.187	↓1
26	Morelos	3.299	3.889	3.793	3.531	2.473	1.382	0.241	↓1
27	Chihuahua	3.517	4.236	2.823	4.535	2.876	1.783	-0.239	↑2
28	Sonora	3.524	4.185	2.700	3.907	3.639	1.950	0.346	↓1
29	Guanajuato	3.567	3.836	2.557	4.817	3.809	1.446	-0.050	↓1
30	Colima	3.989	4.298	3.997	4.331	4.251	1.258	-0.340	↑1
31	Zacatecas	4.227	5	2.706	5	5	1.360	0.294	↓1
32	Baja California	4.307	5	3.580	4.506	4.732	2.009	-0.094	↔
NATIONAL		2.605	2.335	3.180	2.594	2.848	1.497	-0.005	

Source: IEP



METHODOLOGY AT A GLANCE

The Mexico Peace Index (MPI) is based on the concepts and framework of the Global Peace Index (GPI), the leading global measure of peacefulness produced annually by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) since 2007. However, as an internal analysis of a single country, the MPI adapts the GPI methodology for a sub-national application, similar to the United Kingdom Peace Index (UKPI) and the United States Peace Index (USPI), also produced by IEP. All of these indices measure negative peace according to its definition as “the absence of violence or fear of violence.”

This is the ninth iteration of the MPI and uses data primarily published by the Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security / *Secretariado Ejecutivo de Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública* (SESNSP). Wherever possible, the official data is adjusted for underreporting and contextualized using other datasets. A detailed review of the methodology can be found in Section 6.

The MPI is composed of the following five indicators, scored between 1 and 5, where 1 represents the most peaceful score and 5 the least peaceful. Throughout the report indicators are *italicized*, which distinguishes them from rates, which are not.



GLOBAL PEACE
INDEX 2021

HOMICIDE

The number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 people.

Source: SESNSP

VIOLENT CRIME

The number of violent crimes per 100,000 people, adjusted for underreporting. Violent crimes include robbery, assault, sexual violence and violence within the family.

Source: SESNSP

ORGANIZED CRIME

Organized crime is made up of the following sub-indicators: extortions, major offenses, retail drug crime offenses, and kidnapping or human trafficking investigations.

Extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking rates are adjusted for underreporting.

Major organized crime offenses include:

- the federal crimes of production, transport, trade, supply, or possession of drugs or other crimes under the Crimes Against Public Health Law / *Los Delitos contra La Salud Pública*; and
- crimes classed under the Law Against Organized Crime / *La Ley Contra El Crimen Organizada*, which includes all of the above crimes when three or more people conspire to commit them.

Retail drug crimes are used as a proxy of the size of the market fueled by illegal drug production and distribution.

Each *organized crime* sub-indicator is weighted and averaged to form the indicator score. Sub-indicator

weights adjust the scores based on the distribution of crimes, the relative social impact of the offense, and the degree to which the crime represents the presence of criminal organizations in a particular state of the country.

Source: SESNSP

FIREARMS CRIME

The number of victims of an intentional or negligent homicide or assault committed with a firearm per 100,000 people.

Source: SESNSP

DETENTION WITHOUT A SENTENCE

The ratio of people in prison without a sentence to the number of violent crimes (including homicide).

Source: Secretariat of Security and Civilian Protection / *Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana* (SSPC)

UNDERREPORTING AND ADJUSTMENT

Two of the indicators – *violent crime* and *organized crime* – are adjusted for underreporting. In 2020, 93.3 percent of crimes in Mexico did not make it into the official statistics because they were either not reported to the authorities or because no investigation was opened.¹ IEP uses the National Survey of Victimization and Perceptions of Public Security / *Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública* (ENVIPE) of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography / *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* (INEGI) to calculate underreporting rates for each state and crime, and adjusts the official statistics for robbery, assault, sexual violence, extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking to approximate actual rates of violence.



NATIONAL RESULTS

Peacefulness in Mexico improved by 0.2 percent in 2021 (Figure 1.1). Despite the relatively minor change in score, this represents the second year in a row of improvement following four consecutive years of deteriorations. Of the five MPI indicators, three – *homicide*, *firearms crime* and *detention without a sentence* – improved in 2021, while two – *violent crime* and *organized crime* – deteriorated. The homicide rate fell by 4.3 percent and the firearms crime rate by 6.2 percent, marking the second consecutive year of improvement for both indicators. This is significant given that these two categories of crime have driven Mexico's overall deterioration in peacefulness since 2015.


In recent years, violence has become increasingly concentrated in certain parts of Mexico, and this trend continued in 2021. As in 2020, just six states – Guanajuato, Baja California, the state of México, Michoacán, Chihuahua and Jalisco – accounted for approximately half of all homicides. Reflecting the significant divergence in levels of violence across the country, the average homicide rate in Mexico's five least peaceful states was 73 per 100,000 people, compared to 8.2 per 100,000 people in its five most peaceful states.

In 2021, approximately two-thirds of homicides in Mexico were estimated to be connected to organized crime,² indicating that the growing concentration of violence in the country is largely tied to inter-group conflicts and shifts in the organized criminal landscape. Following a period of heightened cartel fragmentation and the rise of new major criminal actors, such as the Jalisco New Generation Cartel / *Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación* (CJNG), violent confrontations between rival criminal groups and infighting have led to sporadic rises in violence across some states.³

Figure 1.2 shows the number of states that have improved in peacefulness and the number that have deteriorated each year.

FIGURE 1.1
Change in overall peacefulness, 2015–2021

Peacefulness improved slightly in 2020 and 2021, after four consecutive years of deteriorations.




Source: IEP

In the past two years, more states have improved than deteriorated, with 2021 witnessing the highest number of improving states in the past seven years. However, despite the vast majority of states improving in peacefulness in 2021, the national score experienced only a marginal improvement. This reflects the degree to which deteriorations in a minority of states are driving elevated levels of violence in Mexico.

In 2021, the largest improvements were in the *homicide* and *firearms crime* indicators, as shown in Figure 1.3. These two indicators typically correlate strongly because the majority of homicides in Mexico are committed with firearms and this type of gun violence is captured by one of the two sub-indicators of *firearms crime* – *homicide with a firearm*. Overall, the *homicide* score improved by 2.5 percent, with the national homicide rate falling from 27.8 to 26.6 deaths per 100,000 people. The *firearms crime* score improved by 3.9 percent, driven by reductions in the rates of assaults with a firearm and homicides with a firearm, which fell by over six percent each. Notably, the rate of non-firearm homicides declined by less than 0.2 percent in 2021. This indicates that the overall reduction in homicides came almost entirely from the reduction in gun violence.

FIGURE 1.2
Number of states recording improvements and deteriorations in peacefulness, 2016–2021

Starting in 2020, the vast majority of states began improving in peacefulness.



Source: IEP

The *detention without a sentence* score, which represents the ratio of unsentenced detainees relative to national levels of homicide and violent crime, also improved by 1.4 percent in 2021.

In 2021, the majority of states improved across all indicators. The exception, however, was in *violent crime*, for which only five states improved, compared to 27 that deteriorated. This marks a clear reversal from 2020, when 25 states improved in *violent crime*.

In 2020, *violent crime* was one of the indicators most affected by the restrictions placed on everyday activities due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The rebound of violent crime rates in 2021 is likely associated with the lifting of such restrictions. According to Google mobility data, stay-home rates in Mexico declined fairly steadily each month after peaking in April 2020, when they were 19.3 percent higher than their pre-pandemic levels. By December 2021, stay-home rates were only 1.8 percent higher than their pre-pandemic levels.⁴ In the context of this return to pre-pandemic patterns of movement, the national *violent crime* score experienced the worst deterioration of any indicator in 2021, increasing by 4.4 percent.

Aside from *violent crime*, the only other indicator that deteriorated in 2021 was *organized crime*, which rose by 1.3 percent. However, improvements were not consistent across all *organized crime* sub-indicators. While extortion and retail drug crimes both deteriorated by 11 and 6.2 percent, respectively, major offenses and kidnapping and human trafficking both improved by 11.5 and 9.2 percent, respectively.


Figure 1.4 shows the changes by sub-indicator rates between 2020 and 2021 as well as between 2019 and 2020. Following dips in opportunistic crimes such as assault and extortion in 2020, both of these crimes increased again in 2021. While the rates of robbery and kidnapping and human trafficking continued to improve in 2021, the improvements were much smaller than in 2020.

In contrast, interpersonal violence – as measured by the family violence and sexual assault sub-indicators – continued to

deteriorate in 2021, and at a much higher rate than in 2020. These trends may be due to a change in reporting over the period. The relatively modest deteriorations in reported rates of family violence and sexual assault in 2020 may have in part been a result of a rise in underreporting brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated restrictions on regular activities and movements.⁵

FIGURE 1.3
Changes in peacefulness by indicator, 2020–2021


The *firearms crime* and *homicide* indicators recorded the largest improvements in 2021, at 3.9 and 2.5 percent, respectively. However, deteriorations in *violent crime* and *organized crime* meant the overall score improved only marginally.



Source: IEP
Note: A lower score indicates a higher level of peacefulness.

FIGURE 1.4
Changes in peacefulness by sub-indicator, 2020–2021 and 2019–2020

In 2021, five sub-indicators continued to improve as in the previous year, while four experienced a change in trend. Three sub-indicators – family violence, sexual assault and retail drug crimes – saw a continued deterioration in 2021.



Source: IEP

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE IN MEXICO

People fleeing their homes in search of greater security has become a topic of increased concern in Mexico over the past year. This is the case for both Mexicans who have been internally displaced by violence and the hundreds of thousands of international migrants who pass through or remain in Mexico to escape poverty and violence in their home countries. In 2021, there were substantial increases in both categories of displaced people.

With regard to Mexican citizens displaced by violence, the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights / *Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos* (CMDPDH) tracks large-scale displacement events. According to its records, such events entailed the displacement of at least 117,301 people in the past six years, with at least 44,905 people displaced in 2021 alone (Figure 1.5).⁶ Approximately two-thirds of displacements were due to violence caused by organized armed groups such as drug cartels, while about one-third were due to violence associated with political, social and territorial conflict.⁷ Both forms of violence disproportionately affect indigenous and rural communities.⁸

Between 2016 and 2020, more than 97 percent of the recorded displacements occurred in just six states: Guerrero, Chiapas,

Michoacán, Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Oaxaca. The two states registering the most displacements, Guerrero and Chiapas, were more likely to be affected by political, social and territorial conflicts, while in other states violence was more likely to be caused by organized armed groups.⁹


The dramatic rise in displacements in 2021 has been driven by an escalation of violence by organized criminal groups. This increase also coincided with changes in US immigration policy in 2021 which affected freedom of movement between the two countries.

Displacements spiked in August 2021, during which time 10,475 people reportedly fled their homes.¹⁰ Nearly half of these displacements occurred in a single municipality, Tepalcatepec in Michoacán, due to the CJNG launching a violent offensive against residents and National Guard forces.¹¹ Moreover, this type of violence has led to mass displacements in states where displacement events were previously infrequent, such as Zacatecas. For example, in the municipality of Jerez in Zacatecas, violence between the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel led approximately 1,500 people to flee their homes in mid-2021, leaving at least one town abandoned.¹²

FIGURE 1.5

People internally displaced by violence in mass displacement events, 2016–2021

Mexico saw a major spike in people internally displaced by violence in 2021.



Source: CMDPDH

KEY FINDINGS



IMPROVEMENT AND DETERIORATION

23

Twenty-three of Mexico's 32 states improved in peacefulness in 2021, while nine states deteriorated.

HOMICIDE

4.3%

The national homicide rate fell by 4.3 percent in 2021, marking the largest reduction in the homicide rate since 2014.

DISPLACEMENT

44,000

In 2021, more than 44,000 people in Mexico were internally displaced by violence in mass displacement events. This is more than twice as many as 2016, the next highest year on record.

MEXICO PEACE INDEX

2021
STATE
RESULTS

IMPROVEMENTS IN PEACEFULNESS

Twenty-three Mexican states experienced improvements in peacefulness in 2021, while nine experienced deteriorations. This is the second year in a row that most states improved, following four consecutive years in which the majority deteriorated.

The largest improvements occurred in Mexico's least peaceful states. The two states recording the biggest gains – Colima and Chihuahua – are among the country's most violent, and all of the most improved states fall outside the top ten most peaceful states in Mexico.

In keeping with national trends, four of the five most improved states – Colima, Chihuahua, Tabasco and Sinaloa – experienced reductions in their homicide and firearms crime rates. The only state not to experience such improvements was San Luis Potosí, though its homicide and firearms crime rates remained virtually unchanged from the previous year.

TABLE 1.2

Five most improved states, 2020–2021

Colima recorded the largest improvement in its overall score following five consecutive years of deteriorations.

STATE	CHANGE IN SCORE	2020 RANK	2021 RANK	CHANGE IN RANK
Colima	-0.340	31	30	↑ 1
Chihuahua	-0.239	29	27	↑ 2
Tabasco	-0.225	13	12	↑ 1
San Luis Potosí	-0.152	22	20	↑ 2
Sinaloa	-0.109	15	15	↔

Source: IEP

Note: A negative change is an improvement in peacefulness.



Colima

Rank: 30

MPI SCORE IN 2021

3.989


CHANGE IN RANK 2020-2021

↑ 1

CHANGE IN SCORE 20/21:

-0.340

CHANGE IN INDICATOR RATES, 2020-2021



In 2021, Colima had the largest improvement in peacefulness in Mexico, moving up one place to 30th in the rankings. This improvement follows five consecutive years of deteriorations.

Colima's overall improvement was driven primarily by reductions in its *homicide* and *firearms crime* scores. The homicide rate fell by 19.1 percent, while the firearms crime rate fell by 20.1 percent owing to similar reductions in both assaults and homicides with a firearm.

Despite the overall improvement in its peace score, Colima continues to be among the most violent states in Mexico. Each year from 2017 to 2019, the state recorded over 94 homicides per 100,000 people, consistently representing the highest rates in Mexico. While homicides dropped in both 2020 and 2021, Colima's rate of 65.7 homicides per 100,000 people in 2021 was still the third highest rate in the country.

The upsurge in violence in recent years is largely tied to fighting between drug cartels for control of Mexico's busiest port in the city of Manzanillo. The port is a key point of entry for precursor chemicals from Asia for synthesizing fentanyl and methamphetamines as well as for Colombian cocaine. Starting in 2016, a battle between the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG and Los Zetas for control of the port led Manzanillo and surrounding areas to record among the highest homicide rates in the country.¹³

Between 2016 and 2020, Manzanillo consistently placed in the top five municipalities with the highest homicide case rates in the country, and in most of those years, the nearby coastal municipality of Tecomán occupied the top spot.¹⁴ By 2021, the CJNG had largely consolidated control of both the port and the state,¹⁵ and this coincided with a relative drop in homicides in Manzanillo and across Colima. Despite this, Manzanillo still recorded the eighth highest homicide case rate in the country in 2021, with 103 homicide cases per 100,000 people.

Chihuahua

Rank: 27

MPI SCORE IN 2021

3.517


CHANGE IN RANK 2020-2021

↑ 2

CHANGE IN SCORE 20/21:

-0.239

CHANGE IN INDICATOR RATES, 2020-2021



Chihuahua had the second largest improvement in Mexico in 2021. It improved in four of the five MPI indicators, except for *violent crime*, and the improvement in its organized crime rate was the country's second largest.

Chihuahua's organized crime rate fell by 32.8 percent. This improvement was underpinned by three of the four *organized crime* sub-indicators: the rate of retail drug crimes dropped by 36.8 percent, while the major offenses and extortion rates fell by 10.1 and 5.7 percent, respectively. However, in contrast to the national trend, the kidnapping and human trafficking rate rose by 16 percent.

The state experienced a 9.7 percent improvement in its homicide rate and a 11.7 percent improvement in its firearms crime rate. This is significant given that the state reached a seven-year high in both categories in 2020, when homicides numbered 2,715, of which 69.2 percent were committed with a firearm.

The 2021 changes in Chihuahua's rates of organized crime, firearms crime and homicide may reflect long-term shifts in the state's organized criminal landscape, both in terms of who the dominant actors are and how they operate. Chihuahua has for decades represented one of Mexico's most important states for drug trafficking, owing to its vast size, its long border with the United States and its productive lands that are well suited to cultivating marijuana and opium poppies.¹⁶ As a result, it has been highly contested between rival criminal organizations. In the past decade the two main competitors have been the Sinaloa Cartel and the once-dominant Juárez Cartel, along with their respective factions and allies.¹⁷

For years, the epicenter of this violence was Ciudad Juárez. This is the site of a major border crossing into El Paso, Texas, and used to be referred to as the "murder capital of the world".¹⁸ However, with the legalization and decriminalization of marijuana in many parts of the United States as well as the growing preference for synthetic opioids over heroin, cartels have increasingly turned away from the trafficking of marijuana and heroin as their main sources of income. To compensate for this loss of revenue, cartels have expanded their operations into other activities, such as illegal logging in the southwest of the state. This is now a new focal point in the battle between the Sinaloa and Juárez cartels.¹⁹

Tabasco

Rank: 12

MPI SCORE IN 2021

CHANGE IN RANK 2020-2021


2.113

↑ 1

CHANGE IN SCORE 20/21:

-0.225

CHANGE IN INDICATOR RATES, 2020-2021



The state of Tabasco registered the third largest improvement in peacefulness in Mexico in 2021, marking its third consecutive year of improvement. Tabasco improved in every indicator except for *detention without a sentence*.

Tabasco's most significant improvement was in the *homicide* indicator. The homicide rate fell by 25.2 percent, equivalent to 150 fewer deaths than in 2020. This reduction was underpinned by a fall in homicides committed with a firearm, with the rate falling by 38.3 percent. However, while homicides with a firearm declined, the rate of assault with a firearm rose by 31.3 percent.

Organized crime also declined in Tabasco in 2021, with three of four sub-indicators improving. This was led by a 45.3 percent drop in the rate of retail drug crime and a 27.6 percent decline in the rate of kidnapping and human trafficking. Only the rate of major offenses increased, though even with this deterioration, Tabasco still had the second lowest major offenses rate in the country.

Tabasco's violent crime rate also improved in 2021, dropping by 14.2 percent. This improvement appears to be tied to continued reductions in mobility connected to the COVID-19 pandemic. For the second year in a row, Tabasco had the highest stay-home rates of any state in the country. According to Facebook mobility data,²⁰ an average of 25.2 percent of people in Tabasco did not leave their homes or immediate surroundings on a daily basis in 2021, compared to 32.7 percent in the period between March and December 2020.

Among *violent crime* sub-indicators, these low levels of mobility appear to have had the most significant impact on robberies, which are by far the most common form of crime experienced by people in Tabasco. According to 2021 survey data, 19.6 percent of households in Tabasco had members who had experienced at least one form of robbery in the previous 12 months, the fourth highest rate in the country.²¹ However, overall the robbery rate fell by 44 percent in 2021 and is down 65.5 percent from pre-pandemic levels.

Reductions in mobility appear to have had a more complex impact

on violent crime typically committed in private settings. In 2020, in contrast to the national trend, Tabasco reported lower rates of family violence and sexual assault. However, in 2021, both sub-indicators deteriorated notably, with the sexual assault rate increasing by 21.9 percent and the family violence rate increasing by 19.6 percent. Local authorities have cited various factors for the steep rise in such rates, including higher stay-home rates and the ongoing economic pressures on families brought on by the administrative responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.²²

San Luis Potosí

Rank: 20

MPI SCORE IN 2021

CHANGE IN RANK 2020-2021


2.730

↑ 2

CHANGE IN SCORE 20/21:

-0.152

CHANGE IN INDICATOR RATES, 2020-2021



San Luis Potosí had the fourth largest improvement in Mexico in 2021, a change in trend after five consecutive years of deteriorations. This improvement was driven almost entirely by reductions in *organized crime*, as its other crime indicators either deteriorated or remained virtually unchanged.

The improvement in *organized crime* was consistent across all sub-indicators in 2021. This was largely driven by the 39.5 percent reduction in the rate of major offenses. The rates of retail drug crimes and extortion each fell by over 20 percent, while kidnapping and human trafficking recorded a smaller improvement of 0.7 percent.


Despite this notable improvement in the major offenses sub-indicator, which includes federal drug trafficking crimes and crimes committed by three or more people, San Luis Potosí continues to have one of the highest rates of these offenses in the country. As with some other states in Central Mexico, San Luis Potosí functions as an important transit point for drugs moving into the United States. Its capital city is a major inland shipping hub where, for example, fentanyl produced in western states can be smuggled with other goods north of the border.²³

For this reason, San Luis Potosí represents a strategic location for organized criminal groups. While currently dominated by the CJNG,²⁴ the state also saw the expansion of several newer groups in 2021. According to recent analyses, three of the most important emerging organizations all have roots in the neighboring state of

Tamaulipas and arose as splinter groups of other cartels: the Talibanes and Old School Zetas both emerged out of the fragmentation of the once powerful Zetas, and Grupo Sombra emerged as a splinter of the Gulf Cartel.²⁵

The homicide rate remained virtually unchanged at 26.5 homicides per 100,000 people, with five more deaths recorded in the state in 2021 compared to 2020. Similarly, *firearms crime* deteriorated only marginally, with the rate of assaults with a firearm rising by 0.8 percent and the rate of homicides with a firearm rising by 1.1 percent.

Violent crime experienced the most significant deterioration of any indicator, with increases across all of its sub-indicators. The rates of assault, robbery, sexual assault and family violence rose by between 5.8 and 17.3 percent. This marks a return to previous four-year trends after they each declined for the first time in 2020.



Sinaloa recorded the fifth largest improvement in Mexico in 2021, marking its fourth consecutive year of improved peacefulness. The state experienced improvements in its firearms crime, homicide and detention without a sentence rates.

The most significant improvements occurred in the *homicide* and *firearms crime* indicators, with rates falling by 20.9 and 25.2 percent, respectively. Sinaloa had 163 fewer homicides in 2021 than in 2020 owing to reductions in the number of homicides committed with a firearm. Sinaloa is one of just eight states in Mexico for which the proportion of homicides committed with a firearm has decreased in the past seven years. In 2015, 82 percent of the state's homicides were committed with a firearm, but by 2021 that figure had fallen to 64.8 percent.

In contrast, Sinaloa's violent crime rate deteriorated by 15.3 percent, owing to increases across all sub-indicators. The rates of assault and robbery rose by 19.7 and 14.1 percent, respectively. Similarly, rates of sexual assault and family violence rose by 23.1 and 10.7 percent, respectively. In keeping with national trends, while the assault and robbery rates in Sinaloa have fluctuated

since 2015, the rates of sexual assault and family violence have consistently increased each year.

The organized crime rate deteriorated marginally in 2021, by 2.1 percent. Rates of retail drug crimes, kidnapping and human trafficking, and major offenses declined, while the rate of extortion increased. Despite this marginal deterioration, Sinaloa's organized crime rate has markedly improved since 2015, falling by 54.2 percent. In addition, fatalities arising from cartel clashes have been relatively limited compared to other states with high levels of organized criminal activity.

These developments coincide with the Sinaloa Cartel gaining large control of the state while continuing to conduct illicit activities.²⁶ This decrease in violence may have, in turn, led state authorities to reduce the amount of attention they give to identifying and disrupting other illicit activities that the cartel conducts.²⁷ Despite these recent reductions in violence, illicit activity remains a concern for peacefulness. In 2021 Sinaloa had the fifth highest rate of major organized crime offenses.

“

While the vast majority of states improved in peacefulness in 2021, the national score experienced only a marginal improvement. This reflects the degree to which violence in a minority of states is driving elevated levels of violence in Mexico.

”

DETERIORATIONS IN PEACEFULNESS

As with the most improved states, in comparison to previous years, the five Mexican states with the largest deteriorations all experienced relatively modest changes in score in 2021. As shown in Table 1.3, four out of the five states moved down only one place in the rankings. The remaining state, Nuevo León, fell three places, the largest rank change of any state.

Four of the five states that deteriorated the most in peacefulness also recorded the country's largest deteriorations in both homicide and firearms crime rates, in contrast to the national trend toward improvement. These states were Sonora, Zacatecas, Morelos and Michoacán. While Zacatecas registered the second largest deterioration

in overall score, its deteriorations in these categories were far greater than any other state.

The states that experienced the largest deteriorations in peacefulness stretch across most of Mexico, representing all but the eastern and southern regions of the country. Common to these diverse regions is the presence of rival criminal groups, which drive heightened levels of violence, particularly in contested territories within several dozen municipalities. In addition, all five states have witnessed an incursion of the CJNG in recent years and accounted for nearly a quarter of fatalities from cartel conflicts since 2015.²⁸

TABLE 1.3

Five states with the largest deteriorations, 2020–2021

Sonora had the largest deterioration in overall score, driven by a substantial increase in its homicide rate.

STATE	CHANGE IN SCORE	2020 RANK	2021 RANK	CHANGE IN RANK
Sonora	0.346	27	28	↓ 1
Zacatecas	0.294	30	31	↓ 1
Nuevo León	0.293	18	21	↓ 3
Morelos	0.241	25	26	↓ 1
Michoacán	0.187	24	25	↓ 1

Source: IEP

Note: A negative change is an improvement in peacefulness.



Sonora

Rank: 28

MPI SCORE IN 2021

3.524


CHANGE IN RANK 2020-2021

↓ 1

CHANGE IN SCORE 20/21:

0.346

CHANGE IN INDICATOR RATES, 2020-2021



In 2021, Sonora experienced the largest decline in peacefulness in Mexico. The state deteriorated across all indicators, except for *detention without a sentence*. The most significant change was in the *homicide* indicator, with the rate rising by 20.8 percent, equivalent to 1,975 deaths. Sonora's homicide rate of 63.5 per 100,000 people is now the fifth highest rate in the country.

While Sonora has historically experienced high levels of violence owing to the operations of drug trafficking organizations along its northern border with the United States, its current deterioration trend began three years ago. In 2018, the state was placed 12th in the overall rankings and has since fallen to 28th, marking the largest overall deterioration in peacefulness of any state in that period. In the same period, the state recorded the country's largest deterioration in violent crime rate, second largest deteriorations in homicide and firearms crime rates, and third largest deterioration in organized crime rate.

Sonora's post-2018 deteriorations largely coincide with shifts in its criminal landscape. Most notably, they align with the emergence of the Caborca Cartel, which was reportedly brought together in 2017 by Rafael Caro Quintero, a veteran drug lord who was controversially released from prison in 2013 after serving 28 years. Taking its name from the border municipality of Caborca, the cartel and its local gang affiliates have engaged in violent clashes with the Sinaloa Cartel and its allies for control of key drug trafficking corridors.²⁹

In addition, the rise in violence has been driven by infighting within the Sinaloa Cartel and increasing attempts by the CJNG to establish a foothold in Sonora.³⁰ The municipality of Cajeme, which lies in the southern part of state where the fighting between cartels has been most intense, had the fourth highest homicide case rate in the country last year, with 126 cases per 100,000 people.³¹ In Ciudad Obregón, the municipal seat of Cajeme, 95 percent of residents reported feeling unsafe at the end of 2021.³²

Zacatecas

Rank: 31

MPI SCORE IN 2021

4.227


CHANGE IN RANK 2020-2021

↓ 1

CHANGE IN SCORE 20/21:

0.294

CHANGE IN INDICATOR RATES, 2020-2021



Zacatecas experienced the second largest deterioration in Mexico in 2021, marking its sixth consecutive year of decline. Since 2015, Zacatecas has experienced the most drastic fall in peacefulness of any state, falling from 14th to 31st in the rankings. 2021 was the worst year since at least 2015 for Zacatecas across all indicators, except for *detention without a sentence*.

The continued deterioration was primarily driven by a 50.8 percent increase in its homicide rate, which now stands at 97.3 per 100,000 people, by far the highest rate in the country. The homicides were concentrated in a handful of municipalities, including the state's two largest cities, Zacatecas City and Fresnillo. In 2021, Fresnillo had a homicide case rate of 182 per 100,000 people, the second highest rate in the country.³³ By the end of the year, 96.8 percent of Fresnillo's residents reported feeling unsafe, the highest percentage of any major city in Mexico.³⁴

The principal reason that Fresnillo and the other parts of Zacatecas face such extreme levels of violence is because of their central location along drug trafficking routes. In the past several years, the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG, as well as a number of smaller criminal organizations, have been engaged in a battle for control of these routes, especially to transport fentanyl. Fentanyl often moves from labs in western states across the highways of Zacatecas before moving north to the United States.³⁵

In addition to the transnational movement of drugs, organized criminal activity in Zacatecas also targets the local population. Since 2019, Zacatecas has recorded the highest organized crime rate in the country, and this has been driven by the highest levels of extortion in the country. In 2021, it had an extortion rate of 495 offenses per 100,000 people, more than double the next highest rate. According to 2021 survey data, 6.2 percent of the population had been the victims of extortion in the previous 12 months, the second highest victimization rate in the country.³⁶

Shortly after the monthly homicides in the state reached an all-time high in September 2021, the federal government announced a special operation of security support for Zacatecas.

This entailed the deployment, in November 2021, of 4,699 army and National Guard personnel. These forces were positioned across the state, including at 245 strategic points along highways and other hotspots of criminal activity, as well as in municipalities where local security forces had been displaced by criminal groups.³⁷ While it is too early to assess the operation's impact, in the month that followed the deployment, homicides decreased by 25 percent across the state, which contrasts with trends from previous November-December periods.


Nuevo León **Rank: 21**

MPI SCORE IN 2021 **2.802**

CHANGE IN RANK 2020-2021 **↓ 3**

CHANGE IN SCORE 20/21: **0.293**

CHANGE IN INDICATOR RATES, 2020-2021



In 2021, Nuevo León posted the third largest deterioration in peacefulness in Mexico, falling from 18th to 21st in the rankings. This decline was driven by substantial deteriorations in *organized crime*, *homicide* and *violent crime*, while slight improvements were recorded in the *firearms crime* and *detention without a sentence* indicators.

The number of homicides rose by 17 percent to reach a rate of 18.8 per 100,000 people, the highest rate since at least 2015. The violent crime rate also rose by 17 percent, driven by increases in the rates of assault, sexual assault and family violence.

The organized crime rate experienced the largest increase of any indicator, climbing 37.9 percent. In this category, the most significant increase occurred in kidnapping and human trafficking, which rose by 76.4 percent. In 2021, state security authorities indicated that, for the five major criminal organizations that operate in the state, control of the trafficking of migrants had become a more significant point of conflict than drug trafficking.³⁸

Nuevo León, which borders the United States, has over the past decade been among the five states with highest number of cases of kidnapped migrants in the country, according to a report by the National Human Rights Commission / *Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos* (CNDH). Moreover, the report indicates that, between 2011 and 2020, rescues of trafficked and kidnapped migrants across the country rose 14-fold, with the most rescue operations taking place in Nuevo León.³⁹ In August 2021, for example, the government rescued 327 migrants in Cadereyta, Nuevo León, where smugglers were holding them in a warehouse.⁴⁰


Morelos **Rank: 26**

MPI SCORE IN 2021 **3.299**

CHANGE IN RANK 2020-2021 **↓ 1**

CHANGE IN SCORE 20/21: **0.241**

CHANGE IN INDICATOR RATES, 2020-2021



Morelos had the fourth largest deterioration in Mexico in 2021, dropping one place from the previous year to become the seventh least peaceful state in the country. This deterioration was driven almost exclusively by increases in the state's homicide rate, which rose by 22.9 percent, the second largest increase in the country, after Zacatecas.

Of the 1,189 homicides in the state in 2021, 71.8 percent were committed with a firearm, leading the firearms crime rate to also deteriorate, by 17.6 percent. *Violent crime* deteriorated moderately, led by a 12.6 percent increase in the sexual assault rate, while the *detention without a sentence* indicator experienced a minor deterioration of 0.2 percent.

In contrast to the national trend, *organized crime* experienced a slight improvement, driven by a 61.4 percent decline in the rate of kidnapping and human trafficking. Despite this, government officials have identified 11 criminal groups of varying sizes that were active in Morelos in 2021.⁴¹

With no single dominant group, there has been an intensification of battles for territorial control and a consequent rise in homicides.⁴² The Rojos, a splinter group of the now-disbanded Beltrán Leyva Cartel, previously held a dominant position. However, the 2019 arrest of its leader created a power vacuum that rival organizations, such as the CJNG and the Northeast Cartel, have sought to fill, including by forming alliances with local gangs.⁴³

As a result, Morelos had the sixth highest homicide rate of any state in 2021, with 57.6 homicides per 100,000 people. In 2021, 86.6 percent of residents of Morelos reported feeling that their state was unsafe, the second highest rate in the country.⁴⁴

Michoacán

Rank: 25

MPI SCORE IN 2021

CHANGE IN RANK 2020-2021


3.190

↓ 1

CHANGE IN SCORE 20/21:

0.187

CHANGE IN INDICATOR RATES, 2020-2021



The fifth largest deterioration in peacefulness occurred in Michoacán, which placed 25th in the rankings in 2021, down one spot from 2020. The state deteriorated across all indicators except for *detention without a sentence*, registering its worst homicide, violent crime, firearms crime and organized crime rates since at least 2015.

Michoacán's deterioration in peacefulness was primarily driven by increases in the *organized crime*, *homicide* and *firearms crimes* indicators. The homicide rate rose by 11.7 percent, leading to 2,762 total deaths, or 56.9 homicides per 100,000 people. The vast majority of these homicides, 82.6 percent, were committed with a firearm, representing the highest proportion of homicides committed with a firearm in Mexico. As a result, Michoacán recorded the second-highest *firearms crime* score in the country.

As with all states, most violence in Michoacán in 2021 was concentrated in specific hotspots. For example, the third largest

city in the state, Zamora, had a municipal homicide case rate of 193 per 100,000 people, the highest rate in the country in 2021.⁴⁵ Recent increases in violence were largely due to ongoing conflicts between rival armed groups, including the CJNG and *Cárteles Unidos*, a coalition of criminal organizations and groups that identify as self-defense forces that have come together to fight the advance of the CJNG into the area.⁴⁶

In addition to competition over territory for the production and trafficking of drugs, the disputes between criminal groups have increasingly centered on opportunities to extort Michoacán's highly profitable avocado and lime industries. These products have been targeted for extortion with greater frequency over the past decade.

Criminal groups have also forced workers to limit their working days in order to lower supply, thereby driving up prices and the profits that criminal groups reap. In 2021, such practices contributed to lime prices reaching unprecedented highs across the country.⁴⁷ Such practices also contributed to Michoacán registering a 25 percent increase in its organized crime rate in 2021. While the rates of kidnapping and human trafficking and major offenses declined, retail drug crime and extortion rates increased, with the number of extortions more than doubling.

“

Michoacán deteriorated across all indicators except for *detention without a sentence*, registering its worst homicide, violent crime, firearms crime and organized crime rates since at least 2015.

2 | TRENDS

KEY FINDINGS

- Mexico's peacefulness has deteriorated by 17.1 percent over the last seven years. However, in the past two years, peacefulness in the country has improved by 3.6 percent.
- Public health measures and stay-at-home orders implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic coincided with some of these improvements, with a large reduction in opportunistic crimes recorded in 2020.
- Despite some positive gains, many crime indicators are still much higher today than in 2015. The national homicide rate nearly doubled from 15.1 deaths per 100,000 people to 26.6 in 2021.
- Eight states recorded improvements in their homicide rates since 2015, while the remaining 24 deteriorated.
- Over two-thirds of homicides since 2015 have been the result of gun violence. In 2021, 71.3 percent of male homicides and 56.8 percent of female homicides were committed with a firearm.
- The organized crime rate has deteriorated by 48.1 percent since 2015, attributed mainly to a 139 percent increase in retail drug crimes.
- In recent years, shifts in the organized criminal landscape have been characterized by the rapid and violent territorial expansion of certain larger cartels, proliferation of smaller crime groups and diversification of criminal activity.
- Organized criminal activity continues to drive high levels of homicide in Mexico. The states that recorded the largest deteriorations in their homicide rates were home to ongoing conflicts between cartels. Fatalities attributed to cartel conflicts rose from 669 in 2006 to over 16,000 in 2020.
- The violent crime rate increased by 16.2 percent from 2015 to 2021, driven by widespread deteriorations in the rates of family violence and sexual assault.
- With the exception of 2020, the *detention without a sentence* indicator has improved in each of the past seven years. There were roughly 79,000 detainees without a sentence in 2021, compared to roughly 80,000 in 2015.
- Zacatecas recorded the largest overall deterioration in peacefulness between 2015 and 2021, followed by Guanajuato, Colima, Baja California and Michoacán.
- Sinaloa has experienced the largest overall improvement over the last seven years, followed by Tamaulipas, Guerrero, Coahuila and Yucatán.




SEVEN-YEAR TRENDS

Since 2015, peacefulness in Mexico has deteriorated by 17.1 percent. However, this overall deterioration occurred between 2015 and 2019. In the past two years, peacefulness in the country has improved, marking a shift from previous years (Figure 2.1). This continued improvement has been driven primarily by reductions in *homicide* and *firearms crime* scores. The gap between the most and least peaceful states has consistently widened over the past seven years, suggesting that violence has become more concentrated in the country.

The largest single year-on-year deterioration occurred in 2017, when peacefulness fell by 10.2 percent. In subsequent years, rates of deterioration gradually slowed and in 2020 this trend reversed, with Mexico registering an improvement in peacefulness. A further improvement, albeit marginal, was recorded in 2021. However, the improvements of the past two years have been minor in comparison to the deteriorations experienced before them, and may have been partly influenced by the administrative responses to the COVID-19 pandemic (Box 2.1).

FIGURE 2.1
Annual changes in overall peacefulness, 2015–2021

Peacefulness improved by 0.2 percent in 2021, marking the second year of consecutive improvements.



Source: IEP



The improvements of the past two years have been minor in comparison to the deteriorations experienced before them, and may have been partly influenced by the administrative responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

BOX 2.1

Trends in violence and the COVID-19 pandemic in Mexico

The improvement in peacefulness over the past two years may partly reflect the impacts of public health measures and stay-at-home orders implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. These measures significantly reduced mobility and therefore reduced opportunities for criminal groups to target victims in public. As such, crimes typically associated with people's everyday movements, such as robberies, assaults, kidnappings and extortion, all experienced notable reductions in 2020. However, as measures have been lifted and normal activities have resumed, many of these have rebounded to pre-pandemic levels in 2021.

Conversely, specific types of interpersonal violence, such as family violence and sexual assault, increased during the pandemic. In the case of family violence, research indicates that the stay-at-home orders may have reduced victims' willingness and ability to report the assaults. For example, in Mexico City, while reported cases of family violence fell in April 2020, the first full month of lockdown measures, there was a spike in the number of family violence calls to the capital's emergency hotline for women.¹ Although official reports declined during the first few months of stay-at-home measures, by the end of 2020 the rates of family violence and sexual assault had returned to pre-pandemic levels, and in 2021, both indicators recorded steep increases.

Homicide and *firearms crime* were mostly unaffected by the lockdowns.² The monthly rates of homicide and firearms crimes peaked in July 2018 and have been steadily declining since. In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that certain types of organized criminal activity, such as local and international drug trafficking and retail drug crimes, were also largely unchanged.³

The substantial deterioration in peacefulness over the last seven years has primarily been driven by deteriorations in the *homicide* and *firearms crime* scores, as shown in Figure 2.2. *Firearms crime* recorded the largest deterioration of all indicators, with its rate increasing by 77.9 percent. In 2015, 57.4 percent of homicides were committed with a firearm; by 2021, this figure stood at 68 percent. However, both the absolute number of firearms homicides and the proportion of homicides committed with a firearm have fallen since peaking in 2019. Moreover, the rate of firearms assaults has experienced an especially significant decline since peaking in 2019, falling by 22.2 percent in the past two years.

Overall, the homicide rate has risen by 76.3 percent since 2015. Mexico has recorded more than 34,000 homicides in each of the past four years, and the country's homicide rate of 26.6 deaths per 100,000 people is the eighth highest rate in the world.⁴ However, since peaking in 2019, Mexico's homicide rate has improved by 5.6 percent.

After *firearms crime* and *homicide*, the indicator that has experienced the most significant deterioration since 2015 is *violent crime*. While the firearms crime and homicide rates fell in both 2020 and 2021, the violent crime rate fell in 2020, but then largely rebounded in 2021.

The sub-indicators of *violent crime* show diverging patterns. Specifically, both the assault rate and the robbery rate have fluctuated over the past seven years. The national assault rate has hovered between about 500 and 600 cases per 100,000 people each year, while the national robbery rate has registered between 900 and 1,400 cases per 100,000. In contrast, the sexual assault rate and the family violence rate have consistently increased in each of the past seven years, leading to a near doubling of rates for both.

The *organized crime* indicator comprises four types of criminal acts: major organized crime offences, kidnapping and human trafficking, extortion and retail drug crimes. The organized crime rate – which captures the number of these acts recorded per 100,000 people – has increased by 48.1 percent since 2015.

However, the *organized crime* score has deteriorated only marginally over the same period – by 2.4 percent. This difference is because the two activities that have the highest weights in the *organized crime* score – kidnapping and human trafficking and major offenses – have declined since 2015. In contrast, the rates of crimes with lower weights – extortion and retail drug crimes – have risen substantially. The crimes of kidnapping and human trafficking and major offenses are more heavily weighted because they reflect more severe acts of violence and provide a stronger indication of the presence of major criminal organizations.

Detention without a sentence was the only indicator to register an improvement since 2015, with its score having improved by eight percent. In contrast to the other indicators, it is also the only indicator to have experienced a net deterioration since 2019. In 2020, the partial shutdown of criminal courts during the first several months of the COVID-19 pandemic and the expansion of mandatory pre-trial detention contributed to a rise in the number of unsentenced detainees for the first time since 2015. As of 2021, there were roughly 79,000 detainees without a sentence, up from about 60,000 in 2019 but down from about 80,000 in 2015.


Since 2015, 22 states have deteriorated in peacefulness, while ten have improved. The largest improvement was recorded in Sinaloa, where peacefulness improved by 23.8 percent. This was driven by significant reductions in all of the state's *organized crime* sub-indicators. After Sinaloa, the states to register the largest improvements in peacefulness in the past seven years were Tamaulipas, Guerrero, Coahuila, and Yucatán.

In contrast, Zacatecas recorded the largest deterioration in peacefulness between 2015 and 2021, deteriorating by 97.1 percent. Guanajuato, Colima, Baja California and Michoacán recorded the next largest deteriorations, with declines in peacefulness ranging from 40.2 to 76.7 percent. All five states recorded substantial increases in their *homicide* and *firearms crime* scores.

FIGURE 2.2

Indexed trend in peacefulness by indicator, 2015–2021

The *firearms crime* and *homicide* indicators recorded the largest deteriorations since 2015. The only indicator to improve was *detention without a sentence*.



Source: IEP



HOMICIDE

Since 2015, the national homicide rate has increased by 76.3 percent, with the total number of homicides over this seven-year period reaching 211,000. Sharp increases in homicides were recorded between 2015 and 2019. However, in the past two years, more states have registered improvements than deteriorations. The national homicide rate improved by 4.3 percent in 2021 relative to the previous year, marking the largest year-on-year improvement since 2014.

Despite recent improvements, Mexico's homicide rate remains near historical highs, at 26.6 deaths per 100,000 people, resulting in over 34,000 victims. This equates to 94 homicides per day on average in 2021. Mexico's homicide rate is also high by international standards, although it is broadly aligned with other large Latin American nations such as Brazil and Colombia.

Figure 2.3 depicts the national trend using monthly data. The monthly homicide rate peaked in July 2018 at 2.5 deaths per 100,000 people. The relative leveling off after this point represents a change from the earlier pattern of steady monthly increases. This change in trend began more than a year and a half before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The overall increase in Mexico's homicide rate in the last seven years can be linked to organized criminal activity.⁵ In particular, clashes between criminal groups, which compete for territory, markets and access to strategic trafficking routes, have led to pervasive insecurity throughout the country.⁶

The states that recorded the largest deteriorations in their homicide rate since 2015 were home to ongoing conflicts either between criminal organizations, or between rival factions within a single organization. Numerous analyses have attempted to measure the extent of organized crime-related homicides, with

estimates suggesting that approximately two-thirds of homicides could be attributed to organized crime in 2021, an increase from roughly 44 percent in 2015.⁷

CHANGES IN HOMICIDE BY STATE, 2015–2021

In the past seven years, eight states recorded improvements in their homicide rate, while 24 deteriorated.


Table 2.1 details the number of states with a homicide rate in the low, moderate, high or extreme category by year. In 2015, a quarter of Mexico's states had relatively low homicide rates. By 2021, just four remained low, while eight had reached a level considered extreme.

The categories are based on the distribution of homicide rates in 2015, when they were much lower. In this analysis, a low homicide rate is considered less than 7.6 per 100,000 people. A moderate rate is between 7.6 and 13.4, while a rate of 13.5 to 48.8 is classified as high. An extreme homicide rate is greater than 48.9 homicides per 100,000 people. At these thresholds, only two countries – El Salvador and Venezuela – have homicide rates that would fall within the extreme classification, while three-quarters of the countries of the world would fall into the low classification. For comparison, most European countries have a homicide rate below 1.5 while the homicide rate for the US is five.

FIGURE 2.3

Homicide rate, 2015–2021

The monthly homicide rate peaked in July 2018 at 2.5 deaths per 100,000 people.



Source: SESNSP

KEY FINDINGS

HOMICIDE

Eight states recorded improvements in their homicide rates since 2015, while the remaining 24 deteriorated.



Over two-thirds of homicides since 2015 have been the result of gun violence. In 2021, 71.3 percent of male homicides and 56.8 percent of female homicides were committed with a firearm.

TABLE 2.1

Number of Mexican states by homicide level, 2015–2021

A quarter of Mexican states recorded an extreme homicide rate in 2021.

	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	EXTREME
2015	8	8	15	1
2016	6	10	14	2
2017	3	8	15	6
2018	2	7	18	5
2019	2	8	16	6
2020	2	8	15	7
2021	4	7	13	8

Source: SESNSP; IEP calculations

Yucatán, Coahuila, Aguascalientes and Baja California Sur all recorded a low homicide rate in 2021. Both Yucatán and Aguascalientes have consistently recorded low homicide rates for the last seven years. Yucatán had the lowest homicide rate in Mexico, at 2.1 deaths per 100,000 people. However, this is the first time Coahuila and Baja California Sur have recorded a low homicide rate, with Coahuila recording a 35.1 percent improvement in 2021.

In 2017, violence in Baja California Sur peaked and the state recorded an extreme homicide rate of 104 deaths per 100,000 people, the second highest homicide rate in the country at the time. This surge in violence coincided with the imprisonment and extradition of Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, the leader of the Sinaloa Cartel. The resulting power vacuum led to intense fighting in 2017, between factions of the Sinaloa Cartel but also between the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel / *Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación* (CJNG).⁸ However, in the last four years, the homicide rate in Baja California Sur has declined by 93.2 percent. This follows a decline in the state's organized crime rate and a fall in the number of fatalities attributed to clashes between the CJNG and Sinaloa Cartel.⁹

The eight states recording extreme homicide rates in 2021 were: Zacatecas, Baja California, Colima, Chihuahua, Sonora, Morelos, Michoacán and Guanajuato. All of these states, except Morelos, also recorded an extreme homicide rate in 2020. In Morelos, the homicide rate has more than doubled in the last seven years, from 26.4 per 100,000 people in 2015 to 57.6 in 2021. Morelos' homicide rate increased by 22.9 percent in the last year alone, marking the second-highest increase of any state. This increase has largely been driven by a sharp rise in gun violence, and the proportion of homicides committed with a firearm rose from 41 percent in 2015 to nearly 72 percent in 2021.

In 2021, Zacatecas recorded the highest homicide rate in the country for the first time. The rise in Zacatecas' homicide rate has been substantial in the last seven years, increasing from 17.8 deaths per 100,000 people in 2015 to 97.3 in 2021, a fivefold increase. In the last year alone, the homicide rate increased by 50.8 percent, by far the largest increase in the country. Zacatecas lies in a strategic location for organized crime groups and recent violence can be attributed to competition for control of the fentanyl trade and key trafficking routes within the state that connect the Pacific with the US-Mexico border.¹⁰ In particular, recent clashes between the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel, which previously dominated the region, are thought to be a key contributor to the sharp increases in homicides.¹¹

MUNICIPAL TRENDS IN HOMICIDE

High levels of violence continue to be driven by a handful of urban areas. In 2021, approximately half of all homicide cases were recorded in just 50 of Mexico's more than 2,450 municipalities.


Figure 2.4 illustrates the number of homicide cases across Mexico's municipalities. Mexico's National System for Public Security / *Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública* (SESNSP) only reports municipal-level homicide data by the number of cases investigated, not by the number of individual victims. The number of individual victims is used in the MPI to calculate state-level and national homicide rates.

Spatial analysis of homicide trends at the municipal level found that approximately 42 percent of Mexico's population live in

FIGURE 2.4

Municipal homicide cases, 2021

Approximately half of all homicide cases were recorded in just 50 of Mexico's more than 2,450 municipalities.



Source: SENS

municipalities that record large numbers of homicides and are also surrounded by municipalities with high homicide counts. Looking at these localized patterns of violence underscores the importance of strategies employed by local governments as well as community involvement in building peace.

Unsurprisingly, Mexico's least peaceful states are home to many of its least peaceful municipalities. However, within larger states substantial differences in levels of violence can be found. For example, the municipality of Cajeme in Sonora, home of Ciudad Obregón, recorded 604 homicide cases in 2021, the fourth highest number of any municipality. This equates to a homicide case rate of 126 per 100,000 people, which was the third highest rate of any municipality. In contrast, the municipality of Navojoa, which shares a border with Cajeme, had just 13 homicide cases in 2021, equivalent to 7.1 cases per 100,000 people.

TABLE 2.2

Ten municipalities with the highest homicide cases, 2021

These ten municipalities accounted for almost one-quarter of all homicide cases in Mexico.

RANK	CITY	STATE	HOMICIDE CASES	
			NUMBER	NUMBER PER 100,00 PEOPLE
1	Tijuana	Baja California	1,770	95
2	Juárez	Chihuahua	1,235	82
3	León	Guanajuato	711	44
4	Ciudad Obregón	Sonora	604	126
5	Acapulco de Juárez	Guerrero	445	51
6	Fresnillo	Zacatecas	429	182
7	Celaya	Guanajuato	413	79
8	Guadalajara	Jalisco	412	26
9	Zamora	Michoacán	391	193
10	Culiacán	Sinaloa	350	35

Source: SESNSP; IEP calculations

TABLE 2.3

Homicides by sex, 2015–2021

The number of killings identified as femicides has more than doubled between 2015 and 2021.

YEAR	TOTAL HOMICIDES	MALE HOMICIDES	FEMALE HOMICIDES	% MALE	% FEMALE	FEMICIDES	% FEMALE HOMICIDES IDENTIFIED AS FEMICIDES
2015	17,319	15,158	2,161	87.5%	12.5%	427	19.8%
2016	22,842	20,006	2,836	87.6%	12.4%	647	22.8%
2017	29,199	25,898	3,301	88.7%	11.3%	766	23.2%
2018	34,098	30,420	3,678	89.2%	10.8%	917	24.9%
2019	34,835	30,995	3,840	89.0%	11.0%	973	25.3%
2020	34,630	30,860	3,770	89.1%	10.9%	978	25.9%
2021	33,360	29,610	3,750	88.8%	11.2%	1,004	26.8%
% Change, 2015–2021	93%	95%	74%	-	-	135%	-

Source: SESNSP; IEP calculations

Note: Female homicides includes femicides. Total homicides exclude homicides where the sex of the victim is unknown.

Table 2.2 lists the ten municipalities with the highest number of homicide cases in 2021. Collectively, these ten municipalities accounted for 23.1 percent of all homicide cases in Mexico. Tijuana, located along the US-Mexico border in Baja California, recorded 1,770 homicide cases, the most of any municipality. This equates to a homicide case rate of 95 per 100,000 people. Since 2015, the city of Tijuana has recorded over 11,000 homicide cases, accounting for nearly three-quarters of all homicide cases in Baja California in the past seven years. The number of homicide cases in Tijuana spiked in 2018 at 2,253, before falling by 21.4 percent in the past three years.

As Tijuana is the site of a major border crossing into the United States and represents a highly strategic hub for the smuggling of drugs, people and guns, the city has had a long history of violence, though certain periods have been characterized by relative levels of peace. The dramatic rise in homicides in recent years has been attributed to renewed hostilities between remnants of the once dominant Tijuana Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel, which a decade prior had established primary control of the city's criminal landscape. Allied with the CJNG, the Tijuana New Generation Cartel has sought to retake this landscape and its associated illicit rackets, leading to a violent struggle with the Sinaloa Cartel.¹²

HOMICIDE RATES BY SEX

Men are much more likely than women to be victims of homicide in Mexico, accounting for nearly 88 percent of homicide victims in 2021.¹³ Male homicides can be linked to organized crime trends, with a strong positive relationship between organized crime, gun violence and male homicide.

Conversely, female deaths are more likely to be associated with intimate partner violence.^{14,15} According to available data, nearly one in five female homicides occur in the home, compared to one in 13 for male homicides.¹⁶ Looking at the dynamics of homicides by sex offers further insight into the factors driving violence, and highlights the necessity for tailored approaches to address distinct patterns of violence affecting men and women in Mexico.

Table 2.3 shows that since 2015 male homicides have increased by 95 percent, a larger increase than for female homicides.

Femicides, defined in Mexican law as the murder of a woman for gender-based reasons (Box 2.2), also rose significantly in this period, from 427 reported victims in 2015 to 1,004 in 2021, marking a 135 percent increase. While femicides are usually included in female homicide figures, not all female homicides can be considered femicides. At present, about one in four female

BOX 2.2

Femicide in Mexico

Femicide is defined as the criminal deprivation of the life of a female victim for reasons based on gender.¹⁷ The murder of a woman or girl is considered gender based and included in femicide statistics when one of seven criteria is met, including evidence of sexual violence prior to the victim's death; a sentimental, affective or trusting relationship with the perpetrator; or the victim's body being displayed in public.¹⁸

The number of femicides reported in Mexico has grown rapidly over the past seven years. While they represented 19.8 percent of female homicides in 2015, this proportion had grown to 26.8 percent by 2021. As a relatively new crime category that requires added levels of investigation and analysis to identify, femicides have not been uniformly classified as such by different law enforcement institutions since the category's introduction. It is therefore difficult to determine with certainty the true number of femicides in Mexico over time.¹⁹ The recorded rise in reported femicides is in line, however, with increases in recorded cases of family violence and sexual assault in Mexico.²⁰

homicides in Mexico are identified as femicides. In this analysis, femicide data are presented as a subset of female homicide to assess the different trends and dynamics of reported femicides.

Figure 2.5 shows the composition of the types of weapons used in homicides in 2021. Firearms were the leading cause of death for both male and female homicide victims. Between 2015 and 2021,

the absolute and relative numbers of firearms homicides increased substantially for men and women. The total number of male victims of homicides with a firearm increased by 229 percent, while the total number of female victims increased by 261 percent. During the same period, the proportion of male homicides committed with a firearm rose from 60.9 percent to 71.3 percent, while the proportion of female firearm homicides rose from 37.8 percent to 56.8 percent.


These numbers show that in the past seven years, guns have become the primary means of homicide for both men and women in Mexico. The same cannot be said, however, for femicide victims, who are more likely to be killed by "other means". Though official data do not provide additional detail, these cases likely include beatings and strangulations.²¹ Knives were used in 23 percent of femicides, while firearms deaths accounted for 21 percent of femicides. While femicide is often discussed in the context of Mexico's increasing homicide rate, there is a weak statistical relationship between femicide and organized crime ($r=0.09$) and between femicide and gun violence ($r=0.24$). This suggests that femicide is a national issue that is related to, but not dependent on, the upsurge of violence that has driven high levels of male and female homicide in the past seven years.

It is also important to assess differences in the age profiles of male and female homicide victims and femicide victims. Of the three categories, victims of femicide are more likely to be minors (those under 18 years of age), accounting for 11.6 percent of all victims. In contrast, minors account for 6.9 percent of total female homicides and 3.6 percent of male homicides.

Moreover, over the past seven years, the killing of minors has been on the rise for both girls and boys. Between 2015 and 2021, the number of girls killed rose from 243 to 275, with the number of such killings identified as femicides more than doubling in that time. As for boys, 574 were killed in 2015 and 911 were killed in 2021, a 58.7 percent increase. In recent years, the upsurge of killings of minors as well as young adults has become so significant that homicide has become the leading cause of death of Mexican males and females aged 15 to 35.²²

FIGURE 2.5
Homicides by weapon and sex, 2021

The vast majority of male homicides are carried out with a firearm, whereas femicide victims are more likely to be killed by other means.



Source: SESNSP
Note: Excludes homicides in which the sex of the victim is unknown; female homicides includes femicides. Percentage of victims killed by unspecified means is not displayed.

VIOLENCE AGAINST POLICE, POLITICIANS AND JOURNALISTS

Targeted assassinations are common in Mexico, with the country experiencing increased violence toward security forces, political figures and journalists. Table 2.4 shows the number of homicides of police officers, politicians and political candidates across Mexico. The majority – 52 percent – of police homicides in 2021 were municipal police officers, followed by state police, at 39 percent, and federal police, at nine percent.

In 2021, Guanajuato recorded the highest number of police homicides, with 54 officers killed. This marked the fourth consecutive year that Guanajuato recorded the most police deaths;²³ however, the figure declined by 35.7 percent from 2020. Violence against police in Guanajuato has been attributed to cartel violence, as the state is home to ongoing turf wars between the CJNG, remnants of the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel and other local gangs backed by the Sinaloa Cartel. Reports indicate that the CJNG has targeted state police forces in Guanajuato and abducted several members of an elite police force to obtain the identity and addresses of other officers who are then killed in their homes.²⁴

Violence against politicians and political candidates escalated in the lead-up to Mexico's midterm elections in June 2021. According to data collected by Etellekt Consultores, 102 politicians and candidates were killed between September 2020 and early June 2021.

While fewer political assassinations were recorded in the 2020-2021 election period compared to the 2018 election, the number of non-fatal attacks against politicians and candidates increased. From September 2020 to early June 2021, there were 1,066 reported attacks on politicians and candidates, a 37.7 percent increase from the previous election period. Attacks were widespread, occurring in 525 municipalities, compared to 440 municipalities in 2017-2018.²⁵ According to Noria Research, 55 percent of all attacks were directed towards mayoral figures, including serving mayors, candidates and pre-candidates, as well as ex-mayors and ex-mayoral candidates.²⁶

Of the total 102 politicians and candidates who were killed across Mexico, 76 percent were members of the opposition, meaning they belonged to parties other than that of the state governor. At the local level, the relative danger to opposition figures was even greater, with 90 percent of assassinated politicians and candidates belonging to a party other than that of the mayor.

Across parties, the largest share of victims was from the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), with 18 politicians and candidates killed. This was followed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the National Renovation Movement (MORENA), each with 14 victims.²⁷

Mexico remains one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a journalist.²⁸ The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) recorded 142 journalist and media worker assassinations in Mexico since 1994, with most of these murders remaining unpunished.²⁹

The number of journalists and media workers killed peaked in 2019, with 11 deaths recorded, and remained consistent in 2020 and 2021 with nine deaths recorded in each year. However, within just the first three months of 2022, the number of journalists killed in Mexico nearly came to match the previous years' totals – between January and March, seven journalists and media workers were killed.³⁰

Journalists are frequently targeted because criminal organizations seek to dissuade media professionals from investigating and

TABLE 2.4

Homicides of police officers, politicians and political candidates, 2021

More than 400 police officers and 102 politicians or political candidates were killed in 2021.

STATE	POLICE HOMICIDES	POLITICAL HOMICIDES*
Guanajuato	54	8
México	47	5
Zacatecas	36	1
Veracruz	30	18
Chihuahua	27	2
Guerrero	26	8
Jalisco	25	4
Michoacán	20	4
Baja California	15	6
Puebla	14	4
Mexico City	13	0
Sonora	12	1
Oaxaca	11	11
San Luis Potosí	10	3
Nuevo León	10	1
Sinaloa	8	1
Colima	8	0
Tabasco	7	1
Morelos	5	5
Quintana Roo	5	2
Chiapas	3	12
Aguascalientes	2	0
Durango	2	0
Nayarit	2	0
Baja California Sur	2	0
Tlaxcala	1	0
Yucatán	1	0
Hidalgo	1	2
Querétaro	1	1
Coahuila	1	0
Tamaulipas	1	2
Campeche	1	0
National	401	102

Source: Causa en Común; Etellekt Consultores.

Note: *Data year refers to 7 September 2020–6 June 2021.

publicizing their operations and crimes. Based on the available data, most journalists killed in the past few decades have covered topics such as crime, corruption and politics.³¹ The increase in violence has led to public protest, with journalists demanding greater protection from the Mexican government and calling for an end to the high levels of impunity for journalist murders.³²

MISSING PERSONS

The homicide rate in Mexico is most likely underestimated. There are large numbers of missing persons in Mexico, a proportion of which may have been victims of homicide. Government estimates of the number of disappeared people in Mexico has fluctuated widely over time, particularly of those who are missing due to possible homicide.³³


The Mexican government has made efforts to accurately assess the number of missing and disappeared people in the country and in 2017 established a National Search Commission / *Comisión*

Nacional de Búsqueda (CNB). The Commission has recorded over 98,000 missing persons, with the vast majority having disappeared since 2006, the beginning of the war on drugs.³⁴ Since 2000, roughly 90 percent have been of Mexican nationality, while approximately 10 percent are either foreigners or of unknown origin, likely migrants. In addition, the vast majority of those missing are men, accounting for over three-quarters of all disappearances. Figure 2.6 displays the annual number of people recorded as missing or disappeared since 2000. The number of people reported missing reached a new high in 2021, at over 9,600. This was this highest year on record for women and the second highest year on record for men.

FIGURE 2.6

Number of reported missing and disappeared persons, by sex, 2000–2021

In 2021, Mexico had its highest ever number of reported cases of missing persons.



Source: CNB

Note: Data correct as of 1 April 2022.



FIREARMS CRIME

In the past seven years, more than 141,000 people have been killed with a gun in Mexico, representing two-thirds of the more than 211,000 total homicides. Between 2015 and 2021, the rate of homicide with a firearm rose by 109 percent, and the proportion of homicides committed with a firearm rose from 57.4 percent to 68 percent. The rate of assault with a firearm also increased, albeit less substantially, by 32.9 percent.

The expansion of organized criminal activity has driven the rise of gun violence across Mexico. While state organized crime rates showed a moderate correlation with firearms crime rates ($r=0.28$) in 2015, by 2021 the correlation had become substantial ($r=0.63$), as shown in Figure 2.7. The state with the lowest organized crime rate in 2021, Yucatán, also had the lowest firearms crime rate, while the state with the country's highest organized crime rate, Zacatecas, also had the highest firearms crime rate. This is largely because gun violence tends to be most intense in states where territory and routes key to drug trafficking and other illicit rackets are in dispute between multiple criminal organizations. In addition to Zacatecas, this is also the case in Baja California and Guanajuato, which in 2021 both figured among the five worst performing states for organized crime rates as well as firearms crime rates.

According to multiple sources, most guns used in violence in Mexico are illegally imported.³⁵ While the exact number of guns arriving illegally is unknown, two recent investigations by the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives of guns


recovered at crime scenes in Mexico both found that 70 percent came from the United States, compared to about 17 percent of non-US origin and 12-13 percent of unknown origin.³⁶ In 2021, it was estimated that more than half a million guns are trafficked from the United States into Mexico each year.³⁷

Despite these long-term trends, the firearms crime rate – which comprises homicides committed with a firearm and assaults committed with a firearm – improved in 2021 for the second year in a row. This was driven by a 6.2 percent decline in homicides with a firearm and a 6.1 percent decline in assault with a firearm. Figure 2.8 highlights the national monthly trends in the firearms crime rate from 2015 to 2021.

While the national firearms crime rate has slowed down and experienced a modest reversal in the last several years, it remains significantly higher than it was seven years ago, with 26 cases per 100,000 people in 2021, compared to 14.6 cases per 100,000 people in 2015. Only eight states experienced improvements in their firearms crime rates in this period, compared with 24 that experienced deteriorations.

FIGURE 2.7
Firearms crime rates vs. organized crime rates in Mexico, 2021

The states with the highest organized crime rates tend to also have the highest firearms crime rates.



Source: SESNSP; IEP calculations

KEY FINDINGS

FIREARMS CRIME



The state with the lowest organized crime rate in 2021, Yucatán, also had the lowest firearms crime rate, while the state with the country's highest organized crime rate, Zacatecas, also had the highest firearms crime rate.


In 2021, for the fifth year in a row, Yucatán had the lowest firearms crime rate in the country, recording a rate of 0.7 firearms crimes per 100,000 people. Since 2015, Baja California Sur has recorded the largest improvement in firearms crimes rate of any state, falling by 81.5 percent. This improvement has been driven by an 88 percent decline in its rate of homicide with a firearm.

In 2021, Zacatecas had the highest firearms crime rate in the country, with 83.2 cases per 100,000 people. This is more than a

fourfold increase from its rate of 19.2 cases per 100,000 people in 2015. Quintana Roo registered the largest deterioration in homicide with a firearm, with its rate increasing from two to 25.3 firearms homicides per 100,000 people. San Luis Potosí had the largest deterioration in assault with a firearm, with its rate increasing from 1.2 to 9.3 firearms assaults per 100,000 people between 2015 and 2021.

FIGURE 2.8
Trends in gun violence, 2015–2021

The rate of firearms crime has increased by 77.9 percent since 2015.



Source: SESNSP



While the national firearms crime rate has slowed down and experienced a modest reversal in the last several years, it remains significantly higher than it was seven years ago, with 26 cases per 100,000 people in 2021, compared to 14.6 cases per 100,000 people in 2015.



VIOLENT CRIME

Over the past seven years, Mexico's violent crime rate has increased by 16.2 percent, driven by near country-wide deteriorations in the rates of family violence and sexual assault. While the national violent crime rate declined in 2020, in part owing to disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, it largely rebounded in 2021, though it still remained slightly below its pre-pandemic levels.

The *violent crime* indicator consists of four sub-indicators: assault, family violence, robbery and sexual assault. Between 2015 and 2021, assault and robbery rates improved modestly, recording net declines of 6.9 and eight percent, respectively, while sexual assault and family violence rates deteriorated substantially, both by over 90 percent. Moreover, while assault and robbery rates have not changed substantially since 2015, sexual assault and family violence rates have consistently increased each year. The divergence in the two sets of rates is shown in Figure 2.9.

Since 2015, 11 states recorded improvements in their overall violent crime rates, while 21 states deteriorated. Yucatán recorded the largest improvement in violent crime in that period, while Oaxaca recorded the largest deterioration. Yucatán, which is Mexico's most peaceful state, experienced the largest improvements in three of the four violent crime sub-indicators between 2015 and 2021, resulting in an 83.8 percent improvement in its overall violent crime rate.

In contrast, Oaxaca recorded a sevenfold increase in its violent crime rate between 2015 and 2021. It experienced the largest deteriorations in assault and robbery rates and the second largest


deteriorations in family violence and sexual assault rates. As a result, Oaxaca went from having the second lowest violent crime rate in the country in 2015 to the 19th lowest rate in 2021.

While Oaxaca has recorded the biggest deterioration in violent crime rates since 2015, the worst rates overall have consistently been in the Greater Mexico City area and surrounding states. In five of the past seven years, the state of México has had the highest violent crime rate in the country, while in the remaining two years the top spot was held by Mexico City itself or the adjacent state of Morelos. Moreover, in each of the past seven years, the state of México has had the country's highest assault rate and either the first or second highest robbery rate. According to 2021 survey data, the state of México and Mexico City have by far the highest rates of people experiencing robberies and assaults on the street or public transport. On average, 13.8 percent of people in the state of México and 11.6 percent of people in Mexico City were victimized by such crimes in the previous 12 months, in each case more than twice the national average.³⁸

According to 2021 survey data, robbery is the most common type of crime experienced by people in Mexico, representing 44.3

FIGURE 2.9
Indexed change in violent crime rates, 2015–2021

The annual rates of family violence and sexual assault have nearly doubled since 2015, while the rates of assault and robbery have improved slightly.



Source: SESNSP; IEP calculations

Note: This figure shows the three-month moving average of the indexed trend.

percent of all crimes committed.³⁹ Nearly 16 percent of households had members who were the victims of at least one robbery in the previous 12 months.⁴⁰ Among types of robbery, those occurring in the street or on public transport represent just over half, or 50.8 percent, of all robberies committed. Of these, 54 percent occurred in street, 33 percent occurred on public transport and 13 percent occurred in some other sort of public space.⁴¹ Notwithstanding their high incidence, robberies across the country have fallen markedly since peaking in 2018. That year, the national rate stood at 1,368 per 100,000 people. It has since declined by 31.1 percent to 943 per 100,000 in 2021.

In contrast to robbery and assault rates, which in the past seven years have both fallen in a slight majority of states, family violence and sexual assault rates have risen both nationally and in the overwhelming majority of states, as shown in Figure 2.10. Since 2015, family violence rates have improved in only two states and sexual assault rates have improved in only three. Yucatán was the only state to register improvements in both family violence and sexual assault, and its improvements were the country's largest in both categories.

In 2021, Colima recorded the highest rate of family violence for the fifth year in a row. With over 1,907 cases per 100,000 people, its rate was three times the national average. Moreover, the sexual assault rate in the state has increased more than tenfold since 2015, by far the largest deterioration in the country in this category. Colima City also has the country's highest rate of women reporting experiences of sexual harassment or sexual violence in public spaces, with 36.5 percent having encountered such situations in 2021, nearly double the national rate of 20 percent.⁴²

While Colima's deterioration in its sexual assault rate has been the most significant, Aguascalientes has been the state with the worst overall rate since 2017. With 1,425 cases per 100,000 people in 2021, the rate in Aguascalientes was more than four times the national average.

National attitudes and perceptions about violence in the home, gender roles and the prevalence of impunity shed some light on the challenge of gender-based violence in Mexico. In a 2020 Latin

American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey, 99 percent of Mexicans said that violence against women in their neighborhoods should be reported to the police.⁴³ However, in a 2021 LAPOP survey, almost half of respondents – 44.4 percent – agreed with the idea that domestic violence is a private matter that should be handled within the family. Similarly, 43.5 percent of people agreed with the idea that a woman should receive permission from her partner in order to visit family and friends. On the subject of receiving a partner's permission, there was a divergence in views between male and female respondents, with 53.4 percent of male respondents agreeing, compared to 34.5 percent of females. Moreover, for a reported case of domestic violence, only 34.8 percent of people believed that the police would be very likely to take the issue seriously, and only 34.2 percent believed that the perpetrator would very likely be punished if the case were brought to the judicial system.⁴⁴


“

In contrast to robbery and assault rates, which in the past seven years have both fallen in a slight majority of states, family violence and sexual assault rates have risen both nationally and in the overwhelming majority of states.

FIGURE 2.10

Number of states that improved and deteriorated by violent crime sub-indicator, 2015–2021

While more than half of states have improved in assault and robbery rates in the past seven years, the overwhelming majority have deteriorated in family violence and sexual assault rates.



Source: SESNSP; IEP calculations



ORGANIZED CRIME

Since 2015, the national organized crime rate in Mexico has increased by 48.1 percent. After a slight improvement in 2020, the organized crime rate again deteriorated in 2021, by 7.1 percent. This was driven by deteriorations in two sub-indicators: extortion and retail drug crimes.

This sub-section presents the trends and results for the four sub-indicators that comprise the overall measure of *organized crime*: extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking, retail drug crimes and major organized crime offenses. Major organized crime offenses include federal drug trafficking crimes and criminal offenses committed by three or more people. Figure 2.11 shows the monthly indexed trends in each of these sub-indicators, which compares their rates to levels in January 2015.

Retail drug crime has driven the rise in the national organized crime rate for the past seven years. The rate of retail drug crimes had the largest increase of the *organized crime* sub-indicators in that period, rising by 139 percent, from approximately 26.7 crimes per 100,000 people in 2015 to 63.8 in 2021. According to national survey data, the rate of people reporting knowledge of drug dealing occurring in their neighborhood rose from 23.4 percent in 2013 to 32.6 percent in 2021. During the same period, knowledge of drug use in one's neighborhood rose from 40.1 percent to 48.1 percent.⁴⁵

The deterioration in retail drug crimes has been widespread, with only seven states recording an improvement in the past seven years, compared to 25 states that deteriorated. Guanajuato had the

highest rate of retail drug crime offenses in 2021, at 382 offenses per 100,000 people. The state has recorded a sevenfold increase in retail drug crimes since 2015.

The sharp increase in retail drug crimes in Guanajuato has occurred in the context of an intensifying turf war between the CJNG and the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel (CSRL). Beginning in 2017, the CSRL challenged the CJNG's dominance of fuel theft in the state which has driven extreme levels of homicide and firearms crime, as well as significant increases in the rates of extortion, major offenses and retail drug crimes.⁴⁶


Coahuila and Baja California recorded the second and third highest rates of retail drug crimes in 2021, at 298 and 218 offenses per 100,000 people, respectively. Coahuila, which borders the United States, is a strategic trafficking route for various organized crime groups and has witnessed the incursion of the CJNG in recent years.⁴⁷

In Baja California, competition to sell drugs in a given local area, known as a plaza in Mexico, has intensified in the city of Tijuana.⁴⁸ Following the demise of the Tijuana Cartel, also known as the Arellano-Félix Organization (AFO), in 2006, the Sinaloa Cartel gained majority control of the plaza. In 2016, it was reported that

FIGURE 2.11

Indexed change in organized crime offenses, 2015–2021

The organized crime rate has been driven by significant increases in retail drug crimes, which have risen by 139 percent since 2015.



Source: SESNSP; IEP calculations

AFO cells re-emerged and became known as the Tijuana New Generation Cartel. The group, along with the Beltran Leyva Organization, aligned itself under the CJNG's leadership to counter the Sinaloa Cartel's dominance.⁴⁹ Tijuana has consistently recorded the highest number of homicide cases of any municipality in Mexico.⁵⁰ Local and state officials estimate that the majority of homicides in Tijuana are linked to local drug sales.⁵¹

Overall, the national extortion rate increased by 37.9 percent, from 53.3 offenses per 100,000 people in 2015 to 73.5 in 2021. The extortion rate has increased every year since 2015, with the exception of 2020, reaching the highest rate on record in 2021. According to the latest available data, criminal earnings from extortion have continued to increase, reportedly amounting to 12 billion pesos in 2018.⁵²

In the most recently available national survey data, 90.7 percent of extortions and attempted extortions occur over the phone, equivalent to approximately 4.7 million crimes in a year. This is down from 2016, when a high of 95.6 percent of extortions and attempted extortions took place over the phone. For many such extortions, the calls often take the form of a "virtual kidnapping", during which perpetrators demand a ransom payment without having actually taken a hostage.⁵³

In 2021, Zacatecas recorded the highest extortion rate in Mexico. The extortion rate has consistently risen since 2015, recording a fivefold increase to 2021. While larger organized crime groups such as the CJNG and Sinaloa Cartel compete for territorial control in Zacatecas, reports suggest that smaller groups in the state are behind the increase in illicit activities such as extortion.⁵⁴

In contrast, the rate of major organized crime offenses has improved since 2015. The largest improvements were recorded between 2015 and 2017, while rates deteriorated between 2018 and 2020 before improving again in 2021. Mexico's major organized crime offenses disproportionately occur in the northern border states where drugs are trafficked to the United States. The four states with the highest average major offenses rates over the past seven years have all been northern states located along or near the US-Mexico border. Baja California and Sonora registered the worst average major offenses rates since 2015, with the vast majority of offenses related to possession and transportation of drugs.

In addition, the kidnapping and human trafficking rate more than halved in the last seven years, falling from 11.7 cases per 100,000 people in 2015 to 4.8 in 2021. The spike in the kidnapping and human trafficking rate in August 2015, shown in Figure 2.10, was due to a high level of police reporting that month, based on successful police rescues of trafficked migrants in Coahuila.⁵⁵ Since then, the monthly rate has fluctuated, but has generally followed a downward trend. Much of this decline was recorded in 2020, when the rate fell by 24.9 percent.

Despite this improvement in the overall kidnapping and human trafficking rate, in the past decade there has been a rise in such offenses against migrants in Mexico. Between 2011 and 2020, a total of 1,518 operations to rescue migrants from traffickers were carried out by the Federal Police and the National Guard, through which 48,234 people were rescued. However, the majority of these rescues took place in just two years: 2019 and 2020. While in 2011 there were 51 operations leading to the rescue of 1,100 migrants, in 2020 there were 317 operations leading to the rescue of 15,237. Much of this apparent rise in migrant kidnapping and trafficking has come as the result of the growing flows of Central American migrants passing through Mexico *en route* to the United States, with migrants from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador being victimized far more than any other nationality.⁵⁶

Calculating the incidence of kidnapping and human trafficking

offenses against migrants is challenging given extremely low rates at which migrants report crimes.⁵⁷ Moreover, it may be difficult to distinguish between situations in which migrants have volunteered to be smuggled and those in which they are held or trafficked against their will, as migrants sometimes place themselves at the mercy of smugglers who may exploit their vulnerable situation in various ways.

Increasingly, however, migrants have become victims of clear-cut kidnappings involving demands for ransom payments from family members abroad. It has recently been estimated that one out of every ten victims of kidnapping in Mexico is a migrant.⁵⁸ The ransom payments have been found to range from US\$1,500 to US\$10,000, with kidnappers likely to demand more if the victim has family in the United States.⁵⁹ One estimate placed crime groups' earnings from migrant kidnappings at US\$800 million over the past decade.⁶⁰

LANDSCAPE OF ORGANIZED CRIME

The deterioration in organized crime rates has been widespread, with only ten states recording an improvement in the past seven years, compared to 22 states that deteriorated. The increase of organized crime activity across Mexico follows the fragmentation of major criminal organizations since the start of the drug war and the arrest or execution of leaders of major cartels. This has had significant impacts on the criminal landscape, including:

- the proliferation of smaller, often more agile and adaptable criminal organizations.⁶¹ Smaller criminal groups pose a new set of challenges since they lack clear hierarchical structures and are harder for law enforcement to track.⁶²
- the geographical expansion of cartels which has contributed to heightened competition over territory and access to drug trafficking routes.⁶³
- the diversification of criminal activity. In particular, smaller groups which do not have the necessary infrastructure to export drugs are turning to more localized activities, such as extortion, kidnapping and retail drug crime. These activities are less likely to be detected by authorities and provide a fast and easy way to raise revenue.⁶⁴

Mexico's organized crime landscape has shifted since the early 2000s. Back then, several large cartels dominated the scene, but now more than 400 organizations and cells of varying sizes and scope operate in the country.⁶⁵ In recent years, some of Mexico's largest organized crime groups – including the Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas – have fragmented or faced internal conflict following the arrests of their leaders or high-level operatives.⁶⁶ At the same time, fragmentation has given rise to powerful new organized crime groups, such as the CJNG.

The CJNG first emerged in 2011 as a splinter group of the Milenio Cartel and once reportedly served as an enforcement group for the Sinaloa Cartel until mid-2013 when the groups split.⁶⁷ In 2020, the US authorities called the CJNG the "most well-armed cartel in Mexico" and "one of the most dangerous transnational criminal organizations in the world."⁶⁸

Violent confrontations between rival criminal groups have driven Mexico's elevated homicide rate.⁶⁹ Violent clashes between criminal organizations have typically occurred when a single organization does not have total control over an illicit market.⁷⁰ Data shows that the number of violent rivalries between criminal groups in Mexico rose from three in 2006 at the start of the drug war, to 19 in 2020.⁷¹ Furthermore, organized crime conflict has become increasingly widespread: out of Mexico's 32 states, just nine recorded clashes in 2006, compared to 27 states in 2020.

Figure 2.12 illustrates the geographical trend in fatalities due to organized crime violence over the last 15 years. The figures demonstrate how violence has become pervasive throughout Mexico, with deaths attributed to organized crime conflict increasing from 669 in 2006 to over 16,000 in 2020.

As the CJNG has attempted to expand and secure territory across Mexico, it has been increasingly involved in violent confrontations for drug plazas and trafficking routes.⁷² Since 2011, the CJNG has been engaged in clashes with at least nine other organized crime groups.⁷³ Fatalities attributed to clashes involving the CJNG account for more than three quarters of the total between 2011 and 2020. Beginning in 2015, the ongoing conflict between the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG has been especially deadly, with over 10,000 fatalities recorded to 2020. Baja California has recorded the most fatalities from this conflict, with over 6,700, followed by Colima and Zacatecas, with approximately 1,970 and 1,160 fatalities, respectively. These states are among those that have had the largest increases in homicide rate in the past seven years.

CHANGES IN THE DRUG MARKET

In the past decade, the markets in which Mexican drug trafficking organizations operate have been dramatically affected by two developments in the United States: the increasing decriminalization and legalization of marijuana across the country and a massive upsurge in the demand for synthetic opioids such as

fentanyl. These developments have led to significant shifts in the drugs that organized criminal groups produce, move and sell, with the trafficking of marijuana falling precipitously while the trafficking of fentanyl has skyrocketed.


According to data on drug seizures at US points of entry, when the first US states approved the legalization of the recreational use of marijuana in 2012, over a million kilograms of marijuana were seized across all US points of entry each year. However, by 2021, with US citizens in a majority of states able to legally access the drug for recreational use or not face criminal penalties for its possession, the volume of seizures had declined to less than 70,000 kilograms, representing a more than 90 percent drop.⁷⁴ Over 97 percent of marijuana that enters the US illegally comes via the border with Mexico.⁷⁵ Some Mexican traffickers now report that the drug has lost virtually all of its profitability.⁷⁶ In the context of this crash in the illegal market for marijuana, which was formerly a major source of cartel income, organized criminal groups have expanded their trafficking of other drugs.⁷⁷

Fentanyl, a powerful synthetic opioid, is by far the most important among these.⁷⁸ The shift to fentanyl has been highly lucrative, given that it is extremely potent, relatively cheap to produce and often sold in pill form, meaning crime groups can earn far more relative to the volume of the drug trafficked.⁷⁹ In recent years, the use of fentanyl in the US has grown exponentially, with overdose

FIGURE 2.12

Fatalities due to non-state violence, 2006–2020

Deaths attributed to organized crime conflict were recorded in 27 states in 2020, compared to nine states in 2006.



Source: UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset; IEP calculations

Note: The size of a circle is proportional to the number of fatalities of an event, and the darkness of a circle is indicative of the number of events that occurred in the same location.

deaths from the drug climbing from less than 5,000 per year before 2014 to more than 64,000 in 2021. This has made it the leading cause of death among US citizens aged 18 and 45.⁸⁰

Between 2016 and 2021, the volume of fentanyl seizures by US border authorities grew by 870 percent, as shown in Figure 2.13. As with marijuana, over 97 percent of fentanyl illegally entering the US comes via the border with Mexico.⁸¹ Fentanyl seizures also increased exponentially within Mexico; in 2016, Mexican authorities seized just 15 kilograms of fentanyl nationwide, while in 2021 they seized 1,852 kilograms, a more than 100-fold increase.⁸²


As Figure 2.13 shows, the only other category of drug to experience a large uptick in seizures by US border authorities in recent years

has been cocaine. However, unlike the other major categories of drugs, whose illegal entry into the US comes almost entirely via Mexico, less than half of trafficked cocaine comes across the border with Mexico. Moreover, both the absolute and relative volumes of cocaine moved across the US-Mexico border have fallen in recent years. In 2019, 2,189 kilograms of cocaine were seized at the US-Mexico border, representing 41.3 percent of the cocaine seized at all US points of entry. However, in 2021, only 1,709 kilograms were seized, representing just 18.3 percent of the nationwide total.⁸³ This decline in cocaine seizures at the US-Mexico border further highlights the increasing centrality of fentanyl in the activities of Mexican drug trafficking organizations.

FIGURE 2.13

Indexed change in volume of drug seizures at US points of entry, by drug type, 2016–2021

Between 2016 and 2021, the volume of fentanyl seized rose by 870 percent.



Source: US Customs and Border Protection; IEP calculations
 Note: Data refer to seizures from all US points of entry.



DETENTION WITHOUT A SENTENCE

With the exception of 2020, the *detention without a sentence* indicator has improved in each of the past seven years. Following a trend of consistent improvements between 2015 and 2019, the partial shutdown of criminal courts during the first several months of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the expansion of mandatory pre-trial detention, contributed to a significant rise in the number of unsentenced detainees in 2020. Although the rate fell by four percent in 2021, it was still 37.5 percent higher than at its record low in 2019.

There were roughly 79,000 detainees without a sentence in 2021, compared to approximately 77,000 in 2020 and about 60,000 in 2019. Despite this increase, the *detention without a sentence* score, which represents the ratio of unsentenced detainees to the relative to national levels of homicide and violent crime, improved by 1.4 percent in 2021. As this indicator is a ratio, the improvement is due to the increases in violent crime offenses in 2021 significantly outpacing the increase in unsentenced detainees.

In the past seven years, the state of México recorded the largest reduction in the number of detainees without a sentence, from 11,062 in 2015 to 9,605 in 2021, a 13.2 percent decline. Conversely, Mexico City registered the largest absolute increase and the second largest relative increase in the number of unsentenced detainees, from 3,851 in 2015 to 7,098 in 2021, an 84.3 percent increase.

A number of legal reforms have sought to reduce the use of pre-trial detention. For example, the introduction of presumption of innocence as a legal standard in Mexico, as part of the new criminal justice system, is intended to protect the rights of the accused and prevent the majority of presumed criminals from being detained without a conviction.

Article 19 of the Mexican constitution prescribes preventative prison for nine "grave" crimes, which include organized crime-related offenses, rape and homicide.⁸⁴ In February 2019, the national legislature voted to include an additional eight crimes, including corruption and abuse of a minor.⁸⁵ The Article states that a judge may order "preventative prison" for up to two years prior to sentencing when other precautionary measures are not enough to:

- guarantee the presence of the accused at the legal proceedings
- prevent obstruction of justice
- protect victims, witnesses or the community.⁸⁶

As such, the *detention without a sentence* indicator captures the degree to which state governments rely on pre-trial detention as a tool.

Figure 2.14 displays the trend in the number of detainees without a sentence since 2006. As an increasing number of states implemented reforms to the justice system, there was a steady decline in the overall number of detainees without a sentence until 2020. This sharp increase in unsentenced detainees came as a result of the partial shutdown of criminal courts during the COVID-19 pandemic. This also coincided with the expansion of

mandatory pre-trial detention for more offenses, including electoral offenses, illegal possession of weapons and enforced disappearances, which was approved by the Mexican Senate in July 2020.⁸⁷

According to national survey data of prison populations, there were about 220,500 incarcerated people in Mexico in 2021. Among sentenced inmates, it took more than one year for 48 percent to be given a sentence and more than two years for 23.9 percent to be sentenced. This is up from 2016, when it took more than one year for 45 percent and more than two years for 20.2 percent to receive a sentence.⁸⁸

Analysis of survey data of prison populations shows that detention without a sentence is more commonly used for organized crime offenses such as kidnapping, illegal arms possession and drug dealing.⁸⁹ As men and women tend to be involved in different types of crime, statistics of detention without a sentence vary by sex. Robbery is the most common type of crime for which men are imprisoned, representing more than 30 percent of male inmates.


Women are most commonly incarcerated for kidnapping, representing about 24 percent of female inmates. Of those incarcerated, survey data show that 46.1 percent of the female inmate population report not having been sentenced. This compares with 26.7 percent of male inmates. Overall, men represent 94.3 percent of the total prison population.⁹⁰

In addition, women have much lower recidivism rates than men. In 2021, 21.3 percent of all male prisoners in Mexico had previously been convicted of a crime. In contrast, only 6.8 percent of female prisoners had been previously convicted of a crime.⁹¹

FIGURE 2.14

Total number of detainees without a sentence, 2006–2021

Despite an overall improvement in score, the raw number of detainees without a sentence rose slightly in 2021. This follows a sharp increase in 2020, which came after record low levels between 2017 and 2019.



Source: Secretariat of Security and Civilian Protection / Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana (SSPC); data prior to 2020 are CNS data provided by Jurimetría

Note: Includes prisoners charged with state-level crimes and incarcerated in state prisons, federal crimes not included.

3

THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE IN MEXICO

KEY FINDINGS

- In 2021, the economic impact of violence in Mexico was 4.92 trillion pesos (US\$243 billion), equivalent to 20.8 percent of the country's GDP.
- This represents an improvement from 2020, with the impact decreasing by 2.7 percent, or 137 billion pesos. This marks the second consecutive annual improvement.
- In 2021, the economic impact of violence was more than seven times higher than public investments made in health care and more than six times higher than those made in education.
- Mexico's spending on domestic security and the justice system in 2021 was equal to 0.63 percent of GDP, the least of any Latin American country or member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
- In 2021, costs associated with homicide represented 43.4 percent of the economic impact of violence. This was equivalent to 2.2 trillion pesos (US\$105.5 billion).
- A one percent decline in the economic impact of violence would equal the federal government's investment in science, technology and innovation in 2021.
- The annual economic impact of violence was 38,196 pesos per person, approximately 2.5 times the average monthly salary in Mexico.
- The per capita economic impact of violence varies substantially from state to state, ranging from 12,064 pesos in Yucatán to 77,871 pesos in Zacatecas.
- In 2021, the economic impact of sexual assault recorded the largest percentage increase of all the sub-indicators in the model, totaling 511.9 billion pesos.
- Mexico has increased its investment in the military to address organized crime. Since 2015, military expenditure increased by 31.3 percent to reach almost 167 billion pesos, the highest level on record. This corresponds with reductions in spending on domestic security of 37.2 percent and on justice of 7.5 percent.



THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE IN 2021

In 2021, the economic impact of violence in Mexico was estimated to be 4.9 trillion pesos in constant 2021 terms (US\$243 billion). This is equivalent to 20.8 percent of Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) or 38,196 pesos per person.¹

The economic impact of violence improved for the second year in a row in 2021, falling by 2.7 percent, or 137 billion pesos, from the previous year. Despite the improvement, the economic impact of violence remains high by international standards and is equivalent to more than three times Mexico government's expenditure on economic development.² Box 3.1 provides a brief explanation of the economic costing model used in the MPI and a summary of the methodology can be found at the end of this section. A comprehensive explanation of how the economic impact of violence is calculated is provided in Section 6.

Table 3.2 presents a full breakdown of the 2021 economic impact of violence cost estimates. This outlines the direct costs, indirect costs and multiplier effect for each indicator and the aggregate economic impact of violence. Box 3.1 outlines the breakdown of each indicator.

In both 2020 and 2021, Mexico recorded improvements in the economic impact of violence, reversing a four-year trend of continuous increases. This follows recent improvements in

peacefulness at the national level, driven primarily by reductions in homicide and gun violence.

In 2021, decreases in crime such as homicides, kidnappings and robbery underpinned the 2.7 percent improvement in the economic impact of violence. Similarly, the Mexican government reduced spending on domestic security and the justice system contributing to the lower overall impact. Conversely, *military expenditure* and the economic impact of sexual assault increased from the previous year. The economic impact of sexual assault recorded the largest percentage deterioration of all indicators, increasing by 16.9 percent from the previous year. Sexual assault as a sub-indicator is included in the *violent crime* indicator.

Figure 3.1 displays the economic impact of violence by state as a percentage of their GDP in 2021. Zacatecas, Michoacán and Morelos all have a cost of violence that exceeds 40 percent of GDP. These three states suffer from higher levels of interpersonal violence and are all ranked in the bottom half of the 2022 MPI.

BOX 3.1

The economic impact of violence – definition and model

The economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic effect related to “containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence.” It comprises the **economic cost of violence** – both direct and indirect – plus a multiplier effect (Table 3.1).

Direct costs are incurred by the victim, the government and the perpetrator. These include medical expenses, policing costs and expenses associated with the justice system. **Indirect costs** accrue after the fact and include the present value of long-term costs arising from incidents of crime, such as lost future income and physical and psychological trauma.

The **multiplier effect** represents the economic benefits that would have been generated if all relevant expenditure had been directed into more productive alternatives.

TABLE 3.1

Components of the economic impact of violence model

The economic impact of violence comprises the economic cost of violence plus a multiplier effect.

IMPACT		COMMENTARY
Economic cost of violence	i) Direct costs	Costs directly attributable to violence or its prevention
	ii) Indirect costs	Medium- and long-term losses arising from acts of violence
Economic impact of violence	iii) Multiplier effect	Economic benefits forgone by investing in violence containment and not in other more productive activities

Source: IEP

TABLE 3.2

The economic impact of violence in 2021, constant 2021 pesos, billions

The total economic losses amounted to 4.9 trillion pesos in 2021.

INDICATOR	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE (BILLIONS PESOS)		MULTIPLIER EFFECT	THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (BILLIONS PESOS)
	DIRECT	INDIRECT		
Homicide	185.66	1,767.48	185.66	2,138.79
Violent crime	363.44	1,100.51	363.44	1,827.38
Organized crime	-	16.61	-	16.61
Fear of violence	-	44.67	-	44.67
Private security & weapons	132.82	-	132.82	265.63
Military expenditure	166.54	-	166.54	333.08
Domestic security expenditure	39.97	-	39.97	79.93
Justice system expenditure and incarceration	108.04	4.04	108.04	220.13
Total	996.46	2,933.31	996.46	4,926.24

Source: IEP

Note: Totals may not be exact due to rounding.

BOX 3.2

The MPI economic costing indicators and sub-indicators

Indicators are *italicized*, which distinguishes them from the sub-indicators which are not. The following defines the sub-indicators contained within each indicator:

- *Homicide*
- *Violent crime*
 - Violent assault
 - Self-reported losses from violent crime
 - Sexual assault
 - Robbery
- *Organized crime*
 - Extortion
 - Human trafficking and kidnapping
- *Fear of violence*
- *Protection costs (private security and weapons)*
- *Military expenditure*
- *Domestic security expenditure*
- *Justice system expenditure*
- *Incarceration*

FIGURE 3.1

The economic cost of violence by state, percentage of state's GDP, 2021

The economic cost of violence ranges from 2.8 percent of GDP in Campeche to 51.9 percent of GDP in Zacatecas.




Source: IEP

Violence and the fear of violence create significant economic disruptions. Violent incidents generate costs in the form of property damage, physical injury or psychological trauma. Fear of violence also alters economic behavior, primarily by changing investment and consumption patterns. This diverts public and private resources away from productive activities and towards protective measures. Violence and the fear of violence also leads to substantial losses in the form of productivity shortfalls, foregone earnings and distorted expenditure. Therefore, measuring the scale and cost of violence has important implications for assessing its effects on economic activity. Figure 3.2 illustrates the share of the total economic impact of violence in 2021 by costed categories.

The data show that the consequential costs from violence in Mexico are substantially larger than government expenditure on violence containment. In 2021, 18.2 percent of Mexico's economic impact of violence was government expenditure and private protection expenditures, whereas the remaining 81.8 percent was from *homicide, violent crime, organized crime and fear of violence*. This differs markedly from the global economic impact of violence, where 82 percent of the impact consists of government and private expenditures on containing and preventing violence.³ These figures strongly suggest that violence containment expenditure is disproportionately low in Mexico.

FIGURE 3.2
Breakdown of the economic impact of violence, 2021

Homicide and violent crime represent 80.5 percent of the economic impact of violence.



Source: IEP
Note: Other includes the economic impact of fear, extortion and kidnapping.

In 2021, the economic impact of *homicide* was the largest category in the model at 2.2 trillion pesos (US\$105.5 billion), or 43.4 percent of the total. This figure is equivalent to nine percent of Mexico's GDP.

By contrast, in the global economic impact model, *homicide* is 6.7 percent of the total impact, equal to 0.8 percent of global GDP.⁴

If Mexico were to achieve a ten percent decline in the homicide rate, the country's economic impact of violence would decrease by 213.9 billion pesos – more than four times government spending on science, technology and innovation in 2021.⁵

Violent crime, which comprises robbery, assault and sexual assault, was the second costliest form of violence. At 1.8 trillion pesos, it represented 37.1 percent of the total economic impact in 2021. The economic impact of *violent crime* also measures the financial and health-related losses incurred by households and businesses.

Government spending on violence containment – *domestic security, the military and the justice system* – amounted to 633.1 billion pesos, accounting for 12.9 percent of the total economic impact. Also included in government spending is the economic impact of *incarceration*, calculated as the loss of wages of those imprisoned. Prisoners' lost wages are assumed to equal the Mexican minimum wage of 37,408 pesos per year in 2021. In 2021, the cost of *incarceration* was estimated at 4.04 billion pesos.

The economic impact model includes the costs households and businesses incur in protecting themselves from crime and violence. *Protection costs* amounted to 265.6 billion pesos in 2021 – 5.4 percent of the total economic impact of violence.⁶ This indicator includes insurance, private security spending, the cost of firearms for protection, changing place of residence or business due to violence, and the installation of alarms, locks, doors, windows, bars and fences.

The remaining 1.2 percent of economic losses are related to the costs of *organized crime* and the *fear of violence*. The economic impact of organized criminal activity is calculated for two types of crimes – extortion and kidnapping – and amounted to 16.6 billion pesos in 2021. However, this is a conservative estimate as the model does not include all of the losses imposed by organized criminal groups, particularly commodity theft or drug trade-related economic activity such as production, transport and distribution. Furthermore, the presence of organized criminal groups can increase costs incurred by businesses due to the risks of kidnapping and extortion.⁷ Data on the economic impact of these crimes are difficult to capture.

Fear of violence distorts consumer and business behavior, which in turn causes economic losses. These losses were calculated at 44.6 billion pesos in 2021.⁸

“

If Mexico were to achieve a ten percent decline in the homicide rate, the country's economic impact of violence would decrease by 213.9 billion pesos – more than four times government spending on science, technology and innovation in 2021.



TRENDS IN THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

Since 2015, the economic impact of violence has increased by 33 percent, reflecting the deterioration in peacefulness in Mexico over the same period. Having peaked in 2019 at 5.1 trillion pesos (US\$253.8 billion), the economic impact of violence has since declined by 218 billion pesos.

The largest annual improvement came in 2021, with the economic impact falling by 137 billion pesos from the previous year. Declines in violence have driven the improvements over the last two years.

For the second consecutive year, the homicide rate fell in Mexico, decreasing from 28.2 homicides per 100,000 people in 2019 to 26.6 homicides per 100,000 in 2021.⁹ This improvement is positively reflected in the economic impact of *homicide* which fell by 270.8 billion pesos, or 11.2 percent from 2019. The impact of *violent crime* also fell by 5.2 percent from 2019. Figure 3.3 displays the trend in Mexico's economic impact of violence.

The economic impact of *organized crime*, *violent crime* and *military expenditure* increased from 2020. All other indicators recorded decreases from the previous year, as shown in Table 3.3.

Between 2015 and 2019, the economic impact of violence grew year on year, increasing by 38.9 percent in total. Increases over this period coincided with Mexico's rising homicide rate and the overall deterioration in peacefulness. Consequently, the economic impact of violence was 1.2 trillion pesos (US\$60.3 billion) higher in 2021 than in 2015.

TABLE 3.3

Trend in the economic impact of violence, constant 2021 pesos, billions, 2015–2021

In 2021, violent crime recorded the largest absolute increase from 2020 of any indicator in the economic impact of violence model.

INDICATOR	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	CHANGE (BILLIONS) 2020-2021	PERCENTAGE CHANGE 2020-2021
Homicide	1,263.31	1,569.74	2,075.93	2,391.45	2,409.57	2,341.94	2,138.79	-203.14	-8.7%
Violent crime	1,633.19	1,618.67	1,714.63	1,934.09	1,927.91	1,781.13	1,827.38	46.26	2.6%
Organized crime	18.95	16.89	17.51	17.14	19.08	16.43	16.61	0.18	1.1%
Fear	46.49	45.61	42.92	45.03	45.53	44.79	44.67	-0.12	-0.3%
Protection costs	123.34	179.88	174.95	154.75	147.53	274.66	265.63	-9.02	-3.3%
Military expenditure	253.75	241.61	236.37	239.13	269.83	290.41	333.08	42.67	14.7%
Domestic security expenditure	127.23	116.15	106.12	106.24	91.39	87.31	79.93	-7.38	-8.5%
Justice system expenditure and incarceration	236.57	264.69	241.92	254.83	233.41	226.95	220.13	-6.82	-3.0%
Total	3,702.84	4,053.24	4,610.35	5,142.65	5,144.25	5,063.61	4,926.24	-137.4	-2.7%


Source: IEP

Note: Totals may not be exact due to rounding.

FIGURE 3.3

Trend in the economic impact of violence and year-on-year percentage change, 2015–2021

The largest annual increase in the economic impact of violence occurred in 2017, equal to 557 billion pesos. This represented a 13.7 percent increase from 2016.



Source: IEP

Figure 3.4 shows the trend in the economic impact of violence in Mexico across three categories: personal and business protection costs, interpersonal violence and government expenditure. All three categories were higher in 2021 than in 2015. However, the economic impact from interpersonal violence and the expenditures on personal and business protection and safety increased at a much larger rate compared to government spending. In 2021, the economic impact of interpersonal violence increased 36 percent from 2015. The impact of *homicide* drove this increase.

The indicator *protection costs* is an aggregate of surveyed responses by citizens and businesses on expenditures made to protect themselves, compiled by the National Survey of Business Victimization / *Encuesta Nacional de Victimización de Empresas* (ENVE) and the National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Security / *Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública* (ENVIPE). The economic impact of *protection costs* has more than doubled from 2015, the largest increase of the three categories. In 2020, *protection costs* were up 86.2 percent from the previous year, equal to 127 billion pesos,¹⁰ while personal protection expenses decreased by 0.7 percent.

The rapid increase in *protection costs* was driven by business rather than private citizens. These business expenses include higher insurance premiums, installation of additional locks, alarms, video surveillance cameras, and tracking devices. There was also an increased demand for hiring surveillance personnel and private security. This increase in crime prevention expenses had multiple drivers, but an important factor was the rise in extortion against businesses of all sizes across Mexico.¹¹ The National Institute of Statistics and Geography / *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* (INEGI) recorded a 26 percent rise in extortion cases from 2017 to 2019, with the vast majority of threats being committed by phone. Business owners and employees risk physical aggression or the destruction of property if the terms of the extortion are not met.¹²

Businesses are also at risk of theft of resources, especially fuel. Stolen gasoline, or *huachicol*, is obtained by bribing service station employees, intercepting tanker trucks or directly siphoning distribution pipelines.¹³ It is often sold directly to drivers, generating substantial financial losses to fuel distributors and retailers. While losses from fuel theft have fallen in recent years, it is estimated to have cost Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the state-owned petroleum company, nearly US\$30 million in the first half of 2021.¹⁴ With the steep rise in international oil prices from

March 2022 as a consequence of the war between Russia and the Ukraine, the incentives to trade in *huachicol* may be amplified.

The rise in business expenditure on protection underscores the state's failure to provide adequate security for legitimate business operations. The need for self-protection diverts funds, time and resources from other activities that would improve productivity and employment.

Table 3.4 shows the change in the economic impact of violence by indicator over the last seven years. The impact of *homicide* has recorded the largest increase, having increased 875.5 billion pesos. *Domestic security expenditure* recorded the largest decrease, by 47.3 billion pesos.

TABLE 3.4
Change in the economic impact of violence by indicator, constant 2020 pesos, billions, 2015–2021


The economic impact of homicide was over 875 billion pesos more in 2021 compared to 2015.

INDICATOR	2015	2021	CHANGE (BILLIONS) 2015-2021	PERCENTAGE CHANGE (2015-2020)
Homicide	1,263.3	2,138.8	875.5	69.3%
Violent crime	1,633.2	1,827.4	194.2	11.9%
Organized crime	18.9	16.6	-2.3	-12.4%
Fear	46.5	44.7	-1.8	-3.9%
Protection costs	123.3	265.6	142.3	115.4%
Military expenditure	253.7	333.1	79.3	31.3%
Domestic security expenditure	127.2	79.9	-47.3	-37.2%
Justice system expenditure and incarceration	236.6	220.1	-16.4	-7.0%
Total	3,702.8	4,926.2	1,223.4	33.0%

Source: IEP
Note: Totals may not be exact due to rounding.

FIGURE 3.4
Indexed trend in the economic impact of violence, 2015–2021

Personal and business expenses on protection have recorded the largest percentage increase since 2015.



Source: IEP



THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE BY STATE

The economic impact of violence differs substantially from state to state within Mexico. Some states are more prone to particular types of crime. Administrations and state programs across the country have had varying degrees of success in containing the costs of violence.

CHANGES IN 2021


In 2021, 12 of the 32 states in Mexico recorded a higher economic impact of violence compared to the previous year. Zacatecas experienced the largest percentage increase of 30.9 percent, followed by Campeche at 17.2 percent. The higher economic impacts in these two states were driven by the increased costs from interpersonal violence in 2021. Zacatecas registered the largest increase in the homicide rate of any Mexican state between 2020 and 2021, by 50.8 percent, while Campeche's homicide rate rose by 21.6 percent in the same period. This sharp deterioration in Zacatecas over the past year contributed to a poor outcome in the 2021 economic impact of violence rankings.

Figure 3.5 displays the largest state improvements and deteriorations between 2020 and 2021. Guanajuato, Colima, Tabasco, Sinaloa and Veracruz recorded the five largest improvements in the economic impact of violence. Guanajuato, in particular, saw a 22.8 percent decline in the impact of violence, largely driven by lower *homicide* and *violent crime* costs.

FIGURE 3.5

Changes in the economic impact of violence by state, 2020–2021

Zacatecas, the second least peaceful state, recorded the largest increase in the economic impact of violence of any state, increasing by 30.9 percent from 2020 to 2021.



Source: IEP

STATES WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE

Of the 32 Mexican states, Zacatecas recorded the highest burden from the economic cost of violence, equivalent to 51.9 percent of

TABLE 3.5

The economic cost of violence – the five most and least affected states, 2021

The five states with the highest economic cost of violence are less peaceful than those with the lowest cost.

HIGHEST COST		LOWEST COST	
STATE	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE (% OF STATE GDP)	STATE	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE (% OF STATE GDP)
Zacatecas	51.9	Campeche	2.8
Michoacán	44.6	Yucatán	4.5
Morelos	43.5	Coahuila	5.2
Oaxaca	35.1	Mexico City	6.8
Guerrero	33.2	Tabasco	8.6

Source: IEP

its state GDP (Table 3.5). With the exception of Oaxaca and Tabasco, the states with the higher costs as a percentage of GDP all have higher homicide rates compared to the states with the lowest economic cost from violence. In addition, the states with the highest cost of violence all have higher rates of firearms crime compared to those with the lowest cost of violence.

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE PER PERSON

The states with higher rates of organized crime, homicide and violent assault also suffer from a higher economic impact of violence. The nationwide economic impact amounted to 38,196 pesos per person in 2021 (Table 3.6). This is worth approximately 2.5 months' income for an average Mexican worker.¹⁵ There are large state-by-state variations, with the per capita impact on a state such as Zacatecas more than six times higher than in the Yucatán.

The three least peaceful states in Mexico – Colima, Zacatecas and Baja California – recorded the highest per capita impact in 2021, with the three states exceeding 70,000 pesos per person. Yucatán, the most peaceful state in 2021, recorded the lowest economic impact per person at 12,064 pesos.

Figure 3.6 displays the map of the per capita economic impact of *homicide* by state for 2021. Yucatán's per capita impact of *homicide* is equal to 1,283 pesos per person, the lowest in Mexico. The highest impact of 60,628 pesos per person is found in Zacatecas.

TABLE 3.6

The per capita economic impact of violence, 2021

The per capita economic impact of violence varies significantly from state to state in Mexico, from Yucatán at 12,064 pesos per person, to Zacatecas at 77,871 pesos per person.


STATE	MPI RANK	PER CAPITA ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (CONSTANT 2021 PESOS)	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (CONSTANT 2021 PESOS, BILLIONS)	STATE	MPI RANK	PER CAPITA ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (CONSTANT 2021 PESOS)	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (CONSTANT 2021 PESOS, BILLIONS)
Yucatán	1	12,064	27.6	Baja California Sur	18	38,308	31.5
Tlaxcala	2	19,713	27.5	Jalisco	19	35,347	300.1
Chiapas	3	20,558	119.5	San Luis Potosí	20	34,223	98.8
Campeche	4	25,796	26.2	Nuevo León	21	35,927	204.3
Hidalgo	5	25,537	79.7	Guerrero	22	36,422	133.6
Nayarit	6	24,177	31.6	México	23	33,327	586.7
Coahuila	7	17,820	58.1	Quintana Roo	24	54,004	95.1
Veracruz	8	21,855	187.7	Michoacán	25	64,572	313.7
Puebla	9	40,678	271.1	Morelos	26	62,202	128.4
Durango	10	22,446	42.3	Chihuahua	27	57,570	220.9
Tamaulipas	11	27,608	101.6	Sonora	28	57,770	179.7
Tabasco	12	29,803	77.5	Guanajuato	29	51,593	324
Aguascalientes	13	41,929	60.9	Colima	30	72,851	58.1
Oaxaca	14	34,695	144.5	Zacatecas	31	77,871	130.7
Sinaloa	15	28,963	92.1	Baja California	32	70,730	261
Querétaro	16	43,686	101.3	National	-	38,196	4,926.20
Mexico City	17	45,578	410.4				

Source: IEP

FIGURE 3.6

Map of the per capita economic impact of homicide, 2021, constant 2021 pesos

The difference in the per capita economic impact of homicide is largest between Zacatecas and Yucatán, at a total of 58,705 pesos.



Source: IEP

Colima and Baja California Sur, which ranked as the 30th and 18th most peaceful states out of the total 32 states, had the highest per capita expenditure on *domestic security*, the *justice system* and the *military*. Mexico City had the highest per capita expenditure on private security and weapons, equal to 16,469 pesos per person. This is over six times higher than the next highest state, Nuevo León.

The Crime Victimization Survey / *Encuesta Nacional Sobre Inseguridad* (ENSI) found that households in areas suffering from

higher levels of drug violence spend on average US\$1,085 (20,880 pesos) more on security per year than areas not affected by similar violence.¹⁶

There have been large increases in the per capita economic impact of violence in the past six years. In particular, the impact almost tripled in Zacatecas from 2015 to 2021 (Table 3.7). Oaxaca, Colima, Guanajuato and Michoacán also experienced large increases. In contrast there have been substantial reductions in states such as Yucatán, Guerrero and Sinaloa.

TABLE 3.7

The percentage change in the per capita economic impact of violence, 2015–2021 & 2020–2021

The per capita economic impact in Zacatecas was 179.1 percent higher in 2021 than in 2015. This was the largest percentage increase of any Mexican state.

STATE	CHANGE IN PER CAPITA ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (CONSTANT 2021 PESOS, %)	
	2015–2021	2020–2021
Zacatecas	179.1	30.0
Oaxaca	131.7	-7.1
Colima	109.2	-14.1
Guanajuato	94.9	-23.4
Michoacán	95.5	15.9
Sonora	69.3	11.7
Quintana Roo	56.8	7.9
Querétaro	60.5	-2.7
Baja California	50.7	-4.8
San Luis Potosí	55.1	-1.1
Chihuahua	52.4	-9.1
Puebla	49.4	1.2
Aguascalientes	44.2	-4.9
Nayarit	34.0	2.1
Campeche	31.9	15.3
Jalisco	36.2	-10.6

Source: IEP

STATE	CHANGE IN PER CAPITA ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (CONSTANT 2021 PESOS, %)	
	2015–2021	2020–2021
Nuevo León	33.0	9.7
Hidalgo	32.4	-5.2
Mexico City	42.3	-2.2
Morelos	25.9	8.0
Veracruz	21.2	-10.4
Tabasco	7.8	-13.4
Tlaxcala	3.1	-4.5
Chiapas	-12.0	3.5
Baja California Sur	-18.5	2.4
México	-14.7	-7.6
Durango	-19.6	2.9
Tamaulipas	-23.7	-4.0
Coahuila	-27.1	-7.0
Sinaloa	-26.8	-12.0
Guerrero	-35.4	-4.8
Yucatán	-49.6	-1.2



IMPROVEMENTS AND DETERIORATIONS IN THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE


Over the last seven years, the economic impact of violence has improved in nine states and deteriorated in 23 states. This has led to a national average 33 percent increase in the economic impact of violence compared to 2015.

The deteriorations in the economic impact of violence have been considerably larger in states that were already less peaceful to begin with. This has led to an increase in the economic impact gap between the more peaceful and less peaceful states (Figure 3.7). The economic impact of violence of Mexico's five most peaceful states has been broadly unchanged since 2015. This contrasts to an almost doubling in Mexico's least peaceful states.

FIGURE 3.7

The economic impact gap – differences between the five most and five least peaceful states, 2015–2021

Since 2015, the five least peaceful states have almost doubled their economic impact, increasing on average by 97 percent.



Source: IEP

TABLE 3.8

The economic impact in the five states with the largest improvements, 2015–2021

The impact of violence fell by 27.8 percent across the five states with the largest improvement.

STATE	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (CONSTANT 2021 PESOS, BILLIONS)			PERCENTAGE CHANGE (2015–2021)
	2015	2021	CHANGE 2015–2021	
Yucatán	51	27.6	-23.4	-46.0
Guerrero	201.7	133.6	-68.1	-33.7
Sinaloa	119.3	92.1	-27.2	-22.8
Coahuila	73.3	58.1	-15.2	-20.7
Tamaulipas	126.5	101.6	-24.9	-19.7
Total	571.7	413	-158.7	-27.8

Source: IEP

Note: Total refers to the sum of the five states, the total change across the five states and the total percentage change.

IMPROVEMENTS

In total, only nine states have recorded improvements in the economic impact of violence since 2015. The five states with the sharpest improvements were Yucatán, Guerrero, Sinaloa, Coahuila and Tamaulipas. On average, the economic impact of violence fell by 27.8 percent across these five states (Table 3.8). Not only has Yucatán been the most peaceful state in Mexico for the last five years, but it also recorded the largest percentage improvement from 2015, decreasing by 33.5 percent or 12.7 billion pesos.

DETERIORATIONS

Since 2015, 23 states have recorded deteriorations in the economic impact of violence, with the average state deteriorating by 68.6 percent. These increases were primarily driven by *homicide*, *violent crime* and private expenditure on *protection costs*. The economic impact of *homicide* increased by 132.2 percent and *protection costs* increased 170 percent across these 23 states. In these states over the same period, the total government expenditures on *domestic security* and the *judicial system* declined by 36.4 and 6.3 percent, respectively. This highlights the stark contrast between falling government expenditure on security and the rising costs of violence.

The five states that recorded the largest percentage deteriorations were Zacatecas, Oaxaca, Colima, Guanajuato and Michoacán (Table 3.9). On average, their economic impact of violence increased by 120.5 percent. Zacatecas recorded the largest deterioration and ranks as the second least peaceful state in the MPI 2022. Its economic impact of violence increased by 192.3 percent or 86 billion pesos.

TABLE 3.9

The economic impact in the five states with the largest deteriorations, 2015–2021

The impact of violence increased by 120.5 percent across the five states with the largest deteriorations.

STATE	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (CONSTANT 2021 PESOS, BILLIONS)			PERCENTAGE CHANGE (2015–2021)
	2015	2021	CHANGE 2015–2021	
Zacatecas	44.7	130.7	86	192.3
Oaxaca	60.2	144.5	84.3	140.2
Colima	25.1	58.1	32.9	131.1
Guanajuato	157	324	167.1	106.4
Michoacán	153.4	313.7	160.3	104.5
Total	440.4	971	530.6	120.5

Source: IEP

Note: Total refers to the sum of the five states, the total change across the five states and the total percentage change.



Since 2015, 23 states have recorded deteriorations in the economic impact of violence, with the average state deteriorating by 68.6 percent.



GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT

Mexico's government spending on domestic security and the judicial system as a percentage of GDP is half of the OECD average. Considering the country's high levels of violence, considerable gains could be made by increasing funding to match the OECD average.

Government expenditure on containing and dealing with violence accounted for 12.8 percent of Mexico's economic impact of violence in 2021, or 633.1 billion pesos. Violence containment spending is comprised of the government expenditures on *domestic security*, the *military* and the *justice system*. In 2021, the economic impact of these three indicators increased by 4.7 percent from the previous year.

Since 2007, federal violence containment expenditure increased by 78.5 percent accounting for inflation.¹⁷ The government's expenditure on the military, judicial system and domestic security has increased, but the size of the increase has differed for each category. Of the three, military expenditure saw the largest change, increasing by 127 percent since 2007. This was followed by expenditure on the judicial system, which increased by 56.2 percent and expenditure on domestic security, which increased 18.4 percent.

These differences suggest that Mexico is increasingly leaning towards a military solution to its internal security problem. In 2019, the Mexican Government formed the National Guard which combines personnel from the army police, the naval police and the federal police. The intention was to increase the pool of resources available to combat organized crime and improve the efficiency of the security apparatus.^{18,19} However, the increased focus on militarization created unease among the traditional internal security organizations.²⁰

In recent years, the government has implemented austerity measures.²¹ Consequently, in four of the last five years, the government has cut funding for domestic security and the justice system. In contrast, the expenditure on the military has decreased only once in the last five years.²² The government's expenditure on domestic security services has fallen by 37.2 percent since 2015.

Spending on domestic security through police, protection services, custody and incarceration costs, surveillance and security of persons, and respective administration costs peaked in 2012, but has since declined by 37.7 percent.²³ Spending on the justice system in 2021 was 108 billion pesos, down by 3.3 percent from the previous year.

While spending on public order and safety has decreased over the last years, spending on the military has outpaced other forms of government expenditure. Military expenditure is currently 166.5 billion pesos, the highest level on record. Furthermore, military expenditure increased by 21.3 billion pesos in 2021 from the previous budget – the largest increase since at least 2007 when records began.²⁴

Mexico spends less on security, justice and public order, and


domestic safety than regional and international averages. Mexico's expenditure on the military is equivalent to 0.6 percent of its GDP, well under the global average.²⁵ Similarly, Mexican public spending on justice and domestic security is well below regional and international levels. Mexico spent 0.63 percent of its GDP on the justice system and domestic security in 2021, less than half of the OECD average.²⁶ A similar trend emerges when Mexican spending on justice and domestic security is compared with other Latin American and Caribbean countries.²⁷

Figure 3.8 shows the government's expenditure on violence containment from 2007 to 2021. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show the justice system and domestic security spending for countries in the OECD, and for Latin America and the Caribbean, displaying Mexico's relative position in both groups.

Given the magnitude of the direct losses from *homicide* and *violent crime*, there is a strong argument for increasing violence containment spend in Mexico. The Mexican system has found it difficult to build sufficient judicial capacity to meet the demand. Consequently, Mexico's justice system displays the need to increase the number of judges. Mexico has an average of 4.5 judges per 100,000 people.²⁸ This is half the average number of judges compared to the rest of Latin America and nearly four times less than the global average. This deficit limits the judicial system's capacity to process cases and creates backlogs of unsolved cases

FIGURE 3.8
Trend in government spending on violence containment, 2007–2021

Mexico's military expenditure was at its highest level in 2021, while domestic security expenditure was at a 13-year low.



Source: Mexican Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP); IEP

and persons incarcerated without a sentence. By increasing the number of judges, the capacity of Mexico's legal system may improve, leading to reductions in overcrowding in prisons and those incarcerated without a sentence.²⁹ However, increasing the number of judges alone is not enough, and concerted efforts to reduce corruption in the judicial system and improve public trust are necessary.

The pattern of federal expenditure on domestic security and justice by state does not match the levels of violence as captured by state MPI scores. States such as Baja California, Michoacán, Chihuahua and Guanajuato experience high levels of violence yet have a below-average per capita spending on domestic security and justice. Figure 3.11 shows the level of peacefulness and per capita domestic security expenditure by state.

In evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of government spending on the justice and public security sectors, spending


beyond an optimal level has the potential to constrain a nation's economic development. This is because excessive investment on security would unnecessarily divert funds from other sectors such as education and health.

However, underinvestment can create conditions for higher levels of impunity, which in turn reduces deterrents to crime and violence. According to the Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security / *Secretariado Ejecutivo de Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública* (SESNSP), there is approximately a 42 percent deficit of state police, a finding that supports the hypothesis of underinvestment in security.³⁰ With 1.02 police officers per 1,000 people, Mexico is below the international minimum standard of 1.8 police officers per 1,000 people established by the National Public Security Council / *Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública* (CONASP).^{31,32}

FIGURE 3.9

Domestic security and justice system spending in OECD countries, percentage of GDP

Mexico spends 0.66 percent of its GDP on public order and safety, less than half of the OECD average.




Source: OECD; Mexican Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP); IEP calculations
 Note: Where data isn't available for the latest year, the latest available data is used.

FIGURE 3.10

Domestic security and justice system spending in Latin America and Caribbean countries, percentage of GDP

Mexico's expenditure on domestic security and justice as a proportion of GDP is less than half the average for Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries.



Source: Jaitman (2018); IEP calculations
 Note: Mexico figure calculated by IEP for 2021, other countries reflect 2014 levels from Jaitman (2018).

KEY FINDINGS ↗

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE

37.2% ↘

Spending on domestic security decreased by 37.2 percent from 2015 to 2021, after adjusting for inflation. Spending on the justice system decreased by 7.5 percent over the same period.




A one percent decline in the economic impact of violence would equal the federal government's investment in science, technology and innovation in 2021.

FIGURE 3.11

State MPI scores and per capita expenditure on domestic security and justice, 2021

States that experience the lowest levels of peace do not necessarily receive higher per capita funds for domestic security and justice.



Source: INEGI; IEP

Limited public resources mean that an increase in spending on containing violence has to be funded by either increased taxes or reallocating funds from other sectors. These trade-offs are not easy to navigate and present an important policy challenge. In Mexico, the lack of capacity in the judicial and security sectors leads to a security gap where the consequential costs of violence far exceed the containment costs. Therefore, achieving optimal spending on public security expenditure is important for achieving the most productive use of capital.

METHODOLOGY

The economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic activity related to "containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence." The **economic impact of violence** refers to the total cost (direct and indirect) of violence plus an economic peace multiplier. The **economic cost of violence** refers to the direct and indirect costs of violence.

IEP's estimate of the economic impact of violence includes three components:

1. **Direct costs** are the costs of crime or violence to the victim, the perpetrator, and the government, including those associated with policing, medical expenses, funerals or incarceration.
2. **Indirect costs** accrue after the fact. These include physical and psychological trauma and the present value of future costs associated with the violent incident, such as the consequential lost future income. There is also a measure of the impact of fear on the economy, as people who fear that they may become a victim of violent crime alter their behavior.
3. The **multiplier effect** is a commonly used economic concept that describes the extent to which additional expenditure has flow-on impacts in the wider economy. Injections of new income into the economy will lead to more spending, which will in turn create employment, further income and encourage additional spending, thereby increasing GDP. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle explains the "multiplier effect," and why a dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity. The multiplier effect calculates the additional economic activity that would have accrued if the direct costs of violence had been avoided. Refer to Box 3.3 for more detail on the multiplier.

Mexico's economic impact of violence consists of three categories:

1. **Violence containment expenditure** refers to the direct and indirect costs associated with preventing or dealing with the consequences of violence. This includes government spending on domestic security, justice and military.
2. **Protection Costs** refers to the personal and business expenses from the National Survey of Business Victimization (ENVE) and the National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Security (ENVPIE) surveys.
3. **Interpersonal Violence** refers to the direct and indirect costs associated with homicide, violent crimes, organized crimes and the fear of victimization.

This study uses a cost accounting methodology to measure the economic impact of violence. Expenditures on containing violence are totaled and unit costs are applied to the MPI estimates for the number of crimes committed. A unit cost is also applied to the estimated level of fear of insecurity. The unit costs estimate the direct (tangible) and indirect (intangible) costs of each crime. Direct unit costs include losses to the victim and perpetrator and exclude costs incurred by law enforcement

and health care systems, as these are captured elsewhere in the model. The direct costs for violent crime and organized crime are obtained from household and business surveys undertaken by the Mexican statistical office, which assesses economic and health costs to the victim of a crime.

Indirect unit costs include the physical and psychological trauma, and the present value of future costs associated with the violent incident, such as lost lifetime wages for homicide victims.

The cost estimates provided in this report are in constant 2021 pesos, which facilitates the comparison of the estimates over time. The estimate only includes elements of violence in which reliable data could be obtained. As such, the estimate can be considered conservative. The items listed below are included in the cost of violence methodology:

1. Homicide
2. Violent crime, which includes assault, sexual violence and robbery
3. Organized crime, which includes extortion and kidnapping
4. Indirect costs of incarceration
5. Fear of insecurity
6. Protections costs, including private security and firearms
7. Federal spending on violence containment, which includes the military, domestic national security and the justice system
8. Medical and funeral costs.

The economic impact of violence excludes:

- State level and municipal public spending on security
- The cost of drug trade related crimes such as the production, possession, transport and supply of drugs
- Population displacement due to violence.

Although data are available for some of these categories, it is either not fully available for all states or for each year of analysis.

BOX 3.3

The multiplier effect

The multiplier effect is a commonly used economic concept that describes the extent to which additional expenditure improves the wider economy. Injections of new income into the economy will lead to more spending, which in turn creates employment, further income and additional spending. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle is known as the "multiplier effect" and is the reason that a peso of expenditure can create more than one peso of economic activity.

Although the exact magnitude of this effect is difficult to measure, it is likely to be particularly high in the case of expenditure related to containing violence. For instance, if a community were to become more peaceful, individuals and corporations would spend less time and resources protecting themselves against violence. Due to this decrease in violence, there would likely be substantial flow-on effects for the wider economy, as money is diverted towards more productive areas such as health, business investment, education and infrastructure.

The potential economic benefits from increased peace can be significant. When a homicide is avoided, the direct


costs, such as the money spent on medical treatment and a funeral, can be spent elsewhere. The economy also benefits from the victim's lifetime income and expenditure.

More generally, there is strong evidence to suggest that violence and the fear of violence can fundamentally alter the incentives for business. For example, Brauer and Tepper-Marlin (2009) argue that violence or the fear of violence may result in some economic activities not occurring at all. Their analysis of 730 business ventures in Colombia from 1997 to 2001 found that amidst higher levels of violence, new ventures were less likely to survive and profit. Consequently, with greater levels of violence, it is likely that employment rates and economic productivity will fall long-term, due to the disincentives around job creation and long-term investments.

This study assumes that the multiplier is one, signifying that for every peso saved on violence containment, there will be an additional peso of economic activity. This is a relatively conservative multiplier and broadly in line with similar studies.²²

“

A dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity



4 | POSITIVE PEACE

KEY FINDINGS

- Mexico's national Positive Peace Index (PPI) score has deteriorated by 1.1 percent since 2009. This is in contrast to the 2.7 percent improvement in the average national score for countries in Central America and the Caribbean over the same period.
- Positive Peace in Mexico steadily improved between 2009 and 2015, but then recorded substantial deteriorations between 2015 and 2020, undoing the gains made in the previous years.
- The net deterioration since 2009 was driven by three Pillars of Positive Peace: *Well-Functioning Government*, *Low Levels of Corruption* and *Good Relations with Neighbors*.
- Since 2009, the Pillar of Positive Peace to record the largest improvement was the *Free Flow of Information*. This was driven by national policies to improve Internet access and the use of information technologies. Despite this overall improvement, this Pillar faces serious challenges in Mexico, particularly in relation to violence against journalists.
- The *Acceptance of the Rights of Others* Pillar also improved substantially, mainly driven by Mexico's achievement of near gender parity in the federal legislature.
- Between 2019 and 2020, Mexico's PPI score recorded a sharp deterioration, most likely the result of administrative measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and the implementation of tougher initiatives to stem the tide of immigrants from Central America.
- The lockdown measures led to a reduction in GDP, increasing unemployment and causing disruption to education programs, which in turn caused a negative impact on the *Sound Business Environment* Pillar. The harsher stance on immigrants passing through Mexico generated friction between the immigrants and locals, and negatively affected the *Acceptance of the Rights of Others* Pillar.
- At the sub-national level, the Mexico Positive Peace Index (MPPI) identifies variations in societal resilience across the country's 32 states. Querétaro, Baja California Sur, Aguascalientes, Sonora and Tlaxcala recorded the highest levels of Positive Peace in 2020.
- In contrast, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Morelos, Veracruz and Michoacán recorded the lowest levels of Positive Peace.
- The MPPI Pillars with the strongest associations with actual peace, as measured by the MPI, are *Low Levels of Corruption* and *Well-Functioning Government*. This suggests that corruption and administrative ineffectiveness are key drivers of violence in Mexico, as they contribute to impunity and reduce the amount of resources available to combat crime.



WHAT IS POSITIVE PEACE?

Positive Peace is defined as the *attitudes, institutions and structures* that create and sustain peaceful societies (Figure 4.1). The same factors also lead to many other desirable socio-economic outcomes. Higher levels of Positive Peace are statistically linked to greater income growth, better environmental outcomes, higher levels of wellbeing, better developmental results and stronger resilience.

IEP has empirically derived the Positive Peace Index (PPI) through the analysis of almost 25,000 economic and social progress indicators to determine which ones have statistically significant relationships with peace as measured by the Global Peace Index (GPI).

FIGURE 4.1

What is Positive Peace?

Positive Peace is a complementary concept to negative peace.



THE PILLARS OF POSITIVE PEACE

Positive Peace is predicated on eight key factors, or Pillars, that describe the workings of the socio-economic system:

Well-Functioning Government – A well-functioning government delivers high-quality public and civil services, engenders trust and participation, demonstrates political stability and upholds the rule of law.

Sound Business Environment – The strength of economic conditions as well as the formal institutions that support the operation of the private sector. Business competitiveness and economic productivity are both associated with the most peaceful countries.

Equitable Distribution of Resources – Peaceful countries tend to ensure equity in access to resources such as education, health and economic opportunity.

Acceptance of the Rights of Others – Peaceful countries often have formal laws that guarantee basic human rights and freedoms, and the informal social and cultural norms that relate to behaviors of citizens.

Good Relations with Neighbors – Peaceful relations with other countries are as important as good relations between groups within a country. Countries with positive external relations are more peaceful and tend to be more politically stable, have better functioning governments, are regionally integrated and have lower levels of organized internal conflict.

Free Flow of Information – Free and independent media disseminates information in a way that leads to greater knowledge and helps individuals, businesses and civil society make better decisions. This leads to better outcomes and more rational responses in times of crisis.

High Levels of Human Capital – A skilled human capital base reflects the extent to which societies educate citizens and promote the development of knowledge, thereby improving economic productivity, care for the young, political participation and social capital.

Low Levels of Corruption – In societies with high levels of corruption, resources are inefficiently allocated, often leading to a lack of funding for essential services and civil unrest. Low corruption can enhance confidence and trust in institutions.

FIGURE 4.2

The Pillars of Positive Peace

All eight factors are highly interconnected and interact in complex ways.



The Pillars of Positive Peace interact systemically to support a society’s attitudes, institutions *and* structures that underpin development and peacebuilding (Figure 4.2). High levels of Positive Peace occur where attitudes make violence less tolerated, institutions are resilient and more responsive to society’s needs, and structures create the environment for the nonviolent resolution of grievances.

The Pillars also offer a practical framework for the implementation of small-scale Positive Peace projects. In cooperation with its global partners, IEP implements and supports a number of projects in local communities around the world using the Pillars of Positive Peace as the main framework to plan action and design measurement.

BOX 4.1

Measuring Positive Peace in Mexico

This section assesses the state of Positive Peace in Mexico in two different but complementary ways. The first – presented in the sub-section ‘Positive Peace in Mexico’ – is an assessment of where Mexico as a country stands in the global Positive Peace framework. This approach uses data and insight derived from the 2022 Positive Peace Index, and investigates Positive Peace in Mexico against a global context so as to allow for comparisons with neighbors or other comparable countries. The objective of comparing and ranking countries is to give policymakers insight into which socio-economic trends, developments and initiatives have been effective in creating and supporting peaceful societies around the world.

The second approach is the development of a sub-national Positive Peace Index for Mexico presented in the section

‘Positive Peace by State’ on page 65. The sub-national Mexico Positive Peace Index uses Mexico-specific data, produced by the national statistical agency and third-party sources, to assess the level of Positive Peace in each of Mexico’s 32 states.

It is currently not possible to replicate the 24 indicators of the global Positive Peace Index at the sub-national level in Mexico (see Section 6: Methodology). For the sub-national analysis section, data have therefore been obtained from various statistical sources and selected based on their statistical relationships with the MPI and their ability to, as closely as possible, capture elements of the eight Pillars of Peace.

In addition to the framework of the eight Pillars, Positive Peace can also be studied through the lenses of its three domains:

- *Attitudes* describes how members of a society view and relate to one another.
- *Institutions* measures the effectiveness, transparency and inclusiveness of administrative organizations.
- *Structures* gauges the technological, scientific and economic foundations that support social development.


The 2022 Positive Peace Index uses 24 indicators of socio-economic development produced by reputable sources of publicly available data. The data for the indicators cover 163 nations and independent territories worldwide, corresponding to 99.7 percent of the global population. These statistical indicators are selected for having high correlations with actual peace as measured by the GPI internal peace score.

Each indicator is allocated to a Pillar and a domain according to the nature of the information it conveys. Indicator scores are harmonized, meaning scores close to 5 indicate less socio-economic resilience and scores close to 1 indicate more socio-economic resilience. A more detailed discussion of the indicators, concepts, methodology and results of the PPI can be found in the 2022 Positive Peace Index.¹

FIGURE 4.3

Overall Positive Peace Score in Mexico, 2009–2020

Over the past decade, Mexico’s national Positive Peace score deteriorated by 1.1 percent, primarily driven by developments since 2015.



Source: IEP Global Positive Peace Index 2022

TABLE 4.1

Positive Peace Index – Central America and the Caribbean rankings, 2020

Mexico displayed a high level of Positive Peace in 2019, ranking sixth in Central America and the Caribbean.

COUNTRY	STATUS IN 2020			POSITIVE PEACE CATEGORY	CHANGE IN SCORE FROM 2009 TO 2020 (%)
	REGIONAL RANK/12	GLOBAL RANK/163	SCORE		
Costa Rica	1/12	39/163	2.314	Very High	-5.8
Trinidad and Tobago	2/12	47/163	2.682	High	-4.2
Panama	3/12	50/163	2.718	High	-6
Jamaica	4/12	53/163	2.833	High	-6.7
Mexico	5/12	76/163	3.123	High	1.1
Dominican Republic	6/12	82/163	3.185	Medium	-7.3
Cuba	7/12	91/163	3.259	Medium	-7
El Salvador	8/12	92/163	3.275	Medium	-0.3
Honduras	9/12	107/163	3.566	Medium	1.7
Nicaragua	10/12	109/163	3.574	Medium	1.1
Guatemala	11/12	121/163	3.652	Medium	0
Haiti	12/12	148/163	4.041	Low	-1.9
Regional Average			3.185		-2.7

Source: IEP Global Positive Peace Index 2022



POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO: RESULTS FROM THE 2022 GLOBAL POSITIVE PEACE INDEX

Positive Peace has deteriorated by 1.1 percent in Mexico over the past decade, in contrast to a 2.7 percent improvement in the average Central America and Caribbean regional score.² Of the 12 countries included in this grouping, Mexico was one of just four that deteriorated in Positive Peace between 2009 and 2020. This indicates that Mexico has become less resilient than ten years ago, both in absolute terms and relative to its counterparts.

In 2020, Mexico ranked 76th out of the 163 countries in the PPI. This is 14 places worse than its position in 2009, although the country has remained in the ‘High Positive Peace’ category alongside countries such as Panama, Jamaica, Brazil and Colombia. Among its regional neighbors, Mexico ranked as the fifth highest Positive Peace nation (Table 4.1).

TRENDS IN POSITIVE PEACE

Mexico’s deterioration in Positive Peace occurred from 2015 onwards when the nation’s PPI score began to reverse gains achieved earlier in the decade (Figure 4.3). This was driven by deteriorating scores for the *Institutions* domain, which measures the effectiveness of administrative organizations, and the *Attitudes* domain, which captures how citizens and social groups interrelate (Figure 4.4).

The *Structures* domain has improved fairly steadily since 2009. This domain improved by more than ten percent in the last decade, and was the primary factor driving Mexico's improvement in the overall PPI between 2009 and 2015.

In contrast, the four percent deterioration in Mexico's *Institutions* domain between 2009 and 2020 was heavily influenced by worsening scores in the *government effectiveness* and *rule of law* indicators, particularly from 2016 onwards. To some extent, this reflects the authorities' ineffectiveness in handling the precarious internal security situation in the country and in rooting out endemic corruption and impunity.

Since 2006, Mexico has employed its military to combat drug


trafficking and organized crime. While this added resources and personnel to the effort against crime, it also meant the military took on responsibilities that were previously managed by civilian agencies. In this shift, there have been many reports of infringements of human rights.³ Between 2014 to 2019, Mexico's National Human Rights Commission / *Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos* (CNDH) received nearly 3,000 complaints regarding alleged military abuses.⁴

More recently, between 2019 and 2020, Mexico's PPI score deteriorated sharply as a result of a number of factors discussed in Box 4.2.

FIGURE 4.4

Positive Peace Domain Scores in Mexico, 2009–2020

In the second half of the 2010s, further progress in the *Structures* Domain was more than offset by steep deteriorations in the *Institutions* and *Attitudes* Domains.



Source: IEP Global Positive Peace Index 2022



Between 2019 and 2020, Mexico's PPI score recorded a sharp deterioration, most likely the result of administrative measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and the implementation of tougher initiatives to stem the tide of immigrants from Central America.

BOX 4.2

Mexico's sharp deterioration in Positive Peace in 2020

Between 2019 and 2020, the Mexican PPI score deteriorated from 3.074 to 3.123. This 1.6 percent deterioration was one of the largest recorded in the 2022 Positive Peace Index and caused the country to drop six places in the global PPI rankings.

This deterioration was driven by sharp movements in two indicators in the *Attitudes* domain: a 33 percent deterioration in *law to support the rights of population segments* and an 11 percent deterioration in the *quality of information* disseminated by the government domestically. These indicators capture a number of recent developments in Mexico – including responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and the treatment of international migrants in the country – that detracted significantly from the country's overall score.

In recent years, Mexico has witnessed a growing number of refugees and other international migrants passing through or seeking to resettle in the country. Most of these people enter Mexico to flee extreme violence and poverty in their home countries, primarily in Central America, with the intention of continuing on to the United States. However, there has also been a significant increase in the number of people seeking asylum in Mexico itself. In 2021, the number of migrants requesting asylum in Mexico reached a record 130,863, which was more than three times as many received in 2020 and more than 14 times as many received in 2016.⁵

Since 2019, the Mexican government has implemented a stricter policy toward unauthorized migrants in the country. This has entailed the detention and, in some cases, deportation of Central American migrants attempting to pass through Mexico on their way to the US. Many of these actions were conducted by Mexico's National Guard and took place around the country's southern border with Guatemala.⁶ In addition, the crackdowns on migrant flows by both Mexican and US authorities have left migrants especially vulnerable to criminal organizations and people smugglers. While underreporting rates for crimes committed against unauthorized migrants are extremely high, over the past six years, the most commonly reported crime has been robbery, at 43 percent of the total. This is followed by crimes related to the illegal trafficking of migrants at 31.2 percent, and kidnapping at 11.5 percent.⁷

Misinformation disseminated through social media has further added to the crisis, turning many southern Mexicans increasingly hostile towards asylum seekers.^{8,9}

The COVID-19 pandemic

The policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have also had a significant impact on Positive Peace in Mexico. For example, the GDP per capita indicator (from the *Sound Business Environment* Pillar) deteriorated by 5.4 percent from 2019 to 2020, reflecting business failures, unemployment and worker furloughs as a result of lockdowns and social distancing measures. This caused the Pillar to deteriorate by 2.1 percent in that period.

Economic inequality also increased, with the indicator *exclusion by socio-economic group* (from the *Acceptance of the Rights of Others* Pillar) deteriorating by 2.6 percent. According to survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), in 2021, 64.7 percent of people from low-income households reported that their economic situation was worse than in the previous year, compared to 35.3 percent from high-income households and 53.2 percent from middle-income households.

The economic downturn also disproportionately affected women, with 61 percent of female respondents reporting a worse economic situation than in the previous year, compared to 48 percent of male respondents.¹⁰ Of those respondents who reported their economic situation had worsened, a higher proportion of female respondents suggested this was due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.¹¹

In addition to a steep decline in GDP, the measures implemented to combat the pandemic resulted in Mexico's unemployment rate rising from 3.5 percent in 2019 to 4.7 percent in 2020. The number of people living in poverty rose from 51.9 million in 2018 to 55.7 million in 2020.¹² Mexico's large and well-developed tourism industry was also heavily impacted, with the number of international tourists arriving in Mexico almost halving from 2019 to 2020.¹³

In the future, as more data sources update their global indicators for 2020 and 2021, the impact of the pandemic and the measures implemented to manage it in Mexico – and the world – will be more clearly reflected in the Positive Peace Index.

POSITIVE PEACE PILLARS

Since 2009, Mexico’s largest improvement was in the *Free Flow of Information* Pillar (Figure 4.5). This was due to a 50 percent improvement in the indicator *individuals using the Internet* (Figure 4.6). This trend was observed globally and was greatly influenced by the development and proliferation of new technologies, along with the reduction in the costs of telecommunications equipment.

While approximately 26 percent of Mexicans had access to the Internet in 2009, by 2020 this proportion had risen to 72 percent.¹⁴ Instrumental to this rise was an initiative called *México Conectado* (Connected Mexico) implemented from 2013 onwards by then President Enrique Peña Nieto. This initiative saw the nation invest US\$1 billion in bringing broadband connections to libraries, schools, hospitals and other public facilities in urban and rural areas.¹⁵

Partially offsetting the expansion of *individuals using the Internet*, Mexico recorded a steep deterioration in the *quality of information* disseminated by the authorities domestically. The rise in disinformation has been a worldwide phenomenon but in Mexico it took a serious toll in the credibility of official sources, especially around the 2018 presidential elections. Several political parties used bots and influencers to spread information that supported their political views and objectives.¹⁶ *Quality of information*, one of the indicators in the *Free Flow of Information* Pillar, deteriorated by 44 percent in the past decade (Figure 4.6). More recently, *quality of information* deteriorated further as disinformation about the migrant caravans began to spread (Box 4.2).

The Pillar *Acceptance of the Rights of Others* recorded substantial progress. The Pillar improved by almost five percent since 2009 on the back of efforts to reduce gender disparities and economic inequality. This reflects a substantial improvement in the *gender*


inequality indicator. Mexico has made continuous progress in supporting women’s rights, especially with regards to political representation at the federal level. A number of other initiatives have also been successful in addressing the gender gap in the country. For example, in 2008, more men were enrolled in tertiary education than women; ten years later the situation had been reversed, with over 42.3 percent of women accessing colleges, compared to 40.7 percent of men.¹⁷ Gender quota laws have also helped to create near gender parity in Mexico’s legislature. In 2021, women were elected to 50 percent of the seats in the country’s Senate and more than 48 percent of the seats in its Chamber of Deputies.¹⁸

Further contributing to the *Acceptance of the Rights of Others* Pillar, the indicator *exclusion by socio-economic group* has also improved, as social spending reduced the level of poverty and inequality in the country. Social programs implemented by the government at different times in the past few decades such as *Prospera, Proagro and Pensión Universal para Personas Adultas Mayores* have contributed to a reduction in poverty in urban and rural areas. The World Bank estimates that Mexico’s poverty rate – the number of persons living on PPP \$3.20 per day or less – fell from 4.9 percent of the population in 2008 to 1.8 percent in 2018.¹⁹

The indicator *youth not in employment, education or training* has improved substantially over the past decade. In Mexico, youth unemployment rates fell from ten percent in 2009 to seven percent in 2019. This is noteworthy progress, although rates again ticked up to eight percent in 2020 because of measures implemented to contain the COVID-19 pandemic.

FIGURE 4.5
Positive Peace changes by Pillar, Mexico, 2009–2020

There were substantial improvements in *Free Flow of Information* and *Acceptance of the Rights of Others*. *Low Levels of Corruption* and *Well-Functioning Government* had the largest deteriorations.



Source: IEP Global Positive Peace Index 2022

The *Low Levels of Corruption* Pillar has deteriorated by almost eight percent since 2009, with all three indicators in this Pillar deteriorating. In Mexico, corruption is strongly linked with organized crime which has increased by 48.1 percent since 2015. Drug cartels often co-opt authorities to facilitate illicit and criminal activities. Impunity is also common across the country. As of 2020, almost nine out of every ten homicides in Mexico have gone unpunished, according to Impunidad Cero.²⁰


Corruption also affects individuals in Mexico. Experiences of petty corruption from ordinary citizens have increased in recent years, with the proportion of people reporting experiences of corruption in their contact with public servants rising from 12.1 percent in 2013 to 15.7 percent in 2019.²¹ Moreover, there have been a number of high-profile corruption cases, whereby public funds were

diverted or embezzled by politicians or public servants. Combating corruption has become a central issue of the current government, which was elected in 2018 on an anti-corruption platform.²²

Well-Functioning Government recorded the steepest deterioration of all Pillars, by almost 15 percent since 2009. All three indicators of this Pillar deteriorated between 2009 and 2020, with one – *government openness and transparency* – deteriorating by 50 percent. Lack of transparency is a consequence of and further contributor to high levels of corruption. *Good Relations with Neighbors* also deteriorated markedly, driven by the poor result of the indicator *law to support equal treatment of population*. This reflects the growing tensions between some Mexican residents and the refugees and international migrants passing through the country on their way to the US.²³

FIGURE 4.6
Positive Peace changes by indicators, Mexico, 2009–2020

Positive Peace in Mexico has benefited from improvements in Internet access among the population. However, it was more than offset by deteriorations in government openness, quality of information and others.



Source: IEP Global Positive Peace Index 2022



POSITIVE PEACE BY STATE: THE MEXICO POSITIVE PEACE INDEX

The Mexico Positive Peace Index (MPPI) is calculated using an adapted version of the global Positive Peace Index (PPI) methodology. It uses state-level economic, governance, social and attitudinal data sourced primarily from Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography / *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* (INEGI), including the National Survey of Victimization and Public Security Perceptions / *Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública* (ENVIPE) and other surveys. It also uses data from the World Bank, Article 19 and IDD-Mex to build a picture of the state of societal resilience within Mexico.



POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO



This section outlines the sub-national Mexico Positive Peace Index (MPPI) using state-based statistical indicators of socio-economic development. The MPPI uses 24 indicators grouped along the eight Pillars of Positive Peace (Table 4.2). These sub-national indicators map to the global Positive Peace Index as closely as possible and were selected based on their correlations to the MPI crime indicators. However, due to specific issues in the Mexican

sub-national context as well as some data limitations, some indicators have had to be slightly adapted.

Similar to the methodology of the global Positive Peace Index, MPPI indicator scores are harmonized, meaning scores close to 5 indicate less socio-economic resilience and scores close to 1 indicate more socio-economic resilience.

TABLE 4.2

Indicators in the sub-national Mexico Positive Peace Index, 2020

Mexico's sub-national Positive Peace Index was calculated from 24 indicators produced by local and international agencies.

Pillar	Indicator name	Source
Acceptance of the Rights of Others	Civil Liberties	IDD-Mex
	Gender Inequality	UNDP HDI-S
	Political Rights	IDD-Mex
Equitable Distribution of Resources	Access To Nutritious And Quality Food	CONEVAL
	Extreme Poverty	CONEVAL
	Inequality	IDD-Mex
Free Flow of Information	Attacks On Journalists	Article 19
	Internet Access	INEGI ENDUTIH
	Proportion Of Public Institutions That Have A Website	INEGI CNGSPSPE
Good Relations With Neighbors	Confidence In Neighbors	ENVIPE
	Organized Neighbors To Address Issue Of Theft	ENVIPE
	State-Society Competitiveness	World Bank
High Levels of Human Capital	Access To Health Services	CONEVAL
	Illiteracy Rate	IDD-Mex
	Public Expenditure In Education	IDD-Mex
Low Levels of Corruption	Judicial Corruption	ENVIPE
	Perception Of Corruption	ENVIPE
	State Government Corruption	ENVIPE
Sound Business Environment	GDP per Capita (log)	IDD-Mex
	Unemployment Rate	INEGI
	Investment	IDD-Mex
Well-Functioning Government	Citizen Democracy Index	IDD-Mex
	Political Commitment	IDD-Mex
	Homicide Sentencing Rate	INEGI CNG, SESNSP

Note: Índice de Desarrollo Democrático de México (IDD-Mex), Human Development Index sub-national (HDI-S), Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL), Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI), Encuesta Nacional sobre Disponibilidad y Uso de Tecnologías de la Información en los Hogares (ENDUTIH), Censo Nacional de Gobierno, Seguridad Pública y Sistema Penitenciario Estatales (CNGSPSPE), Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE), Censo Nacional de Gobierno (CNG), Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (SESNSP).

The states of Querétaro, Baja California Sur, Aguascalientes, Sonora and Tlaxcala recorded the strongest performance in the MPPI in 2020 (Figure 4.7). The states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, Morelos, Veracruz and Michoacán had the lowest levels of Positive Peace in the country.

Most of Mexico's 32 states recorded MPPI scores around the national average of 3.123.²⁴ This is a relatively high degree of homogeneity and is to be expected in a sub-national analysis since many of the indicators of Positive Peace are influenced by laws and administrative programs implemented nationally and applied uniformly across a nation's constituent states. This means developmental successes and failures are evenly spread across the country and are reflected in the data as such.

In addition, within domestic borders, individuals and groups may migrate from one state to another largely unimpeded. If, for instance, unemployment is particularly high in one state, individuals may move to other parts of the country where it may be less difficult to secure jobs. The relative freedom of movement of people, resources and capital across state borders also contributes to sub-national Positive Peace indices such as the MPPI being more homogeneous than the global PPI.

This relative uniformity of state-by-state Positive Peace outcomes is one of the reasons the relationship between Positive Peace and negative peace²⁵ can become ambiguous at the sub-national level. From state to state, differences in levels of societal resilience are not always large enough to underpin sizable and measurable discrepancies in actual peace. This is a general finding that has been verified in other sub-national analyses conducted by IEP.²⁶ In the case of Mexico, certain characteristics of violence and conflict further distort the relationship between peace and societal resilience.


SUB-NATIONAL POSITIVE PEACE AND THE MPI

Organized crime and drug trafficking in Mexico distort the relationship between levels of violence and Positive Peace. States with higher levels of socio-economic resilience also have greater markets for drugs and more suitable infrastructure of roads and ports through which criminal organizations may transport illegal substances. In addition, some of the states with the highest levels of Positive Peace, as measured by the MPPI, are located close to the border with the US, which means they have high strategic value for the illegal drug trade.

FIGURE 4.7

Mexico Positive Peace by state, 2020

Querétaro, Baja California Sur and Aguascalientes posted the highest state levels of Positive Peace.



Source: IEP

FIGURE 4.8

Correlations between Positive Peace and the MPI, 2020

The relationships between Positive Peace and the MPI show that violence tends to increase as indicators of *Low Levels of Corruption* and *Well-Functioning Government* deteriorate. The economic nature of violence in Mexico also shows an inverse relationship with traditional human development indicators.

0.47	-0.04	0.35	0.38	GRN organized neighbors to address issue of theft
0.46	-0.24	0.21	0.26	LLC judicial corruption
0.37	0.45	0.15	0.20	HLHC public expenditure in education
0.37	0.25	0.30	0.34	WFG political commitment
0.01	0.55	0.32	0.21	LLC perception of corruption
-0.06	0.36	0.41	0.38	LLC state government corruption
0.20	0.27	0.53	0.47	WFG citizen democracy index
0.05	0.27	0.54	0.52	WFG homicide sentencing rate
0.08	0.21	0.26	0.20	ARO civil liberties
0.18	0.16	0.21	0.33	SBE investment
0.19	0.08	0.29	0.24	EDR inequality
0.09	0.03	0.24	0.27	SBE unemployment rate
0.16	0.13	-0.17	-0.21	EDR inequality
0.15	0.36	-0.21	-0.23	SBE unemployment rate
-0.36	-0.14	-0.40	-0.50	ARO gender inequality
-0.44	-0.18	-0.20	-0.24	EDR access to nutritious and quality food
-0.62	-0.26	-0.22	-0.30	EDR extreme poverty
-0.38	-0.41	0.05	-0.05	FFI Internet access
-0.51	-0.41	-0.08	-0.16	HLHC illiteracy rate
-0.41	0.08	-0.23	-0.28	GRN confidence in neighbors
-0.21	0.15	-0.04	-0.07	FFI attacks on journalists
-0.43	-0.01	0.02	-0.06	HLHC access to health services
-0.03	-0.06	-0.03	-0.14	FFI proportion of public institutions that have a website
-0.28	-0.23	0.05	0.04	SBE GDP per capita
MPI organized crime	MPI violent crime	MPI firearms crime	MPI homicide	

Source: IEP

Note: Correlation coefficients higher than 0.3 are highlighted in darker red; those lower than -0.3 are highlighted in darker blue.

Figure 4.8 shows the statistical relationship between MPI crime sub-indicators and the indicators of Positive Peace in Mexico. This shows the various relationships that factors of Positive Peace have with violence in Mexico. These interrelated results demonstrate the need to understand the Mexican context using systems thinking.


The indicators in red at the top of Figure 4.8 represent factors that trend with violence. That is, in states where these factors are weaker, violence tends to be higher. *Low Levels of Corruption* and *Well-Functioning Government* feature solely in this category and show direct correlation across all types of crime in the MPI. This shows that corruption and administrative ineffectiveness enable crime and violence through misallocating funds that could otherwise have been dedicated to public security. The lack of political rights and civil liberties also show an association with higher levels of violence and crime.

Conversely, the Positive Peace indicators in the bottom half of Figure 4.8, largely colored in blue, show an inverse relationship with crime and violence in Mexico. That is, states that perform well in these indicators also tend to have higher levels of violence. In particular, GDP per capita indicates that wealthier states have

FIGURE 4.9

Police wages and organized crime, 2020

Mexico's wealthier states – where police wages are higher – attract more activity from criminal organizations because of their more developed economic infrastructure.



Source: SESNSP; IEP

higher levels of organized crime and violent crime, reflecting the economic nature of these illicit activities. Simultaneously, wealthier states tend to perform more strongly in gender equality indicators, literacy rates, Internet access and access to food and health services. Combined, this has the effect of states that perform better in traditional human development measures of health, wealth and education have higher rates of organized and violent crime.

The link between wealth and organized crime has an important implication for corruption. In recent years, there have been suggestions that low police wages could push officers into corrupt practices to supplement their income.²⁷ This would support impunity and contribute to violence in the country. However,

Figure 4.9 shows that states with low police wages also have low rates of organized crime, and vice versa. In contrast, the Positive Peace analysis presented here suggests that corruption at an institutional level, especially in the judiciary and political systems, shows a stronger relationship to violence in the country.

Such analysis shows the value of using the Pillars of Positive Peace to provide a holistic and systemic lens through which to view the issues facing a country. However, how these interact at a local level will be context specific. In recognition of this, in 2022, IEP developed HALO – an open source and standardized toolbox for describing problems systemically to inform effective responses (Box 4.3).

BOX 4.3

HALO - a new framework and methodology for analyzing societies from a systems perspective

The Halo approach has been designed as a set of 24 building blocks for the analysis of societal systems and the design of resilience building programs. This allows for an adaptive approach that can be uniquely tailored based on many dependencies, including the size of the societal system and the level of sophistication required in the analysis. Halo workshops and programs can be as short as two days or as long as one year using this building block approach. Different building blocks can be utilized depending on the strengths of the design team, desired outcomes and the length of time allocated for the analysis.

Analyzing systems can be time consuming, resource intensive and expensive. One of the most critical difficulties in the process is the lack of comprehensive information on the state and dynamics of a system. Therefore, it is important to understand the scope of the work the research team can undertake and the limitations

they face from the very beginning. Arguably the best approach is to start with the simplest depiction of a system and progressively build its complexity.

Once the analysis is complete there should be enough information to be able to look at what interventions are needed to rectify the imbalances within the system and to set it on a new course. In defining interventions, it is generally better to consistently nudge the system towards improvement, rather than radically change it, as that will only destroy the system, leaving an uncertain replacement or increase the possibility for mistakes. One big mistake is difficult to recover from, whereas small changes can be undone more easily, even if they are numerous.

In addition, drastic changes – even those in the right direction – can be disruptive and, in extreme cases, destabilizing for the system. Abrupt changes create a great deal of uncertainty and individuals, groups or organizations may be unsure about how they fit in the new systemic structure. For this reason, it is possible that large or radical changes may cause resistance and antagonism. More details on the Halo approach can be found in the Positive Peace Report 2022.




FIVE STATES WITH THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF POSITIVE PEACE

As noted, state-by-state differences in Positive Peace tend to be small as most administrative initiatives are implemented uniformly across a nation. However, local circumstances and state-based programs have helped some states achieve

higher levels of Positive Peace than others. The states that recorded the highest levels of Positive Peace in 2020 were Querétaro, Baja California Sur, Aguascalientes, Sonora and Tlaxcala.

Querétaro Rank: 1

Positive Peace Pillar scores, Querétaro, 2020




Source: IEP

Querétaro recorded the top MPPI ranking, with a score of 2.428. The state recorded levels of Positive Peace higher than the national average across all Pillars. In particular, Querétaro outperformed the other states by large margins in the *Well-Functioning Government*, *Free Flow of Information* and *Low Levels of Corruption* Pillars. The state was the first in the country to establish a formal anti-corruption system. In 2017, it created the *Fiscalía Especializada en el Combate a la Corrupción*, a prosecutor's office specializing in corruption cases. Partly the result of initiatives of this kind, Querétaro has among the lowest levels of corruption in Mexico. Despite this, survey data found that 11.3 percent of the state's population had been victimized by corruption in 2019.²⁸

Baja California Sur Rank: 2

Positive Peace Pillar scores, Baja California Sur, 2020




Source: IEP

With the second highest MPPI ranking, **Baja California Sur** recorded an overall MPPI score of 2.555 in 2020. Baja California Sur outperformed the national average in all Positive Peace Pillars, with the exception of *Good Relations with Neighbors*. The state performed well in the *Free Flow of Information*, *Acceptance of the Rights of Others* and *Well-Functioning Government*. Baja California Sur is one of the states with the highest rates of Internet access among households. With the assistance of the federal government, the state is implementing programs to increase the reach of Internet services via satellite, including among rural communities through initiatives such as the *Programa de Internet Satelital* (Satellite Internet Program).

Aguascalientes Rank: 3

Positive Peace Pillar scores, Aguascalientes, 2020




Source: IEP

Aguascalientes recorded levels of Positive Peace higher than the national average across all Pillars. The state's score in 2020 was 2.667, with the Pillar *Good Relations with Neighbors* being one of the key contributors to its high level of societal resilience. The state's business and innovation sectors are competitive, which supports trade and capital flows. The Index of Industrial Activity produced by INEGI shows that industrial production in Aguascalientes has been growing in recent years against a trend of decline among most other states.

Sonora Rank: 4

Positive Peace Pillar scores, Sonora, 2020




Source: IEP

With an overall MPPI score of 2.716, **Sonora** recorded substantial progress in addressing gender inequality over the past decade. In the state's legislature, for example, women outnumber men. This is unusual for Latin America and even among very high Positive Peace nations across the world. As a result, Sonora's score in the Pillar *Acceptance of the Rights of Others* is among the best in Mexico and outperforms the national average by a wide margin. This means the state has one of the highest levels of Positive Peace in the country, despite Sonora's performance in most other Pillars being close to that of other states.

Tlaxcala Rank: 5

Positive Peace Pillar scores, Tlaxcala, 2020



Tlaxcala recorded the best outcome of all states in the *Low Levels of Corruption* Pillar. This Pillar's score is 1.795 for the state, which is almost half the national average score of 3.226. This reflects Tlaxcala's effectiveness in combating corruption, and in combination with favorable performances in the *Acceptance of the Rights of Others* and *Free Flow of Information*, places Tlaxcala close to the top in the MPPI rankings. However, social inequality and poverty remain high and have contributed to a particularly weak result in the *Equitable Distribution of Resources* Pillar.



FIVE STATES WITH THE LOWEST LEVELS OF POSITIVE PEACE

Guerrero Rank: 32

Positive Peace Pillar scores, Guerrero, 2020




Source: IEP

The state of **Guerrero** recorded the lowest level of Positive Peace in the MPPI, with a score of 4.122 in 2020. All Pillars of Positive Peace underperformed the national average, with *Equitable Distribution of Resources* and *Well-Functioning Government* posting particularly poor results. Almost two-thirds of the state's population live in poverty, making it Mexico's second poorest, behind Chiapas. Poverty levels had been declining in the second half of the 2010s, with the implementation of many social welfare, education and health initiatives. While positive, the reduction in poverty has been slow, and may have been reversed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the administrative measures put in place to contain it in 2020 and 2021.

Oaxaca Rank: 31

Positive Peace Pillar scores, Oaxaca, 2020




Source: IEP

Oaxaca also features among Mexico's poorest states. Its MPPI ranking was 31st in 2020, ahead only of Guerrero. This result was largely driven by weak outcomes in the *Free Flow of Information*, *Acceptance of the Rights of Others* and *Equitable Distribution of Resources* Pillars. The state has one of the lowest rates of Internet users in the nation – at 55 percent of the population. This is above only that of Chiapas – at 46 percent – and substantially below the 72 percent national average.²⁹ Gender imbalances are also pronounced in the state; for example, two-thirds of the illiterate population being women. The state remains largely rural, with less than half of the population living in urban areas.³⁰ This compares with a national average of nearly 81 percent.³¹

Morelos

Rank: 30

Positive Peace Pillar scores, Morelos, 2020




Source: IEP

Ranked 30th out of Mexico's 32 states, **Morelos** shows deficiencies in *Well-Functioning Government*, *Acceptance of the Rights of Others* and *High Levels of Human Capital*. In a recent survey, 83 percent of Morelos's residents considered the state government to be inefficient when dealing with the most pressing problems facing the community.³² Morelos suffers from high levels of corruption and 99.6 percent of its violent crimes go unpunished.³³ *Equitable Distribution of Resources* also records worse scores than the national average, with half of the state population living below the national poverty rate, compared to a national average of 44 percent.

Veracruz

Rank: 29

Positive Peace Pillar scores, Veracruz, 2020




Source: IEP

In four of the eight Pillars of Positive Peace – *Acceptance of the Rights of Others*, *Well-Functioning Government*, *High Levels of Human Capital* and *Equitable Distribution of Resources* – the state of **Veracruz** scored substantially weaker than most of its counterparts. For the remainder of the Pillars, Veracruz's results were broadly aligned with national averages. Gender inequality remains a serious issue in the state, which contributed to the poor results in the *Acceptance of the Rights of Others*. According to Mexico's statistical bureau INEGI, women in Veracruz have a workload of 8.7 hours per week (paid and unpaid work) more than men's.³⁴ This gap is the fourth largest in Mexico.

Michoacán

Rank: 28

Positive Peace Pillar scores, Michoacán, 2020



Source: IEP

Michoacán ranks 28th in the 2020 MPPI, with a score of 3.542. The state's score in the *Well-Functioning Government* Pillar was particularly weak in comparison with the national average. Contributing to this result, the state operates with a high level of criminal impunity, with only around 1.3 percent of criminal acts being denounced and investigated.³⁵ In addition, almost 38 percent of the population does not have access to basic health services.³⁶ This already high rate has increased in recent years, further lowering the state's performance in the *High Levels of Human Capital* Pillar.

5

STRENGTHENING POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO

Positive Peace and negative peace are complementary concepts. Understanding this systemic relationship is vital in designing peacebuilding strategies that simultaneously contain violence, foster societal resilience and build socio-economic development.

This section presents examples of initiatives, projects and public policies that contribute to the strengthening of Positive Peace at state and national levels in Mexico. It also shows how the conceptual framework of the eight Pillars of Positive Peace, developed by IEP, can be implemented to pursue peacebuilding in ways that seek to address the complex and systemic nature of negative and Positive Peace.



MEXICO CASE STUDIES

POSITIVE PEACE TRAINING FOR YOUTH, THE MILITARY AND POLICE

Within Mexico, IEP has conducted numerous conferences and training workshops with members of the military, the police, local civil society organizations, state governments and citizens. These workshops have developed the capacity of these organizations and individuals to implement Positive Peace within their communities.

Starting in 2019, IEP Mexico has provided a series of conferences and training workshops for some of the main institutions responsible for training military personnel in the country, such as the National School of Sergeants, the War College, the Military School of Nursing and the Military School of Music. In addition, IEP has collaborated on Positive Peace initiatives with Mexico's federal government and state representatives from Jalisco, Hidalgo, Sinaloa, Guerrero and Morelos.

Over the last three years, IEP has trained approximately 3,500 young leaders and peacebuilders, 3,500 local public servants and 3,000 members of the armed forces in Mexico.

Some of the activities IEP has been involved in include:

- Training sessions for 830 soon-to-be first sergeants at the Military School of Sergeants in Puebla and a presentation on military education and innovation to 250 directors from military education institutions in Mexico, both in 2019.
- A training session held on International Women's Day in March 2020, for 500 women belonging to various units of the Mexican Army.
- A Positive Peace workshop held in August 2019 for 400 state police officers belonging to five different divisions in Hidalgo. To date, IEP has provided workshops to more than 1,000 state police officers and approximately 300 women who work in the Secretary of Public Security in the state of Hidalgo.
- Sixteen workshops, held between September and December 2019, in the 12 regions that make up the state of Jalisco, training more than 500 public servants, including mayors, councilors, public officials and municipal police.
- Training sessions for more than 3,500 young leaders and peacebuilders in the states of Jalisco and Sinaloa since 2020.

PEACE AMBASSADORS AND ACTIVATORS

In 2015, IEP launched its global Ambassadors program which educates people around the world on the work of IEP and Positive Peace. The program provides participants with concrete knowledge and tools to apply Positive Peace in their own spaces through community projects, conferences, trainings and other public events.

In 2017, Rotary International and IEP partnered to develop, organize and run the first national 'A Stronger Mexico' meeting. The event spanned three days in the state of Puebla and convened 300 leaders interested in building peace in their surroundings. Based on the success of this meeting, a second group of 150 young people was trained in Hidalgo and Mexico City in 2019.

These events led to the formation of a National Pro Peace Network. This network develops a large number of Positive Peace initiatives in schools, universities, local governments, companies, civil society organizations and the media throughout the country.

To further build on this momentum, Rotaract Mexico formed the National Committee for Positive Peace. With a presence in all regions of the country, this committee allows young Rotarians to disseminate Positive Peace content among the nearly ten thousand Rotarians in Mexico.

These Positive Peace communities have had both a local and international impact. In 2019, several members participated and facilitated activities in the XVII World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates in Mérida, Yucatán. In the same year, others attended the Rotary International Convention in Hamburg, Germany. Six of these participants now form part of a group of 30 Positive Peace Activators in Latin America.

Initiated by Rotary, the Positive Peace Activators Program connects high-level professionals for the promotion of peace in the region. Between August 2020 and April 2022, the Program has seen 30 Activators trained in Latin America, reaching over 22,000 people. IEP has also expanded its Positive Peace training across the region, with workshops held in Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.



Initiated by Rotary, the Positive Peace Activators Program connects high-level professionals for the promotion of peace in the region.



JALISCO: CULTURE OF PEACE, CITIZEN SECURITY REFORM AND ALTERNATIVE JUSTICE

Since 2015, the state of Jalisco has reported an overall deterioration in peacefulness. While Jalisco improved by 2.7 percent in overall peacefulness in 2021, consistently high homicide and violent crime rates have prevented the state from achieving larger overall improvements. Against this backdrop, a growing interest in peace as a practical policy objective in the state government, spurred on by the encouragement of a number of civil society groups, has led to many agencies engaging with IEP to implement Positive Peace initiatives.

CULTURE OF PEACE LAW

In April 2021, the state Congress of Jalisco approved the State Law for the Culture of Peace / *Ley Estatal de Cultura de Paz*,¹ the first law of its kind in Mexico. The law recognizes peace as a human right and aims to promote the principles that guarantee social justice and harmonious coexistence among people. This law is guided by 15 principles, which include the elimination of social inequalities, co-responsibility, human rights, governance and citizen participation, inclusivity, transparency and accountability. As such, the Culture of Peace law contributes to strengthening of the *Well-Functioning Government, Good Relations with Neighbors and Acceptance of the Rights of Others* Pillars of Positive Peace.

In developing the state government's program for a Culture of Peace, IEP participated in discussions along with public agencies, civil society organizations and universities. Notably, IEP is one of the principal advisors to the Jalisco state government on the development of the Culture of Peace program.

The implementation of the State Law for the Culture of Peace is linked to other initiatives, such as laws on social development, youth, equality between women and men, the treatment of victims of violence and the rights of minors. While the impacts of the program and the new law are yet to be seen, the creation of the law is a positive step towards opening opportunities for dialogue and the strengthening of relationships between people and institutions in Jalisco.

CITIZEN SECURITY REFORM

In recent years, several events in Jalisco, such as the death of Giovanni López in police custody and subsequent protests, have led state authorities to open avenues for dialogue and public reflection.^{2,3} As a result, a new citizen security model has been proposed that calls for inclusive responsibility and peacebuilding in Jalisco.

To date, this transition has led to the creation of a new police university, a network of police peacebuilders, multiple restructurings in the prosecutor's office to give priority to the rights of victims of violence, comprehensive capacity-building programs and a series of reforms that address the multifaceted challenges facing the state. While these changes are still being implemented, it is a positive sign that they are rooted in systemic approaches.

ALTERNATIVE JUSTICE INSTITUTE

The growing work of Jalisco's Alternative Justice Institute / *Instituto de Justicia Alternativa* (IJA) also aligns closely with the Positive Peace framework.⁴ While the IJA was created a decade ago, its impact has grown significantly since 2019.

In view of often overstretched and under-resourced law enforcement agencies and an impunity rate of nearly 95 percent at the national level,⁵ the Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms / *Mecanismos Alternativos de Solución de Controversias* (MASC) offer citizens a reliable, fast and free option to resolve their conflicts. These mechanisms make it possible to settle non-violent disputes between neighbors, family members and even businesses.

In Jalisco, the IJA has 50 public mediation centers that offer services to resolve conflicts in family, civil, commercial, criminal and community matters free of charge.⁶ In the last three years, the number of agreements reached has grown by more than 200 percent. These agreements have the same validity and force as the sentences issued by a judge. As such, these agreements can provide an opportunity to access justice systems for people who typically may not be able to access them, and can help to prevent the violent escalation of conflicts.⁷



PEACEBUILDING AND RECONCILIATION COUNCILS

Recent government initiatives to address the social causes of crime and violence have sought new approaches to peacebuilding, including multi-sectoral collaboration and direct attention to vulnerable populations. An example is the model of state Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Councils, implemented by the Ministry of the Interior / *Secretaría de Gobernación* (SEGOB).⁸

The main objective of the councils is to promote short- and medium-term local processes that strengthen Positive Peace and community resilience. By prioritizing vulnerable groups and reducing the inequality gaps that underlie social grievances, it also seeks to reestablish broken relationships and restore social trust, particularly between citizens and authorities. To achieve this, the councils bring together the government, media, private sector, universities, civil society organizations and churches.

As of April 2022, four Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Councils have been piloted nationwide, in the states of Guerrero, Michoacán, Quintana Roo and Sinaloa. At the time of writing, councils in Michoacán and Quintana Roo have recently been formalized and written into law. Each council establishes its agenda and determines the priorities of its own state, though the federal program also proposes some specific objectives that include the mapping of local actors, the development of peacebuilding initiatives and the creation of spaces for dialogue and collective exchange.

The process of creation and consolidation of the state Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Councils is presented in four stages:

1. Identification of strategic actors and leaders to initiate community consultations and dialogue.
2. Definition of the community peace agenda and priorities for the programs.
3. Formalizing the structures that will oversee and carry out the programs.
4. Evaluating and systematizing the programs and initiatives, and seeking ways to secure their sustainability.

Through focusing on the factors and dynamics that prioritize peace, the design of the Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Council's policies highlight issues that until recently had not been addressed. The achievement of the councils' medium- and long-term objectives will depend on the ability of the actors to collaborate and bridge differences in interests in order to build agreements that promote collective well-being and the emergence of an ethic of peace.

In terms of Positive Peace, the state Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Councils provide examples of ways in which to strengthen *High Levels of Human Capital, Good Relations with Neighbors* and *Equitable Distribution of Resources*.



NATIONAL ANTI-KIDNAPPING COORDINATION

In 2014, the National Anti-Kidnapping Coordination / *Coordinación Nacional Antisecuestro* (CONASE) was established under the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection / *Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana* (SSPC). CONASE is highlighted as an example of effective institutional coordination, with greater cooperation between federal public security forces and state prosecutors' offices to address kidnapping.

CONASE's strategy to combat kidnapping in Mexico is based on three principles:

1. An approved investigation process and the systematization of actions in the cabinet, field and tactical support areas.
2. The reduction of the backlog in the execution of arrest warrants throughout the country.
3. The strengthening and increasing involvement of judicial authorities in the handling of investigations.

Efforts to reduce kidnapping are reflected in long-term trends. The MPI finds that kidnapping and human trafficking experienced one of the largest improvements of any sub-indicator in the last seven years. In that period, the national kidnapping and human trafficking rate fell by 59.3 percent, from 11.7 cases per 100,000 people in 2015 to 4.8 in 2021 (Figure 5.1). The most significant annual improvement occurred in 2020 with a 24.9 percent reduction.

The work of CONASE is part of a "zero impunity" approach by the federal government. Part of CONASE's novel approach includes a working model that relies on inter-institutional coordination, technology and intelligence resources, which has seen an increase in the number of convictions (*sentencias condenatorias*) by the justice system. Figures recently released by the government affirm that, between July 2019 and February 2022, 4,286 people have been arrested for kidnapping, 1,859 kidnapping victims were released, and 469 kidnapping gangs have been dismantled.⁹


In addition to the reduction of violence from kidnapping, CONASE can be seen as a positive step towards improving the population's confidence in its institutions, encouraging crime reporting and reducing impunity. From a Positive Peace perspective, the work of CONASE helps to strengthen several Pillars including *Well-Functioning Government, Low Levels of Corruption, Equitable Distribution of Resources* and *Sound Business Environment*.

There is no doubt that a multitude of factors could have contributed to the long-term reduction in kidnappings; however, the case of CONASE stands out. The work of CONASE highlights the benefit of inter-institutional efforts and current successes provide optimism that these efforts can be expanded to other types of crime. As of March 2022, the federal government is reportedly establishing a National Anti-Homicide Coordination / *Coordinación Nacional Antihomicidios* based on the structure and achievements of CONASE.¹⁰

FIGURE 5.1

Trend in the national kidnapping and human trafficking rate, 2015–2021

Since 2015, the national kidnapping and human trafficking rate in Mexico has improved by 59.3 percent.



Source: SESNSP; IEP

6

2022 MEXICO PEACE INDEX METHODOLOGY

The Mexico Peace Index (MPI) is based on the concepts and framework of the Global Peace Index (GPI), the leading global measure of peacefulness, produced annually by IEP since 2007. As an internal analysis of a single country, the MPI adapts the GPI methodology for a sub-national application, similar to the United Kingdom Peace Index (UKPI) and the United States Peace Index (USPI), also produced by IEP. All of these indices measure negative peace according to its definition as "the absence of violence or fear of violence".

The 2022 edition is the ninth iteration of the MPI and uses data published by the Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security / *Secretariado Ejecutivo de Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública* (SESNSP).

The MPI measures peacefulness at the state level in Mexico. A key reason for choosing this unit of analysis is that, similar to the United States, Mexico's state governments have wide-ranging autonomous powers, allowing them to have a significant impact on the level of violence. The response to violence may therefore differ significantly from state to state.

The MPI is composed of five indicators. The *homicide* and *violent crime* indicators are based on those used in the USPI and UKPI, using the US Federal Bureau of Investigation's standard definition of violent crime. The *detention without a sentence* indicator in the MPI captures the excessive use of incarceration in some states. The *firearms crime* indicator represents gun use and availability, using the best available data. This is similar to the approach used

in the USPI. Lastly, the *organized crime* indicator is specific to Mexico because of the problems the country faces with organized criminal activity.

All data used to calculate the MPI comes from government bodies in Mexico. IEP then uses survey data collected by the national statistics office to adjust the crime figures for underreporting.

2022 MPI INDICATORS

DATA SOURCES

The MPI is composed of the following five indicators, scored between 1 and 5, where 1 represents the most peaceful score and 5 the least peaceful. Population data is used for estimating rates per 100,000 people. The data runs from 2015 to 2021.

Homicide

The number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 people.

Source: SESNSP

Violent Crime

The number of robbery, sexual assault, and family violence cases and the number of violent assault victims per 100,000 people, adjusted for underreporting. Robbery cases must meet one of two criteria to be included:

- types of robbery that rely on the threat of violence, such as a mugging, or
- robbery incidents where the database indicates violence was used.

Source: SESNSP

Organized Crime

The number of extortions, drug trade related crimes, and kidnapping or human trafficking investigations per 100,000 people. Extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking rates are adjusted for underreporting. Drug trade and major organized crime offenses include:

- the federal crimes of production, transport, trafficking, trade, supply, or possession of drugs or other crimes under the *Crimes Against Public Health Law / Los Delitos contra La Salud Pública*
- retail drug crimes, as a proxy indicator of the size of the market fueled by illegal drug production and distribution
- and crimes classed under the *Law Against Organized Crime / La Ley Contra El Crimen Organizada*, which includes all of the above crimes when three or more people conspire to commit them.

Source: SESNSP

Firearms Crime

The number of victims of an intentional or negligent homicide or assault committed with a firearm per 100,000 people.

Source: SESNSP

Detention without a Sentence

The ratio of persons in prison without a sentence to the number of homicides and violent crimes.

Source: Secretariat of Security and Civilian Protection / *Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana* (SSPC)

Population data

The estimated population of each state in each year.

Population data is used to calculate the rate per 100,000 people for homicide, violent crime, organized crime and weapons crime.

Source: National Population Council / *Consejo Nacional de Población* (CONAPO)

UNDERREPORTING

Only about ten percent of crimes in Mexico are reported to the authorities.¹

Two of the MPI indicators – *violent crime* and *organized crime* – are adjusted for underreporting. IEP uses ENVIPE data to calculate underreporting rates for each state and adjusts the official statistics for robbery, assault, family violence, sexual violence, extortion and kidnapping and human trafficking to better reflect actual rates of violence. This approach helps to counterbalance the high rates of underreporting in Mexico.

IEP calculated the underreporting rates for each state and crime based on the information from ENVIPE. The survey asks each

respondent if they were a victim of a particular type of crime and whether or not they reported it to the authorities. IEP sourced this data from each victimization survey for the years 2017 to 2021 and took the total number of each crime in each state for the five years. IEP then divided the total numbers of crimes reported by survey respondents by the number of crimes that survey respondents said they reported to the authorities. This produces a multiplier for adjusting the official statistics. The adjustments are made for the crimes of robbery, assault, family violence, sexual violence, extortion and kidnapping and human trafficking.

The underreporting rates use five years of data because, in some states, there were crimes where none of the victims reported the crime to the authorities. If none of the crimes were reported, the reporting rate of zero percent cannot be used to adjust the police-recorded numbers. Additionally, combining the data over time smooths out any large fluctuations in underreporting rates that may be the result of complex and imperfect surveying

methodologies, rather than a true change in reporting. Reporting rates have not changed significantly in Mexico over the last five years.

Underreporting rate

Definition: Number of crimes reported by victims on the victimization survey divided by the number of those crimes that victims stated they reported to the authorities.

Source: ENVIPE

INDICATOR SCORE & OVERALL CALCULATIONS

The MPI indicators are scored between 1 and 5, with 5 being the least peaceful score and 1 being the most peaceful score. Banded indicator scores are calculated by normalizing the range of raw values based on each state's average value over the period 2015 to 2021. First, the average value for each state over the six years of the study is calculated. Then the outliers are removed from the range of average state values in order to identify the min and max of normally distributed average values. Outliers in this case are defined as data points that are more than three standard deviations greater than the mean. Next, the values for each year are normalized using the min and max of the normal range and are banded between 1 and 5. The calculation for banded scores is:

$$Banded\ score_x = \left(\frac{raw\ value_x - min_{sample}}{max_{sample} - min_{sample}} \times 4 \right) + 1$$

Finally, if any of the banded values are above 5, the state is assigned a score of 5 and if any values are below 1, the state is assigned a score of 1.

There is one additional step used to calculate the *organized crime* score: in the case of the *organized crime* indicator, raw values are multiplied by the indicator sub-weights listed in Table 6.2. The

sub-weights are used so that the indicator score reflects the more serious societal impact of particular crimes and to correct for the uneven distribution of offenses. In 2018, extortion and retail drug crimes made up 88.6 percent of crimes, which means that the trend in these offenses would overshadow any changes in kidnapping, human trafficking or major drug crime rates.

Major organized crime offenses, such as drug trafficking and kidnapping and human trafficking have the highest weights in the *organized crime* score. These crimes reflect more severe acts of violence and provide an indication of the strength and presence of major criminal organizations. Retail drug crimes serve as a proxy indication of the size of the drug market. However, some portion of the retail drug market will represent small individual sellers or reflect personal drug use, both of which are of less concern. Human trafficking and major drug trafficking offenses are more destabilizing to Mexican society because these crimes:

- reflect large revenue sources for criminal organizations
- absorb more human and physical resources into violent, illicit economic activity
- depend upon a greater level of corruption
- indicate the presence of organizations that pose a greater threat to the Mexican state.

After the score for each indicator has been calculated, weights are applied to each of the five indicators in order to calculate the overall MPI score. The overall score is calculated by multiplying each indicator score by its index weight and then summing the weighted indicator scores.

There are many methods for choosing the weights to be applied to a composite index. In order to maintain consistency across IEP's various peace indices, the weights in the MPI mirror those used in the GPI, USPI and UKPI as closely as possible.

The weights for the GPI indicators were agreed upon by an international panel of independent peace and conflict experts and are based on a consensus view of their relative importance. To complement this approach and reflect the local context of Mexico, a second expert panel was formed consisting of leading Mexican academics and researchers to determine the final weights for the five indicators in the MPI. With direction from the expert panel at the time of the design of the index, a number of different methods, such as equal weighting, principal component analysis and

analytical hierarchical processing, were used to test the robustness of the results. The final weights as determined by the IEP research team and the expert panel are shown in Table 6.1.

TABLE 6.1
Indicator weights in the MPI

INDICATOR	WEIGHT	% OF INDEX
Homicide	4	30%
Violent crime	3	21%
Weapons crime	3	20%
Detention without a sentence	1	8%
Organized crime	3	21%

TABLE 6.2
Composition of the MPI organized crime score

MPI INDICATOR	DESCRIPTION	WEIGHT AS % OF OVERALL MPI SCORE	INDICATOR SUB-TYPE	VARIABLES INCLUDED	SUB-WEIGHT RELATIVE TO OTHER CRIMES IN THE INDICATOR
Organized crime	Extortions, kidnappings and cases of human trafficking, and narcotics crimes per 100,000 people	21%	Extortion (adjusted for underreporting)	Extortion	3
			Kidnapping & human trafficking (adjusted for underreporting)	Kidnapping	5
				Human trafficking	
			Trafficking of minors	1	
			Retail drug crimes		Possession, commerce and supply in small amounts
Major organized crime offenses	Violations of the law prohibiting crimes against public health, which criminalizes drug trafficking	20			
	Violations of the organized crime law, which criminalizes organized crime related offenses committed by three or more people				

Source: IEP

2022 MPI EXPERT PANEL

- **Alejandra Ríos Cázares**
INEGI. Directora General Adjunta de Desarrollo de Información Gubernamental, Índices e Indicadores.
- **Leslie Solís Saravía**
World Justice Project
- **Leonel Fernández Novelo**
Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano
- **Paola Jiménez Rodríguez.**
Jurimetría. Iniciativas para el Estado de Derecho, AC
- **Alberto Díaz-Cayeros**
Center for Democracy Development and Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute of International Affairs. Stanford University
- **David Ramírez De Garay**
Coordinador del Programa de Seguridad. México Evalúa



METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

The economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic activity related to "containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence." The **economic impact of violence** refers to the total cost (direct and indirect) of violence plus an economic peace multiplier. The **economic cost of violence** refers to the direct and indirect costs of violence.

IEP's estimate of the economic impact of violence includes three components:

1. **Direct costs** are the costs of crime or violence to the victim, the perpetrator and the government, including those associated with policing, medical expenses, funerals or incarceration.
2. **Indirect costs** accrue after the fact. These include physical and psychological trauma and the present value of future costs associated with the violent incident, such as the consequential lost future income. There is also a measure of the impact of fear on the economy, as people who fear that they may become a victim of violent crime alter their behavior.
3. The **multiplier effect** is a commonly used economic concept that describes the extent to which additional expenditure has flow-on impacts in the wider economy. Injections of new income into the economy will lead to more spending, which will in turn create employment, further income and encourage additional spending, thereby increasing GDP. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle explains the "multiplier effect," and why a dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity. The multiplier effect calculates the additional economic activity that would have accrued if the direct costs of violence had been avoided. Refer to box 5.1 for more detail on the multiplier.

Refer to Box 6.1 for more detail on the multiplier.

CATEGORIES AND INDICATORS INCLUDED IN THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

1. **Violence containment expenditure** refers to the direct and indirect costs associated with preventing or dealing with the consequences of violence. This includes government spending on domestic security, justice and military.
2. **Protection Costs** refers to the personal and business expenses from the National Survey of Business Victimization (ENVE) and the National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Security (ENVPIE) surveys.
3. **Interpersonal Violence** refers to the direct and indirect costs associated with homicide, violent crimes, organized crimes and the fear of victimization.

This study uses a cost accounting methodology to measure the economic impact of violence. Expenditures on containing violence are totaled and unit costs are applied to the MPI estimates for the number of crimes committed. A unit cost is also applied to the estimated level of fear of insecurity. The unit costs estimate the direct (tangible) and indirect (intangible) costs of each crime. Direct unit costs include losses to the victim and perpetrator and exclude costs incurred by law enforcement and health care systems, as these are captured elsewhere in the model. The direct costs for violent crime and organized crime are obtained from household and business surveys undertaken by the Mexican statistical office, which assesses economic and health costs to the victim of a crime.

Indirect unit costs include the physical and psychological trauma and the present value of future costs associated with the violent incident, such as lost lifetime wages for homicide victims.

The cost estimates provided in this report are in constant 2021 pesos, which facilitates the comparison of the estimates over time. The estimate only includes elements of violence in which reliable data could be obtained. As such, the estimate can be considered conservative. The items listed below are included in the cost of violence methodology:

1. Homicide
2. Violent crime, which includes assault, violence within the family, sexual violence and robbery
3. Organized crime, which includes extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking
4. Indirect costs of incarceration
5. Fear of insecurity
6. Protections costs, including private security and firearms
7. Federal spending on violence containment, which includes the military, domestic security and the justice system
8. Medical and funeral costs

The economic impact of violence excludes:

- State level and municipal public spending on security.
- The cost of drug trade related crimes such as the production, possession, transport and supply of drugs.
- Population displacement due to violence.

Although data is available for some of these categories, it is either not fully available for all states or for each year of analysis.

BOX 6.1

The multiplier effect

The multiplier effect is a commonly used economic concept, which describes the extent to which additional expenditure improves the wider economy. Injections of new income into the economy will lead to more spending, which in turn creates employment, further income and additional spending. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle is known as the “multiplier effect” and is the reason that a peso of expenditure can create more than one peso of economic activity.

Although the exact magnitude of this effect is difficult to measure, it is likely to be particularly high in the case of expenditure related to containing violence. For instance, if a community were to become more peaceful, individuals and corporations would spend less time and resources

protecting themselves against violence. Due to this decrease in violence, there would likely be substantial flow-on effects for the wider economy, as money is diverted towards more productive areas such as health, business investment, education and infrastructure.

The potential economic benefits from increased peace can be significant. When a homicide is avoided, the direct costs, such as the money spent on medical treatment and a funeral, can be spent elsewhere. The economy also benefits from the victim’s lifetime income and expenditure. More generally, there is strong evidence to suggest that violence and the fear of violence can fundamentally alter the incentives for business. For example, Brauer and Tepper-Marlin (2009) argue that

violence or the fear of violence may result in some economic activities not occurring at all. Their analysis of 730 business ventures in Colombia from 1997 to 2001 found that amidst higher levels of violence, new ventures were less likely to survive and profit. Consequently, with greater levels of violence, it is likely that employment rates and economic productivity will fall long-term, due to the disincentives around job creation and long-term investments.

This study assumes that the multiplier is one, signifying that for every peso saved on violence containment, there will be an additional peso of economic activity. This is a relatively conservative multiplier and broadly in line with similar studies.²

ESTIMATION METHODS

A combination of approaches are used to estimate the economic cost of violence to Mexico’s economy. The analysis involved two components:

1. Financial information detailing the level of expenditure on items associated with violence was used wherever possible.
2. Unit costs were used to estimate the cost of violent activities. Specifically, an estimate of the economic cost of a violent act was sourced from the literature and applied to the total number of times such an event occurred to provide an estimate of the total cost of categories of violence. The MPI data are used for the number of homicides, sexual assaults, violent assaults, robberies, kidnappings and extortions.

IEP uses federal government expenditure data for military, domestic security and the justice system as federal government violence containment costs. Data are sourced from the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit / *Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público* (SHCP). State and municipal level spending are excluded from the study due to data unavailability.

The federal government expenditure data does not provide details of the spending at the state level. Therefore, a combination of state population size and the state funding allocation from the Public Security Contribution Fund/ *Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Pública* (FASP) is used to estimate the likely distribution between states.

A unit cost approach is used to estimate the economic cost of homicide, violent crime, organized crime and fear of insecurity.

Unit costs for the homicide, violent crimes and organized crimes are based on a study by McCollister (2010) that estimated the tangible and intangible cost of violent crimes in the United States. The McCollister (2010) direct and indirect costs are applied to the number of homicides to calculate the total cost of homicide. Only the McCollister (2010) intangible (indirect) costs are applied to violent crime and organized crime. The direct costs of violent crime are taken from the nationally representative victimization surveys (ENVIPE and ENVE) administered by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Both surveys collect data on economic and health-related direct costs due to violent crime.

1. Direct costs or tangible costs of crime include medical expenses, cash losses, property theft or damage, and productivity losses.
2. Indirect costs include physical and psychological trauma as well as long-term costs due to a violent incident.

In addition to the breakdown by tangible and intangible costs, McCollister (2010) offers further details of the costs by victim, perpetrator and justice system. Such itemization enables IEP to exclude the justice system costs to avoid double counting with expenditure data used for the justice system and domestic security.

IEP also uses Dolan & Peasgood’s (2006) estimate of the unit cost of fear of crime to calculate the cost of perceptions of insecurity in Mexico.

To ensure that cost estimates appropriately represent relative income levels in Mexico, they were scaled according to Mexico’s GDP per capita relative to the US before being converted to 2021

Mexican pesos. This was based on the aforementioned US study suggesting that the indirect cost of a homicide approximates US\$8.4 million. The equivalent cost in Mexico was then calculated based on purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita of \$20,944 for Mexico as compared to \$65,298 for the US in 2020. This is called the adjusted unit cost.

All the costs are adjusted to constant 2021 pesos using GDP deflator data from the World Bank. The base year of 2021 was chosen because it is the most recent year for which GDP deflator data was available. Estimating the economic impact in constant prices facilitates comparisons over time.

Any GDP-related analysis uses the most recently available GDP data from INEGI.

CALCULATING THE COST OF HOMICIDE, VIOLENT CRIME AND ORGANIZED CRIME

To calculate the cost for the categories of crime used in this study, IEP uses the data from the MPI.

Data on the incidence of homicide is sourced from the SESNSP. Homicides are multiplied by adjusted unit costs to calculate the total cost of homicide in Mexico.

Violent crime, which includes incidents of sexual violence, robbery and assault are also sourced from SESNSP and are adjusted for underreporting. For more details on the data and underreporting adjustment refer to page 79. The economic costs of each category of violent crime are calculated using the respective adjusted unit costs.

The cost of organized crime is based on the number of incidents of extortion and kidnapping or human trafficking. To estimate the total cost of extortions and kidnapping in Mexico, IEP assumes that extortions and robbery — as well as kidnapping and assault — are equivalent in terms of their economic impact on the victim.

Therefore, unit costs for the indirect costs are sourced from McCollister (2010) and applied to extortion and kidnapping. The direct costs for violent and organized crime are sourced from ENVIPE, a national household survey of victimization and perception of public safety and ENVE, a national survey of business victimization. These surveys collect data on the economic and health-related losses to the victim of violent and organized crime.

COST OF FEAR OF INSECURITY

ENVIPE data are used to estimate the perception of insecurity at the state level in Mexico. IEP uses the proportion of respondents who felt insecure, multiplied by the state's population to arrive at the number of people who reported a fear of insecurity.

Victimization survey estimates are conducted yearly and are available from 2011 to 2021. Therefore, IEP estimates the fear of insecurity for the years for which data is not available. The unit cost of fear is taken from Dolan and Peasgood (2006), from which the adjusted unit cost is derived.

PROTECTION COSTS

Protection costs represent spending by households and businesses on measures that reduces victimization from violent and organized crime. Both households and businesses take measures such as hiring private security, purchasing firearms or insurance, installing alarms, locks and changing place of residence or business to protect themselves in the face of high levels of crime and violence. This category replaces private security expenditure and the cost of firearms.

Data for protection costs are sourced from INEGI, both for households and businesses. INEGI provides state level summaries of protection costs developed from the ENVIPE (household survey) and ENVE (business survey).

CALCULATING THE INDIRECT COST OF INCARCERATION

The direct cost of incarceration is included in the government expenditure on domestic security and the justice system. Therefore, IEP only includes the indirect cost of incarceration, which is the lost income due to imprisonment. This is calculated using the Mexican minimum wage and the number of inmates that would have been in full-time employment. Data on the minimum wage for Mexico are sourced from the Department of Labor and Social Welfare (Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social, STPS). For 2021, the minimum wage of 141.70 pesos is used. This is calculated for a yearly wage of 37,408 pesos. Literature suggests that 60 percent of people who were sentenced to prison had full-time employment prior to being in prison and 20 percent of them have some employment inside prison. Based on this, IEP considers that 60 percent of the inmates would have been in full-time employment. The minimum wage lost is calculated for 60 percent of the prison population in Mexico.

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT

To estimate the total economic impact of violence, IEP uses a peace multiplier to estimate the additional economic activity that would have resulted if violence was avoided. The conceptual underpinning of the multiplier is the opportunity cost of the resources lost by the victim, perpetrator, and the law enforcement agencies due to the crime. Therefore, the peace multiplier represents the flow-on effects of redirected expenditure from violence containment to more economically enabling activities, such as business investment or education.



POSITIVE PEACE METHODOLOGY

Positive Peace is defined as the *attitudes, institutions and structures* that create and sustain peaceful societies. IEP has measured Positive Peace at both the state and national levels in Mexico. The subnational Mexico Positive Peace Index (MPPI) is based on the methodology for the global PPI, described in full in the 2022 Positive Peace Report, available at www.visionofhumanity.org.

MEXICO POSITIVE PEACE INDEX

The methodology for measuring Positive Peace at the state level is the same as that for the global index, but the indicators in the sub-national MPPI differ slightly for two reasons:

- Sub-national data on Positive Peace is limited
- considerations specific to the Mexican context require some changes in indicators.

The sub-national MPPI was derived from a different set of indicators using information sourced from reputable Mexican and international sources (Table 6.3). Due to the frequency of data releases for some sources, the sub-national index is updated every two years.

Correlations between sub-national MPPI indicators and negative peace are relatively low (Table 6.3). For this reason, all indicators were weighted equally in building the Pillars and the overall score. Correlations are low presumably because most policies influencing socio-economic outcomes are set up at the national rather than state level. Thus sub-national data may be more prone to statistical noise. That is, variations in the measurement statistic that reflect mostly methodological issues and data-gathering limitations rather than actual differences in the underlying social phenomenon being measured.

Further, in some countries – and this appears to be the case in Mexico – the states or regions with the highest standards of living are sometimes those with greater urbanization and interpersonal violence. In addition, Mexican states with higher levels of socio-economic resilience are typically those where criminal organizations are more active since they have more suitable infrastructure of roads and ports through which criminal organizations may transport illegal substances.

TABLE 6.3

Indicators in the sub-national Mexico Positive Peace Index, 2020

PILLAR	INDICATOR NAME	SOURCE*	CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (TO THE MPI)
Acceptance of the Rights of Others	Civil Liberties	IDD-Mex	0.27
	Gender Inequality	UNDP HDI-S	-0.5
	Political Rights	IDD-Mex	0.24
Equitable Distribution of Resources	Access to Nutritious and Quality Food	CONEVAL	-0.33
	Extreme Poverty	CONEVAL	-0.44
	Inequality	IDD-Mex	-0.07
Free Flow of Information	Attacks on Journalists	Article 19	-0.07
	Internet Access	INEGI ENDUTIH	-0.21
	Proportion of Public Institutions that have a Website	INEGI CNGSPSPE	-0.1
Good Relations with Neighbors	Confidence in Neighbors	ENVIPE	-0.31
	Organized Neighbors to Address Issue of Theft	ENVIPE	0.4
	State-Society Competitiveness	World Bank	0.31

	Access to Health Services	CONEVAL	-0.15
High Levels of Human Capital	Illiteracy Rate	IDD-Mex	-0.34
	Public Expenditure in Education	IDD-Mex	0.33
	Judicial Corruption	ENVIPE	0.25
Low Levels of Corruption	Perception of Corruption	ENVIPE	0.31
	State Government Corruption	ENVIPE	0.37
	GDP per Capita (log)	IDD-Mex	-0.05
Sound Business Environment	Unemployment Rate	INEGI	-0.05
	Investment	IDD-Mex	0.23
	Citizen Democracy Index	IDD-Mex	0.49
Well-Functioning Government	Political Commitment	IDD-Mex	0.4
	Homicide Sentencing Rate	INEGI CNG, SESNSP	0.47

Source: *Índice de Desarrollo Democrático de México (IDD-Mex), Human Development Index sub-national (HDI-S), Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL), Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI), Encuesta Nacional sobre Disponibilidad y Uso de Tecnologías de la Información en los Hogares (ENDUTIH), Censo Nacional de Gobierno, Seguridad Pública y Sistema Penitenciario Estatales (CNGSPSPE), Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE), Censo Nacional de Gobierno (CNG), Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (SESNSP).

CALCULATING STATE SCORES

The process for calculating state Positive Peace scores is similar to that described for calculating the MPI, but all indicators in the MPPI are evenly weighted. Thus, the indicators are normalized and banded, and then the arithmetic mean of indicator score is calculated as the score for each Pillar. The arithmetic mean of the Pillar scores is used for each state's overall score.

COMPARING PREVIOUS INDICES

The Positive Peace indicators in this report are different from those used in the 2020 MPI, when the MPPI was last updated. This was necessary to guarantee the currency of the data, to update the constituents of the Pillars, and to be able to observe changes over time. For this reason, the MPPI presented in this report is not directly comparable with that of the 2020 report.

APPENDICES

RESULTS TABLES

APPENDIX A

MPI RESULTS

Table A.1

Overall Scores, 2015–2021

A lower score indicates a better level of peacefulness.

STATE	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
AGUASCALIENTES	1.841	1.736	2.061	2.218	2.325	2.249	2.150
BAJA CALIFORNIA	3.073	3.056	3.932	4.310	4.459	4.401	4.307
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR	2.639	3.222	4.331	2.923	2.601	2.520	2.478
CAMPECHE	1.670	1.644	1.626	1.555	1.944	1.689	1.622
CHIAPAS	1.816	1.729	1.739	1.810	1.734	1.610	1.613
CHIHUAHUA	2.525	2.795	3.274	3.372	3.695	3.756	3.517
COAHUILA	2.378	1.794	1.806	1.949	2.033	1.991	1.967
COLIMA	2.451	3.836	3.884	4.050	4.311	4.328	3.989
DURANGO	2.171	2.105	2.193	2.128	2.156	2.071	2.051
GUANAJUATO	2.019	2.072	2.352	3.169	3.332	3.617	3.567
GUERRERO	3.303	3.626	3.666	3.691	3.405	2.954	2.862
HIDALGO	1.454	1.524	1.721	1.837	1.998	1.874	1.817
JALISCO	2.266	2.239	2.425	2.729	2.692	2.567	2.496
MÉXICO	2.621	2.377	2.563	2.658	2.830	2.867	2.904
MEXICO CITY	2.306	2.300	2.484	2.888	2.965	2.462	2.426
MICHOACÁN	2.183	2.369	2.507	2.640	2.922	3.004	3.190
MORELOS	2.693	2.768	2.630	2.760	3.274	3.058	3.299
NAYARIT	1.794	1.552	2.204	2.394	1.903	1.825	1.869
NUEVO LEÓN	2.299	2.519	2.606	2.549	2.599	2.508	2.802
OAXACA	1.652	2.149	2.267	2.630	2.526	2.349	2.290
PUEBLA	1.911	1.745	1.932	2.141	2.286	2.051	2.042
QUERÉTARO	1.620	1.664	1.836	2.047	2.379	2.416	2.348
QUINTANA ROO	2.276	1.963	2.473	3.313	3.774	3.118	3.052
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ	1.852	2.056	2.300	2.365	2.544	2.882	2.730
SINALOA	3.010	2.800	3.156	2.756	2.543	2.403	2.294
SONORA	2.708	2.865	2.831	2.336	2.913	3.178	3.524
TABASCO	2.151	2.197	2.441	2.906	2.795	2.338	2.113
TAMAULIPAS	2.746	2.757	2.921	2.738	2.309	2.122	2.064
TLAXCALA	1.385	1.392	1.437	1.457	1.510	1.564	1.517
VERACRUZ	1.476	1.733	2.140	2.057	2.257	2.082	2.028
YUCATÁN	1.488	1.457	1.366	1.242	1.237	1.245	1.254
ZACATECAS	2.145	2.491	3.095	3.237	3.261	3.933	4.227
NATIONAL	2.225	2.244	2.473	2.623	2.702	2.610	2.605

Source: IEP

APPENDIX B

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

Table B.1

The economic impact of violence 2021, constant 2021 pesos

STATE	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (BILLIONS)	PER CAPITA ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE % GDP
AGUASCALIENTES	60.9	41,929	15.7%
BAJA CALIFORNIA	261.0	70,730	26.7%
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR	31.5	38,308	12.8%
CAMPECHE	26.2	25,796	2.8%
CHIAPAS	119.5	20,558	25.4%
CHIHUAHUA	220.9	57,570	23.9%
COAHUILA	58.1	17,820	5.2%
COLIMA	58.1	72,851	32.3%
DURANGO	42.3	22,446	11.2%
GUANAJUATO	324.0	51,593	27.9%
GUERRERO	133.6	36,422	33.2%
HIDALGO	79.7	25,537	17.4%
JALISCO	300.1	35,347	14.3%
MÉXICO	586.7	33,327	22.0%
MEXICO CITY	410.4	45,578	6.8%
MICHOACÁN	313.7	64,572	44.6%
MORELOS	128.4	62,202	43.5%
NAYARIT	31.6	24,177	13.0%
NUEVO LEÓN	204.3	35,927	8.8%
OAXACA	144.5	34,695	35.1%
PUEBLA	271.1	40,678	28.2%
QUERÉTARO	101.3	43,686	12.1%
QUINTANA ROO	95.1	54,004	22.9%
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ	98.8	34,223	16.1%
SINALOA	92.1	28,963	14.3%
SONORA	179.7	57,770	18.8%
TABASCO	77.5	29,803	8.6%
TAMAULIPAS	101.6	27,608	12.0%
TLAXCALA	27.5	19,713	13.7%
VERACRUZ	187.7	21,855	14.2%
YUCATÁN	27.6	12,064	4.5%
ZACATECAS	130.7	77,871	51.9%
NATIONAL	4926.2		

Source: IEP

Table B.2

The economic impact of violence 2015–2021, constant 2021 pesos, billions

STATE	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
AGUASCALIENTES	38.7	39.2	47.7	53.4	59.1	63.3	60.9
BAJA CALIFORNIA	157.6	165.7	246.5	298.1	276.2	270.1	261.0
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR	33.8	42.1	79.5	36.3	34.9	30.1	31.5
CAMPECHE	17.9	22.0	20.3	21.6	22.7	22.4	26.2
CHIAPAS	124.0	121.3	127.6	138.7	131.3	113.8	119.5
CHIHUAHUA	136.6	160.9	201.2	228.0	243.5	240.7	220.9
COAHUILA	73.3	71.2	71.8	78.0	75.4	61.7	58.1
COLIMA	25.1	56.7	77.7	70.4	73.7	66.6	58.1
DURANGO	49.7	50.1	47.9	45.6	44.6	40.8	42.3
GUANAJUATO	157.0	170.1	197.6	329.8	349.6	419.7	324.0
GUERRERO	201.7	213.7	233.4	228.3	188.5	140.0	133.6
HIDALGO	55.9	63.1	73.6	82.0	93.2	83.2	79.7
JALISCO	206.6	243.3	274.5	324.1	335.2	332.4	300.1
MÉXICO	642.7	590.7	642.1	677.3	669.0	628.8	586.7
MEXICO CITY	290.2	287.7	303.3	390.8	376.8	420.4	410.4
MICHOACÁN	153.4	182.3	198.8	217.0	252.5	268.9	313.7
MORELOS	95.4	104.5	102.2	118.9	129.7	117.8	128.4
NAYARIT	21.6	16.6	38.2	42.8	30.3	30.5	31.6
NUEVO LEÓN	140.6	163.2	165.2	197.5	181.8	183.8	204.3
OAXACA	60.2	148.8	149.9	181.5	183.8	154.8	144.5
PUEBLA	170.8	182.5	194.9	246.0	266.7	265.4	271.1
QUERÉTARO	56.3	54.2	58.5	69.1	67.5	102.4	101.3
QUINTANA ROO	52.5	43.1	59.3	93.6	99.6	86.3	95.1
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ	60.8	68.2	85.2	99.8	86.6	99.2	98.8
SINALOA	119.3	131.4	166.4	127.6	112.9	103.9	92.1
SONORA	98.4	109.7	112.7	115.2	147.3	159.0	179.7
TABASCO	67.1	73.7	86.6	100.3	105.1	88.6	77.5
TAMAULIPAS	126.5	136.5	150.9	144.1	122.6	105.0	101.6
TLAXCALA	24.8	24.7	27.2	29.2	32.8	28.5	27.5
VERACRUZ	148.6	197.6	244.7	236.8	243.2	208.3	187.7
YUCATÁN	51.0	54.1	48.5	45.1	32.0	27.6	27.6
ZACATECAS	44.7	64.5	76.4	75.9	76.2	99.8	130.7
NATIONAL	3,702.8	4,053.2	4,610.4	5,142.7	5,144.3	5,063.6	4,926.2

Source: IEP

ENDNOTES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- 1 IEP calculation using SESNSP homicide data and Lantia Consultores estimate of organized crime-related homicides cited in: Seelke, C.R., Klein, J. (2022). 'Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations'. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved April 4, 2022, from: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42917.pdf>.
- 2 According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Events Dataset (GED) best estimate: Petterson, T. et al. (2021) 'Organized violence 1989-2020, with a special emphasis on Syria', *Journal of Peace Research*, 58(4); Sundberg, R. and Melander, E. (2013) 'Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(4), pp. 523-532. doi:10.1177/0022343313484347.
- 3 CMDPDH. (2021). 'Episodios de desplazamiento interno forzado en México: Informe 2020'. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from: <https://www.cmdpdh.org/publicaciones-pdf/cmdpdh-episodios-de-desplazamiento-interno-forzado-en-mexico-informe-2020.pdf>; Pradilla, A. (2022). 'Desplazamiento interno por violencia se incrementa un 360% al cierre de 2021', *Animal Político*. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from: <https://www.animalpolitico.com/2022/02/desplazamiento-interno-violencia-crecio-cierre-2021/>.
- 4 Total refers to 2016 to 2020 period.
- 5 Dunham, J. (2022). 'Attacks on the press: The deadliest countries in 2021'. Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://cpj.org/reports/2022/01/attacks-on-the-press-the-deadliest-countries-in-2021/>; Chaparro, L. (2021). 'Mexico's most dangerous job is only getting more deadly, and I've seen up close how bad it's getting'. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.businessinsider.com.au/mexico-is-deadliest-country-for-journalists-and-only-getting-worse-2021-9>.
- 6 According to data from the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPI). The exact number of victims varies as different studies apply different criteria in measuring this type of violence.
- 7 '7 Journalists and Media Workers Killed in Mexico – in 2022 / Motive Confirmed or Unconfirmed'. (2022). Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved April 4, 2022, from: [https://cpj.org/data/ ; 'Reporter killed in Mexico to become seventh journalist killing this year'. \(2022\). *The Guardian*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/seventh-journalist-killed-mexico>.](https://cpj.org/data/killed/?status=Killed&motiveConfirmed%5B%5D=Confirmed&motiveUnconfirmed%5B%5D=Unconfirmed&type%5B%5D=Journalist&type%5B%5D=Media%20Worker&cc_fips%5B%5D=MX&start_year=2022&end_year=2022&group_by=year)
- 8 The Global Health Observatory. 'Global health estimates: Leading causes of death – Cause-specific mortality, 2000–2019'. Retrieved April 4, 2022, from: <https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/mortality-and-global-health-estimates/ghe-leading-causes-of-death>.
- 10 Melimopoulos, E. (2020). 'Millions of women in Mexico expected to strike over femicides'. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/3/9/millions-of-women-in-mexico-expected-to-strike-over-femicides>.
- 11 INEGI. (2021). 'Mortalidad: Defunciones por homicidio'. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/continuas/mortalidad/defuncioneshom.asp?s=est>.
- 12 INEGI. (2021). Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE). Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/envipe/2021/>.

SECTION 1: RESULTS

- 1 INEGI. (2021). Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE). Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/envipe/2021/>.
- 2 IEP calculation using SESNSP homicide data and Lantia Consultores estimate of organized crime-related homicides: <https://lantiaintelligence.com/>, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42917.pdf>.
- 3 'Tracking Mexico's Cartels in 2021'. (2021). RANE. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/tracking-mexicos-cartels-2021>.
- 4 Google. (2022). 'COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports'. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from: <https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/>.
- 5 For example, see the Mexico Peace Index 2021: <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ENG-MPI-2021-web-1.pdf>.

- 6 CMDPDH. (2021). 'Episodios de desplazamiento interno forzado en México: Informe 2020'. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from: <https://www.cmdpdh.org/publicaciones-pdf/cmdpdh-episodios-de-desplazamiento-interno-forzado-en-mexico-informe-2020.pdf>; Pradilla, A. (2022). 'Desplazamiento interno por violencia se incrementa un 360% al cierre de 2021', *Animal Político*. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from: <https://www.animalpolitico.com/2022/02/desplazamiento-interno-violencia-crecio-cierre-2021/>.
- 7 IEP calculations; CMDPDH, 'Episodios de desplazamiento interno forzado en México: Informe 2020': <https://www.cmdpdh.org/publicaciones-pdf/cmdpdh-episodios-de-desplazamiento-interno-forzado-en-mexico-informe-2020.pdf>.
- 8 CMDPDH. (2021). 'Episodios de desplazamiento interno forzado en México: Informe 2020'. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from: <https://www.cmdpdh.org/publicaciones-pdf/cmdpdh-episodios-de-desplazamiento-interno-forzado-en-mexico-informe-2020.pdf>; Pradilla, A. (2022). 'Desplazamiento interno por violencia se incrementa un 360% al cierre de 2021'. *Animal Político*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.animalpolitico.com/2022/02/desplazamiento-interno-violencia-crecio-cierre-2021/>.
- 9 CMDPDH. (2021). 'Episodios de desplazamiento interno forzado en México: Informe 2020'. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from: <https://www.cmdpdh.org/publicaciones-pdf/cmdpdh-episodios-de-desplazamiento-interno-forzado-en-mexico-informe-2020.pdf>.
- 10 CMDPDH. (2022). 'Monitoreo'. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from: <https://cmdpdh.org/temas/desplazamiento/monitoreo>.
- 11 CMDPDH. (2021). 'Boletín: situación de desplazamiento interno forzado en México: Septiembre 2021'. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from: <https://mailchi.mp/cmdpdh/situacion-de-desplazamiento-interno-forzado-en-mxico>; Valenzuela, F. (2021). 'Desmiente párroco ataque contra iglesia de El Bejuco'. *El Sol de Zamora*. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from: <https://www.elsoldezamora.com.mx/local/desmiente-parroco-ataque-contra-iglesia-de-el-bejuco-7233743.html>; 'Tepalcatepec under siege: CJNG launches offensive against Michoacán municipality'. (2021). *Mexico News Daily*. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from: <https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/cjng-launches-offensive-against-michoacan-municipality/>.
- 12 CMDPDH. (2021). 'Boletín: situación de desplazamiento interno forzado en México: Septiembre 2021'. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from: <https://mailchi.mp/cmdpdh/situacion-de-desplazamiento-interno-forzado-en-mxico>; Durán, R. (2021). 'Sigue la violencia en Zacatecas: Guerra entre Cártel de Sinaloa y CJNG convierte a Sarabia en pueblo fantasma'. *Debate*. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from: <https://www.debate.com.mx/policiacas/Sigue-la-violencia-en-Zacatecas-guerra-entre-Cartel-de-Sinaloa-y-CJNG-convierte-a-Sarabia-en-pueblo-fantasma-20210825-0171.html>.
- 13 Wilson, M. (2021). 'US sanctions reveal how Mexico's powerful Jalisco cartel is seizing control at a major Pacific port'. *Business Insider*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.businessinsider.com/us-sanctions-show-mexicos-powerful-jalisco-cartel-controls-major-port-2021-10>; Agren, D. (2016). "'The only two powerful cartels left': rivals clash in Mexico's murder capital'. *The Guardian*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/28/mexico-drug-cartels-sinaloa-jalisco-colima>; Goodwin, Z. (2020). 'Why One of Mexico's Smallest States Is Also Its Most Violent'. *Insight Crime*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/colima-mexico-homicides-cartels/>.
- 14 Note: This is among municipalities with a population of at least 100,000. Also, the number of "homicide cases" is distinct from the number of "homicides" in that it represents the number of homicide investigations that have been opened, not the total number of homicide victims.
- 15 Wilson, M. (2021). 'US sanctions reveal how Mexico's powerful Jalisco cartel is seizing control at a major Pacific port'. *Business Insider*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.businessinsider.com/us-sanctions-show-mexicos-powerful-jalisco-cartel-controls-major-port-2021-10>; 'Así quedó el mapa del narcotráfico en México tras las elecciones 2021'. (2021). *Infobae*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2021/06/18/asi-queda-el-mapa-del-narcotrafico-en-mexico-tras-las-elecciones-2021/>.
- 16 Bonello, D. (2020). 'How Drug Cartels Moved into Illegal Logging in Mexico'. *Insight Crime*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/investigations/drug-cartels-illegal-logging-mexico/>.

- 17 Dudley, S. (2013). 'How Juarez's Police, Politicians Picked Winners of Gang War'. Insight Crime. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/investigations/juarez-police-politicians-picked-winners-gang-war/>; Dittmar, V., Bowman, P. & Previde, S. (2021). 'The Next Generation of Criminal Groups Driving Violence in Mexico'. Insight Crime. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/news/next-generation-criminal-groups-violence-mexico/>.
- 18 Petersen, B. (2010). 'Juarez, Mexico - Murder Capital of the World'. CBS News. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/juarez-mexico-murder-capital-of-the-world/>.
- 19 Chaparro, L. (2021). 'As Marijuana Profits Dry Up, Mexico Crime Groups Turn to Alcohol and Logging'. Insight Crime. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/news/mexico-crime-groups-marijuana-profits-dry-up/>; Bonello, D. (2019). 'Illegal Logging in Chihuahua is Now Mexico Cartel Territory'. Insight Crime. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/investigations/drug-cartels-illegal-logging-mexico/>.
- 20 Based on anonymized, aggregated mobility data released by Facebook Data for Good: 'Our Work on COVID-19'. Retrieved January 20, 2022, from <https://dataforgood.fb.com/docs/covid19/>
- 21 IEP calculations ; INEGI. (2021). Encuesta Nacional de Victimization y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE). Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/envipe/2021/>.
- 22 De la Rosa, Armando. (2021). 'Aumenta la violencia vs la mujer en hogares tabasqueños en 2021'. Diariodetabasco. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.diariodetabasco.mx/tabasco/2021/09/07/aumenta-la-violencia-vs-la-mujer-en-hogares-tabasqueños-en-2021/>.
- 23 Verza, M. (2021). 'A Mexican state suffers bloody fallout of cartel rivalry'. AP News. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://apnews.com/article/caribbean-129abf2e577a78fd12cfd6cd284a5aff>.
- 24 'Así quedó el mapa del narcotráfico en México tras las elecciones 2021'. (2021). Infobae. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2021/06/18/asi-queda-el-mapa-del-narcotrafico-en-mexico-tras-las-elecciones-2021/>.
- 25 Dittmar, V., Bowman, P. & Previde, S. (2021). 'The Next Generation of Criminal Groups Driving Violence in Mexico'. Insight Crime. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/news/next-generation-criminal-groups-violence-mexico/>; Gándara, S.R. (2022). 'Mexico Ablaze as Jalisco Cartel Seeks Criminal Hegemony'. Insight Crime. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/news/jalisco-cartel-seeks-mexico-fire-seeks-criminal-hegemony/>.
- 26 'Así quedó el mapa del narcotráfico en México tras las elecciones 2021'. (2021). Infobae. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2021/06/18/asi-queda-el-mapa-del-narcotrafico-en-mexico-tras-las-elecciones-2021/>; Sheridan, M.B. (2020). 'Violent criminal groups are eroding Mexico's authority and claiming more territory'. The Washington Post. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/mexico-losing-control/mexico-violence-drug-cartels-zacatecas/>.
- 27 Meza, S. (2021). 'El peligro de no actuar contra el narcotráfico en Sinaloa'. The Washington Post. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/es/post-opinion/2021/06/17/sinaloa-gobernador-narco-ruben-rocha-moya-cartel-violencia/>.
- 28 According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Events Dataset (GED) best estimate: Petterson, T. et al. (2021) 'Organized violence 1989-2020, with a special emphasis on Syria'. Journal of Peace Research, 58(4); Sundberg, R. and Melander, E. (2013) 'Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset', Journal of Peace Research, 50(4), pp. 523-532. doi:10.1177/0022343313484347.
- 29 Dittmar, V. (2022). 'The Three Criminal Fronts Sparking Violence in Sonora, Mexico'. Insight Crime. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/news/three-criminal-fronts-behind-violence-sonora-mexico/>.
- 30 Ibid
- 31 Note: This is among municipalities with a population of at least 100,000. Also, the number of "homicide cases" is distinct from the number of "homicides" in that it represents the number of homicide investigations that have been opened, not the total number of homicide victims.
- 32 INEGI. (2021). Encuesta Nacional de Seguridad Pública Urbana (ENSU). Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/ensu/>.
- 33 Note: This is among municipalities with a population of at least 100,000. Also, the number of "homicide cases" is distinct from the number of "homicides" in that it represents the number of homicide investigations that have been opened, not the total number of homicide victims.
- 34 INEGI. (2021). Encuesta Nacional de Seguridad Pública Urbana (ENSU). Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/ensu/>.
- 35 Verza, M. (2021). 'A Mexican state suffers bloody fallout of cartel rivalry'. AP News. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://apnews.com/article/caribbean-129abf2e577a78fd12cfd6cd284a5aff>.
- 36 INEGI. (2021). Encuesta Nacional de Victimization y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE). Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/envipe/2021/>.
- 37 'Plan de apoyo a Zacatecas ha disminuido homicidios en un 78%: David Monreal'. (2021). Infobae. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2021/12/14/plan-de-apoyo-a-zacatecas-ha-disminuido-homicidios-en-un-78-david-monreal/>.
- 38 Gallegos, F. (2021). 'Hay cinco cárteles operando en Nuevo León: Aldo Fasci'. ABC Noticias. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://abcnoticias.mx/local/2021/12/3/hay-cinco-carteles-operando-en-nuevo-leon-aldo-fasci-152181.html>.
- 39 Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos. (2021). 'Informe Especial de la CNDH sobre el estado que guarda el tráfico y el secuestro en perjuicio de personas migrantes en México 2011-2020'. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: https://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/default/files/documentos/2021-11/IE_Migrantes_2011-2020.pdf.
- 40 Meza, A. (2022). 'These are the cartels that capture, extort and torture migrants in 8 Mexican states'. NBC News. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/are-cartels-capture-extort-torture-migrants-8-mexican-states-rcna2454>.
- 41 García, M. (2021). 'Morelos lucha contra 11 cárteles: CES'. Diario de Morelos. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.diariodemorelos.com/noticias/morelos-lucha-contra-11-c-rteles-ces>.
- 42 Asmann, P. (2019). 'Morelos, Mexico's Latest Hotspot for Fragmented Criminal Showdowns'. Insight Crime. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/morelos-mexico-latest-hotspot-fragmented-criminal-showdowns/>; Bacaz, V. (2021). 'Morelos tiene el fin de semana más violento de la actual administración: 16 asesinatos'. El Financiero. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/estados/2021/07/05/morelos-tiene-el-fin-de-semana-mas-violento-de-la-actual-administracion-16-asesinatos/>.
- 43 'La recompensa por el "Señorón", líder del CJNG, exacerbó la violencia en Morelos'. (2021). Infobae. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2021/07/20/la-recompensa-por-el-senoron-lider-del-cjng-exacerbo-la-violencia-en-morelos/>; 'El "Señorón": quién es el operador del CJNG, enemigo número uno en Morelos'. (2021). Infobae. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2021/07/13/el-senoron-quien-es-el-operador-del-cjng-enemigo-numero-uno-en-morelos/>; 'Con temibles mantas anunciaron la llegada del grupo armado CDN a Morelos'. (2021). Infobae. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2021/12/15/con-temibles-mantas-anunciaron-la-llegada-del-grupo-armado-cdn-a-morelos/>.
- 44 INEGI. (2021). Encuesta Nacional de Victimization y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE). Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/envipe/2021/>.
- 45 Note: This is among municipalities with a population of at least 100,000. Also, the number of "homicide cases" is distinct from the number of "homicides" in that it represents the number of homicide investigations that have been opened, not the total number of homicide victims.
- 46 'Cárteles Unidos'. Insight Crime. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/carteles-unidos/>.
- 47 Green, E. (2022). 'A Drug Cartel War Is Making Lime Prices Skyrocket in Mexico'. Vice News. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.vice.com/en/article/xgdv9d/a-drug-cartel-war-is-making-lime-prices-skyrocket-in-mexico>.

SECTION 2: TRENDS

- 1 Agencia Digital de Innovación Pública. 'Llamadas realizadas a Línea Mujeres'. Retrieved April 4, 2022, from: <https://datos.cdmx.gob.mx/dataset/linea-mujeres>.
- 2 Balmori de la Miyar, J.D., Hoehn-Velasco, L. & Silverio-Murillo, A. (2021). 'The U-shaped crime recovery during COVID-19: evidence from national crime'. Crime Science. Retrieved April 4, 2022, from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8243050/pdf/40163_2021_Article_147.pdf.
- 3 Balmori de la Miyar, J.D., Hoehn-Velasco, L. & Silverio-Murillo, A. (2021). 'Druglords don't stay at home: COVID-19 pandemic and crime patterns in Mexico City'. Elsevier Public Health Emergency Collection. Retrieved April 4, 2022, from: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7513803/>.
- 4 IEP calculation based on SESNSP data for Mexico's 2021 homicide rate which is compared to other countries using the latest available data from the UNODC.
- 5 Seelke, C.R., Klein, J. (2022). 'Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations'. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved April 4, 2022, from: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42917.pdf>.

- 6 'Tracking Mexico's Cartels in 2021'. (2021). RANE. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/tracking-mexicos-cartels-2021>.
- 7 IEP calculation using SESNSP homicide data and Lantia Consultores estimate of organized crime-related homicides cited in: Seelke, C.R., Klein, J. (2022). 'Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations'. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved April 4, 2022, from: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42917.pdf>.
- 8 Corcoran, P. (2018). 'Expanding Mexico Violence Hits Previously Peaceful Baja California Sur'. Insight Crime. Retrieved April 4, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/expanding-mexico-violence-baja-california-sur/>.
- 9 According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Events Dataset (GED) best estimate: Petterson, T. et al. (2021) 'Organized violence 1989-2020, with a special emphasis on Syria', *Journal of Peace Research*, 58(4); Sundberg, R. and Melander, E. (2013) 'Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(4), pp. 523-532. doi:10.1177/0022343313484347.
- 10 Mejía, I. (2020). 'Zacatecas. Merodean cárteles por moda de fentanilo'. *El Universal*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/zacatecas-en-guerra-5-carteles-se-disputan-por-fentanilo>.
- 11 Lopez, O. (2021). "'We're Living in Hell": Inside Mexico's Most Terrified City'. *The New York Times*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/03/world/americas/inside-mexicos-most-terrified-city-fresnillo.html>; 'Por qué Zacatecas es zona de narcoguerra entre el Mayo Zambada y el Mencho'. (2022). *Infobae*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2022/01/07/por-que-zacatecas-es-zona-de-narcoguerra-entre-el-mayo-zambada-y-el-mencho/>.
- 12 Dittmar, V., Bowman, P. & Previde, S. (2021). 'The Next Generation of Criminal Groups Driving Violence in Mexico'. *Insight Crime*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/news/next-generation-criminal-groups-violence-mexico/>; 'Tijuana Cartel'. (2018). *Insight Crime*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/tijuana-cartel-profile/>; Corcoran, P. (2017). 'What Is Behind Spiking Violence in Tijuana, Mexico?' *Insight Crime*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/what-is-behind-spiking-violence-tijuana-mexico/>.
- 13 Refers to the proportion of male homicides out of total homicides where the sex of the victim is known.
- 14 World Health Organization. (2012). 'Understanding and addressing violence against women: Femicide'. Retrieved April 6, 2022, from: https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/77421/WHO_RHR_12.38_eng.pdf?sequence=1.
- 15 Melimopoulos, E. (2020). 'Millions of women in Mexico expected to strike over femicides'. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/3/9/millions-of-women-in-mexico-expected-to-strike-over-femicides>.
- 16 INEGI. (2021). 'Mortalidad: Defunciones por homicidio'. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/continuas/mortalidad/defuncioneshom.asp?s=est>.
- 17 Comisión Nacional de Seguridad Pública. (2018). 'Instrumento para el Registro, Clasificación y Reporte de los Delitos y las Víctimas CNSP/38/15 Manual de llenado'. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: https://secretariadodjeecutivo.gob.mx/docs/pdfs/nueva-metodologia/Manual_Nuevo_Instrumento.pdf.
- 18 Webber, J. (2020). 'Mexico: "You kill a woman here and nothing happens"'. *The Financial Times*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.ft.com/content/01d43968-5d5d-11ea-8033-fa40a0d65a98>.
- 19 Atuesta, L.H. & Vela Barba, E. (2020). 'Las dos guerras'. *Intersecta*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.intersecta.org/lasdosguerras/>; Torreblanca, C. (2018). '¿Qué contamos cuando contamos "feminicidios"?' Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.animalpolitico.com/el-foco/que-contamos-cuando-contamos-feminicidios/>.
- 20 'Ola de feminicidios en México continúa imparable: 1,004 muertes en 2021'. (2021). *Forbes*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.forbes.com.mx/noticias-ola-de-feminicidios-en-mexico-continua-imparable-con-1004-muertes-en-2021/>.
- 21 'La violencia feminicida en México, aproximaciones y tendencias 1985-2016'. (2017). *SEGOB*. Retrieved April 4, 2022, from: https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/data/file/293666/violenciaFeminicidaMx_07dic_web.pdf.
- 22 The Global Health Observatory. 'Global health estimates: Leading causes of death – Cause-specific mortality, 2000–2019'. Retrieved April 4, 2022, from: <https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/mortality-and-global-health-estimates/ghe-leading-causes-of-death>.
- 23 Based on data from 2018 to 2021.
- 24 '2 police hanged from bridge in Mexico, 7 killed in shooting'. (2021). *AP News*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: [mexico-shootings-c6899c69d4cfd758d940ef1faedbc89](https://apnews.com/article/mexico-shootings-c6899c69d4cfd758d940ef1faedbc89); "'If you want war you'll get war:' cartel hunts down, kills Guanajuato police in their homes'. (2021). *Mexico News Daily*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/cartel-hunts-down-kills-guanajuato-police/>.
- 25 'Séptimo Informe de Violencia Política en México 2021'. (2021). *Etellekt Consultores*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.ellekt.com/informe-de-violencia-politica-en-mexico-2021-J21-ellekt.html>.
- 26 Martínez Trujillo, M.T. & Fajardo Turner, S. (2021). 'Data on Political & Electoral Violence in Mexico, 2020-2021'. *Noria Research*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://noria-research.com/data-on-electoral-violence-mexico-2020-2021/>.
- 27 'Séptimo Informe de Violencia Política en México 2021'. (2021). *Etellekt Consultores*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.ellekt.com/informe-de-violencia-politica-en-mexico-2021-J21-ellekt.html>.
- 28 Dunham, J. (2022). 'Attacks on the press: The deadliest countries in 2021'. *Committee to Protect Journalists*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://cpj.org/reports/2022/01/attacks-on-the-press-the-deadliest-countries-in-2021/>; Chaparro, L. (2021). 'Mexico's most dangerous job is only getting more deadly, and I've seen up close how bad it's getting'. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.businessinsider.com.au/mexico-is-deadliest-country-for-journalists-and-only-getting-worse-2021-9>.
- 29 The exact number of victims varies as different studies apply different criteria in measuring this type of violence.
- 30 '7 Journalists and Media Workers Killed in Mexico – in 2022 / Motive Confirmed or Unconfirmed'. (2022). *Committee to Protect Journalists*. Retrieved April 4, 2022, from: https://cpj.org/data/killed/?status=Killed&motiveConfirmed%5B%5D=Confirmed&motiveUnconfirmed%5B%5D=Unconfirmed&type%5B%5D=Journalist&type%5B%5D=Media%20Worker&cc_fips%5B%5D=MX&start_year=2022&end_year=2022&group_by=year.
- 31 'Reporter killed in Mexico to become seventh journalist killing this year'. (2022). *The Guardian*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/seventh-journalist-killed-mexico>.
- 32 'Mexicans protest journalist killings, call for protection'. *Reuters*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexican-reporters-plan-nationwide-protests-over-journalist-killings-2022-01-25/>.
- 33 Beittel, J.S. (2020). 'Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations'. *Congressional Research Service*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf>.
- 34 Ibid
- 35 Agrawal, D. (2019). 'Combating U.S. Gun Trafficking to Mexico'. *Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California at Berkeley*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://stopusarmstomexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/U.S.-Guns-to-Mexico-Final.pdf>; McDougal, T.L., Shirk, D.A., Muggah, R. & Patterson, J.H. (2015). 'The way of the gun: estimating firearms trafficking across the US-Mexico border'. *Journal of Economic Geography*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://academic.oup.com/joeg/article-abstract/15/2/297/929819>; Austin, A. (2021). 'How US Guns Destabilize Latin America and Fuel the Refugee Crisis'. *Center for Economic and Policy Research*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.cepr.net/how-us-guns-destabilize-latin-america-and-fuel-the-refugee-crisis/>.
- 36 United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives: Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information. (2017). *Mexico*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/report/firearms-trace-data-mexico-cy-11-16pdf/download>; 'Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Gun Smuggling into Mexico Would Benefit from Additional Data and Analysis'. (2021). *United States Government Accountability Office*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-322.pdf>.
- 37 *Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. et al.* (2021). Case Number: 1:2021cv11269. *US District Court for the District of Massachusetts*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/mexico-smith-wesson-complaint.pdf>.
- 38 INEGI. (2021). *Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE)*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/envipe/2021/>.
- 39 IEP calculations; INEGI. (2021). *Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE)*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/envipe/2021/>.
- 40 Ibid
- 41 Ibid
- 42 INEGI. (2021). *Encuesta Nacional de Seguridad Pública Urbana (ENSU)*. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/ensu/>.

- 43 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). (2020). '2020 Mexico National Phone Survey'. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico/LAPOP_Mexico_2020_CATI_OC_Topline_Report_Web_210410.pdf.
- 44 Based on weighted responses from survey data: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). (2021). '2021 Survey'. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico.php>.
- 45 INEGI. (2021). 'Principales Resultados'. Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE). Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/programas/envipe/2021/doc/envipe2021_presentacion_nacional.pdf.
- 46 Henkin, S. (2020). 'Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: Huachicoleros: Violence in Guanajuato Over Control of Illicit Petroleum'. START: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.start.umd.edu/tracking-cartels-infographic-series-huachicoleros-violence-guanajuato-over-control-illicit-petroleum>.
- 47 'Tracking Mexico's Cartels in 2021'. (2021). RANE. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/tracking-mexicos-cartels-2021>.
- 48 Linthicum, K. (2019). 'Must Reads: Meth and murder: A new kind of drug war has made Tijuana one of the deadliest cities on Earth'. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-tijuana-drug-violence-20190130-htlmlstory.html>.
- 49 Ramos, R. (2021). 'Remnants of Arellano-Félix Organization Attracting Renewed Interest in Baja California'. Justice in Mexico. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://justiceinmexico.org/remnants-af-baja-california/>.
- 50 Based on SESNSP data.
- 51 Linthicum, K. (2019). 'Must Reads: Meth and murder: A new kind of drug war has made Tijuana one of the deadliest cities on Earth'. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from: <https://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-tijuana-drug-violence-20190130-htlmlstory.html>.
- 52 'Criminals obtain \$12 billion per year from extortion in Mexico'. (2020). The Oaxaca Post. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://theoaxacapost.com/2020/10/18/criminals-obtain-12-billion-per-year-from-extortion-in-mexico/>.
- 53 'Advierten sobre distintas modalidades de extorsión telefónica'. (2020). NTR Zacatecas. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <http://ntrzacatecas.com/2020/05/26/advierten-sobre-distintas-modalidades-de-extorsion-telefonica>.
- 54 Sheridan, M.B. (2020). 'Violent criminal groups are eroding Mexico's authority and claiming more territory'. The Washington Post. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/mexico-losing-control/mexico-violence-drug-cartels-zacatecas/>.
- 55 Ríos, A. (2017). 'Acecha la trata de migrantes en Coahuila'. Vanguardia. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://vanguardia.com.mx/articulo/acecha-la-trata-migrantes-en-coahuila>.
- 56 Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos. (2021). 'Informe Especial de la CNDH sobre el estado que guarda el tráfico y el secuestro en perjuicio de personas migrantes en México 2011-2020'. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: https://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/default/files/documentos/2021-11/IE_Migrantes_2011-2020.pdf.
- 57 Meza, A. (2022). 'These are the cartels that capture, extort and torture migrants in 8 Mexican states'. NBC News. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/are-cartels-capture-extort-torture-migrants-8-mexican-states-rcna2454>.
- 58 Espino, M. (2022). 'Migrante, una de cada 10 víctimas'. El Universal. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/migrante-una-de-cada-10-victimas-de-secuestro>.
- 59 Cooper, J. (2021). 'Terrifying videos, threats: How kidnapers extort migrants' relatives for ransoms'. NBC News. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/terrifying-videos-threats-kidnappers-extort-migrants-relatives-ransoms-rcna2387>;
- Leutert, S. (2021). 'Migrant Kidnapping in Nuevo Laredo During MPP and Title 42'. The Strauss Center for International Security and Law. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.strausscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Migrant-Kidnappings-in-Nuevo-Laredo.pdf>;
- Camarrillo, M. (2022). 'Narco cobra hasta 10,000 dólares por cada migrante secuestrado en México'. Crónica. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.cronica.com.mx/nacional/crimen-organizado-cobra-10-000-dolares-migrante-secuestrado-mexico.html>.
- 60 Green, E. (2021). 'US Companies Are Helping Mexican Cartels Get Rich Kidnapping Migrants'. Vice News. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.vice.com/en/article/n7bwdz/us-mexico-cartel-kidnapping-migrant-money>.
- 61 Henkin, S. (2020). 'Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: Major Cartel Operational Zones in Mexico'. START: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.start.umd.edu/tracking-cartels-infographic-series-major-cartel-operational-zones-mexico>.
- 62 Asmann, P. (16 Jan 2019). "Fragmentation: The Violent Tailspin of Mexico's Dominant Cartels". InSight Crime. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <http://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/violence-spikes-criminal-groupsfragment-mexico/>.
- 63 Henkin, S. (2020). 'Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: Major Cartel Operational Zones in Mexico'. START: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.start.umd.edu/tracking-cartels-infographic-series-major-cartel-operational-zones-mexico>.
- 64 'In first 6 months, there have been 18,000 suspected extortion calls by phone'. (2019). Mexico News Daily. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/18000-suspected-extortion-calls-byphone/>; Sheridan, M.B. (2020). 'Violent criminal groups are eroding Mexico's authority and claiming more territory'. The Washington Post. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/mexico-losing-control/mexico-violence-drug-cartels-zacatecas/>.
- 65 Chaparro, L. (2021). 'Mexico's war on cartels has created 400 new gangs that are taking on the police and cartels that are left'. Business Insider. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.businessinsider.com/fragmentation-in-mexico-war-on-drugs-created-400-new-gangs-2021-10>.
- 66 Asmann, P. (2019). 'Fragmentation: The Violent Tailspin of Mexico's Dominant Cartels'. InSight Crime. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/violence-spikes-criminal-groupsfragment-mexico/>.
- 67 Beittel, J.S. (2020). 'Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations'. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf>.
- 68 Benczkowski, B.A. (2020). 'Assistant Attorney General Brian A. Benczkowski Delivers Remarks at the Project Python Press Conference'. The United States Department of Justice. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-brian-benczkowski-delivers-remarks-project-python-press>.
- 69 'Tracking Mexico's Cartels in 2021'. (2021). RANE. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/tracking-mexicos-cartels-2021>.
- 70 Calderón, L.Y. (2020). 'Organized Crime and Violence in Guanajuato'. Justice in Mexico. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Organized-Crime-and-Violence-in-Guanajuato.pdf>.
- 71 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Events Dataset (GED) provides data on violence between criminal groups. Based on this source a violent conflict is defined as an incident in which one armed group uses force against another armed group and there is at least one direct death.
- 72 Henkin, S. (2020). 'Tracking Cartels Infographic Series: Major Cartel Operational Zones in Mexico'. START: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.start.umd.edu/tracking-cartels-infographic-series-major-cartel-operational-zones-mexico>.
- 73 According to UCDP GED data, the CJNG has been involved in clashes with La Familia, La Nueva Familia, La Resistencia, Los Cabelleros Templarios, Los Rojos, Los Zetas, Nueva Plaza Cartel, Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel.
- 74 'Drug Seizure Statistics'. (2021). US Customs and Border Protection. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-seizure-statistics>.
- 75 Ibid
- 76 Chaparro, L. (2021). 'As Marijuana Profits Dry Up, Mexico Crime Groups Turn to Alcohol and Logging'. Insight Crime. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://insightcrime.org/news/mexico-crime-groups-marijuana-profits-dry-up/>.
- 77 'The Impact of Mexican Cannabis Legalization'. (2021). RANE. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/impact-mexican-cannabis-legalization>.
- 78 'Mexican cartels are turning to meth and fentanyl production'. (2021). NPR. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.npr.org/2021/12/21/1066163872/mexican-cartels-turning-to-meth-and-fentanyl-production>.
- 79 Travère, A. & Giraudat, J. (2020). 'Revealed: how Mexico's Sinaloa cartel has created a global network to rule the fentanyl trade'. The Guardian. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/08/mexico-cartel-project-synthetic-opioid-fentanyl-drugs>.
- 80 Katz, J. (2017). 'The First Count of Fentanyl Deaths in 2016: Up 540% in Three Years'. The New York Times. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from:

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/02/upshot/fentanyl-drug-overdose-deaths.html>; Mundell, E. (2021). 'U.S. Fentanyl Deaths Soaring, Especially in West'. U.S. News & World Report. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.usnews.com/news/health-news/articles/2021-12-14/u-s-fentanyl-deaths-soaring-especially-in-west>; Conklin, A. (2021). 'A national emergency'. Fox News. Fentanyl number one cause of death for adults 18-45, recent government data says'. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.foxnews.com/us/fentanyl-overdoses-leading-cause-death-adults>.

- 81 'Drug Seizure Statistics'. (2021). US Customs and Border Protection. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-seizure-statistics>.
- 82 Menéndez, C. (2021). 'Los cárteles mexicanos se pasan a las drogas sintéticas | Las incautaciones de fentanilo se disparan'. Euronews. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://es.euronews.com/2021/12/21/los-carteles-mexicanos-se-pasan-a-las-drogas-sinteticas-las-incautaciones-de-fentanilo-se->.
- 83 'Drug Seizure Statistics'. (2021). US Customs and Border Protection. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-seizure-statistics>.
- 84 Unidad General de Asuntos Jurídicos. (2019). Article 19 of the Mexican Constitution. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Constitucion/articulos/19.pdf>.
- 85 Ibid
- 86 Senado de la República Mexicana. (2018). Dictamen de las Comisiones Unidas de Puntos Constitucionales y de Estudios Legislativos Segunda, con Proyecto de Decreto por el que se Reforma el Artículo 19 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en Materia de Prisión Preventiva Oficiosa. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: http://infosen.senado.gob.mx/sghsp/gaceta/64/1/2018-12-04-1/assets/documentos/Dict_PC_art_19_CPEUM_prision_preventiva.pdf.
- 87 'El Senado aprueba reformas sobre prisión preventiva oficiosa'. (2020). Expansión. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://politica.expansion.mx/congreso/2020/07/30/el-senado-aprueba-reformas-sobre-prision-preventiva-oficiosa>.
- 88 INEGI. (2021). Encuesta Nacional de Población Privada de la Libertad (ENPOL). Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/enpol/2021/>.
- 89 INEGI. (2021). 'Principales Resultados'. Encuesta Nacional de Población Privada de la Libertad (ENPOL). Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/programas/enpol/2021/doc/enpol2021_presentacion_nacional.pdf.
- 90 Ibid
- 91 INEGI. (2021). Encuesta Nacional de Población Privada de la Libertad (ENPOL). Retrieved March 18, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/enpol/2021/>.

SECTION 3: THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE IN MEXICO

- 1 The average conversion rate equal to one United States Dollar is equal to 20.72 Mexican Pesos is used.
- 2 Sourced from Unidad de Planeación Económica de la Hacienda Pública and includes general economic, commercial, and labor affairs, agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, fuel and energy, mining, manufacturing and construction, transport, communications, tourism, science, technology and innovation, and other industries and other economic affairs.
- 3 Calculated using the Global Peace Index (GPI) economic impact of violence and includes the indicators military expenditure, internal security expenditure and private security expenditure.
- 4 Calculated using the 2021 GPI economic impact of violence homicide indicator.
- 5 49.7 billion pesos were spent on Science, Technology and Innovation (Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación) in 2021.
- 6 Protection costs are the latest costs reported by ENVE. The 2021 value comes from the 2020 ENVE survey and is adjusted for inflation.
- 7 Ravelo, R. (2012) Narcomex: Historia E Historias De Una Guerra. Vintage Español.
- 8 IEP uses the ENVIPE household survey on victimization and perception of public safety to calculate the level of fear of violence.
- 9 IEP calculations based on SESNSP data and CONAPO population estimates.
- 10 This expenditure is recorded every two years in the ENVE survey.
- 11 Ramírez, M. and López, A. (2020) 'La delincuencia sale cada vez más cara a los empresarios', México Evalúa, 17 December. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from: <https://www.mexicoevalua.org/la-delincuencia-sale-cada-vez-mas-cara-a-los-empresarios/>
- 12 Ibid
- 13 Ferri, P. (2021) El tráfico de huachicol, un mal que no cesa en México,

EL PAÍS. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from: <https://elpais.com/mexico/2021-09-14/el-trafico-de-huachicol-un-mal-que-no-cesa-en-mexico.html>

- 14 Demos, E. and Alegría, A. (no date) La Jornada - LP gas 'Huachicol' cost Pemex 600 million pesos in January-June. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from: <https://www.jornada.com.mx/notas/2021/08/13/economia/huachicol-de-gas-lp-costo-a-pemex-600-mdp-en-enero-junio/>
- 15 The average annual wage income reported by OECD for 2020 in constant 2020 pesos equal to 179,976 pesos. This information was sourced from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Average annual wages, 2020. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AV_AN_WAGE
- 16 Gutiérrez-Romero, R. (2016) 'Estimating the impact of Mexican drug cartels and drug-related homicides on crime and perceptions of safety', Journal of Economic Geography, 16(4), pp. 941-973. doi:10.1093/jeg/lbv023.
- 17 Accounting for inflation.
- 18 Melimopoulos (2019) Mexico's National Guard: What, who and when, Al Jazeera. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/6/30/mexicos-national-guard-what-who-and-when>
- 19 Ivey, A. (2021) 'I Have Other Data': The Guardia Nacional and the Entrenchment of Mexico's Militarization - War on the Rocks, War on the Rocks. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from: <https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/i-have-other-data-the-guardia-nacional-and-the-entrenchment-of-mexicos-militarization/>
- 20 Villegas and Malkin, E. (2019) 'La policía mexicana se rebela contra el nuevo plan de seguridad del gobierno', The New York Times, 5 July. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from: <https://www.nytimes.com/es/2019/07/05/espanol/guardia-nacional-mexico-amlo.html>
- 21 Oxford Business Group (no date) Mexico's economic austerity measures prioritise social spending. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from: <https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/austerity-drive-while-national-plan-prioritises-social-spending-critics-argue-it-falls-short>
- 22 Accounting for inflation.
- 23 See <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/sia/se/SAE-ISS-20-19.pdf> for an itemization of domestic security expenditure.
- 24 See <http://presto.hacienda.gob.mx/EstoporLayout/estadisticas.jsp> for budgetary expenditure.
- 25 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.
- 26 OECD (no date) General government - General government spending - OECD Data. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from: <https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-spending.htm>
- 27 Jaitman, L. et al. (2018) 'The Costs of Crime and Violence: New Evidence and Insights in Latin America and the Caribbean', in. Available at: <https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/The-Costs-of-Crime-and-Violence-New-Evidence-and-Insights-in-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean.pdf>.
- 28 México Evalúa (2021) Hallazgos 2020 Seguimiento y evaluación del sistema de justicia penal en México. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from: <https://www.mexicoevalua.org/mexicoevalua/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/hallazgos2020-7octubreok.pdf>.
- 29 Índice Global de Impunidad México 2018 (2018). San Andrés Cholula, Puebla, México: Universidad de las Américas, Puebla. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from: https://www.udlap.mx/cesij/files/indices-globales/7-IGIMEX_2018_ESP-UDLAP.pdf
- 30 Secretario Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (no date) Modelo Óptimo de la Función Policial. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from: <http://sesnsp.com/mofp/>
- 31 Ibid
- 32 'Yucatán police the best in the country' (2019) The Yucatan Times, 20 November. Retrieved April 8, 2022 from: <https://www.theyucatanimes.com/2019/11/yucatan-police-the-best-in-the-country/>
- 33 Brauer, J. & Marlin, J. (2009). "Defining Peace Industries and Calculating the Potential Size of a Gross World Product by Country and by Economic Sector". Institute for Economics and Peace, Sydney.

SECTION 4: POSITIVE PEACE

- 1 Institute for Economics and Peace. (2022). 'Positive Peace Report 2022': <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/PPR-2022-web-1.pdf>.
- 2 Mexico is included in the Central America and Caribbean region in the global Positive Peace Index based on the regional grouping of the underlying index data sources. Moreover, in terms of peace and security, Mexico has more in common with its Central American neighbors than with the US and Canada, making Central America a more useful analytical category.
- 3 'Criminal Violence in Mexico'. (2022). Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/criminal-violence-mexico>.

- 4 'Mexico: Events of 2020'. (2021). Human Rights Watch. World Report 2021. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/mexico>.
- 5 Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados (COMAR). (2022). 'Solicitantes por año'. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.gob.mx/comar/es/articulos/solicitantes-por-ano>; Chavez, G. & Voisine, A. (2021). 'The Implementation of Mexico's Refugee, Complementary Protection and Political Asylum Law'. E-International Relations. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.e-ir.info/2021/07/05/the-implementation-of-mexicos-refugee-complementary-protection-and-political-asylum-law/>; Arista, L. (2022). 'México recibirá a todos los que soliciten refugio por el conflicto Rusia-Ucrania'. Expansión. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://politica.expansion.mx/mexico/2022/03/02/mexico-recibira-a-todos-los-que-soliciten-refugio-por-el-conflicto-rusia-ucrania>.
- 6 Meyer, M. & Isacson, A. (2019). 'The "Wall" Before the Wall: Mexico's Crackdown on Migration at its Southern Border'. Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.wola.org/analysis/mexico-southern-border-report/>.
- 7 IEP calculations; Unidad de Política Migratoria. (2022). 'Boletines Estadísticos'. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: http://www.politicamigratoria.gob.mx/es/PoliticaMigratoria/Boletines_Estadisticos.
- 8 Cacelín, J. (2018). 'Estas fotos son falsas y se utilizaron en las redes para alimentar el rechazo a los migrantes'. Univision Noticias. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.univision.com/noticias/inmigracion/estas-fotos-son-falsas-y-se-utilizaron-en-las-redes-para-alimentar-el-rechazo-a-los-migrantes>.
- 9 Cobian, J. (2019). 'How Misinformation Fueled Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in the Tijuana Border Region'. Center for American Progress. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/misinformation-fueled-anti-immigrant-sentiment-tijuana-border-region/>.
- 10 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). (2021). '2021 Survey'. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico.php>.
- 11 Ibid
- 12 'Pandemic pushes poverty figures up: the poor number 55.7 million'. (2021). Mexico News Daily. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/coronavirus/pandemic-pushes-poverty-figures-up-the-poor-number-55-7-million/>.
- 13 'Coronavirus: Tourism thrives in Mexico against the odds'. (2021). DW News. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-tourism-thrives-in-mexico-against-the-odds/a-56593041>.
- 14 Based on data from the International Telecommunication Union.
- 15 Barry, J.J. (2018). 'Mexico wants internet access for all. Getting everyone online could reduce poverty, too'. The Conversation. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://theconversation.com/mexico-wants-internet-access-for-all-getting-everyone-online-could-reduce-poverty-too-104206>.
- 16 Martinez, M. (2018). 'Mexico election: Concerns about election bots, trolls and fakes'. BBC. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-44252995>.
- 17 Fasanella, C. (2021). 'Infographic | Women Rising: Reaching gender equality in Mexico'. Wilson Center. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/infographic-women-rising-reaching-gender-equality-mexico>.
- 18 Corley, R. (2022). 'Infographic | Mexican Women in Politics'. Wilson Center. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/infographic-mexican-women-politics>.
- 19 'Poverty gap at \$3.20 a day (2011 PPP) (%) - Mexico'. (2022). World Bank. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.LMIC.GP?locations=MX>
- 20 'OAS rights group: "Critical" levels of impunity in Mexico'. (2021). ABC News. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/oas-rights-group-critical-levels-impunity-mexico-77306777>.
- 21 INEGI. (2019). 'Principales Resultados'. Encuesta Nacional de Calidad e Impacto Gubernamental (ENCIG). Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/programas/encig/2019/doc/encig2019_principales_resultados.pdf.
- 22 Hinojosa, G. & Meyer, M. (2019). 'The Future of Mexico's National Anticorruption System'. Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/The-National-Anti-Corruption-System-under-AMLO.pdf>.
- 23 'Migrant caravan headed to US border amid Mexico tensions'. (2021). Al Jazeera. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/9/migrant-caravan-to-push-for-us-border-amid-mexico-tensions>.
- 24 Twenty-four of the 32 states in Mexico recorded MPPI scores within the interval of the national average minus one standard deviation (2.745) and the national average plus one standard deviation (3.462).
- 25 Defined as the absence of violence or fear of violence.
- 26 Institute for Economics and Peace. (2020). 'Germany Peace Index 2020': <https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/DPI-2020-web.pdf>.
- 27 Graham, D. & Barrera, A. (2017). 'Mexico must pay police much more to end violence: presidential candidate'. Reuters. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-politics-idUSKBN1AC3CP>.
- 28 Pérez, E. (2021). '1 de cada 10 queretanos ha sido víctima de la corrupción'. El Universal Querétaro. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.eluniversalqueretaro.mx/seguridad/1-de-cada-10-queretanos-ha-sido-victima-de-la-corrupcion>.
- 29 Pimentel, A. (2021). 'Oaxaca, penúltimo lugar en acceso a internet y telefonía móvil, de acuerdo con encuesta del Inegi'. El Universal Oaxaca. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://oaxaca.eluniversal.com.mx/sociedad/oaxaca-penultimo-lugar-en-acceso-internet-y-telefoniamovil-de-acuerdo-con-encuesta-del>.
- 30 Schaefer, I. (2013). 'Supporting the Reform Agenda for Inclusive Growth in Oaxaca, Mexico'. World Bank. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/09/04/oaxaca-inclusive-growth>.
- 31 Urban population (% of total population) - Mexico'. (2022). World Bank. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=MX>.
- 32 Díaz, O. (2021). '83% de los morelenses consideran que el 'Cuauh' es ineficiente para resolver problemas'. MSN Noticias. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.msn.com/es-mx/noticias/mexico/83percent-de-los-morelenses-consideran-que-el-cuauh-es-ineficiente-para-resolver-problemas/ar-AAPl0Uj>.
- 33 Martínez, D. (2019). 'Morelos es campeón, pero en la impunidad'. El Sol de Cuernavaca. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.elsoldecuernavaca.com.mx/local/morelos-es-campeon-pero-en-la-impunidad-4539125.html>.
- 34 INEGI. (2021). 'Mujeres y Hombres en México 2020'. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.inegi.org.mx/app/biblioteca/ficha.html?upc=889463900009>.
- 35 Torres, S. (2021). 'Domina la impunidad en homicidios en Michoacán'. Contramuro.com. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.contramuro.com/domina-la-impunidad-en-homicidios-en-michoacan/>.
- 36 Franco, P. (2021). 'Michoacán: más deserción escolar y menos acceso a la salud'. El Sol de Morelia. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.elsoldemorelia.com.mx/local/michoacan-mas-desercion-escolar-y-menos-acceso-a-la-salud-6684432.html>.

SECTION 5: STRENGTHENING POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO

- 1 Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco. (2021). 'Ley de cultura de paz del Estado de Jalisco'. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://transparencia.info.jalisco.gob.mx/sites/default/files/Ley%20de%20Cultura%20de%20Paz%20del%20Estado%20de%20Jalisco-140521.pdf>.
- 2 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mexico (OHCHR-Mexico). (2020). 'La ONU-DH condena la muerte en custodia de Alejandro Giovanni López Ramírez en Jalisco'. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://hchr.org.mx/comunicados/la-onu-dh-condena-la-muerte-en-custodia-de-alejandro-giovanni-lopez-ramirez-en-jalisco/>.
- 3 Balderas, R. (2020). 'Policía de Jalisco agrade nuevamente a manifestantes por caso Giovanni | Videos'. Aristegui Noticias. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://aristeginoticias.com/0506/mexico/policia-de-jalisco-agrade-nuevamente-a-manifestantes-por-caso-giovanni-videos/>.
- 4 Instituto de Justicia Alternativa del Estado de Jalisco. (2022). Gobierno de Jalisco: Poder Judicial. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://ija.gob.mx/>.
- 5 Reina, E. (2021). 'La impunidad crece en México: un 94,8% de los casos no se resuelven'. El País. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://elpais.com/mexico/2021-10-05/la-impunidad-crece-en-mexico-un-948-de-los-casos-no-se-resuelven.html>.
- 6 There are also 246 private care points that offer services at a cost.
- 7 Zepeda, G. (2022). 'Justicia alternativa y acceso a la justicia'. Milenio. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://amp.milenio.com/opinion/guillermo-zepeda/el-laberinto-de-la-legalidad/justicia-alternativa-y-acceso-a-la-justicia>.
- 8 Secretaría de Gobernación. (2021). 'Secretaría de Gobernación privilegia unión y esfuerzo coordinado para la prevención del delito y reconstrucción del tejido social'. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.gob.mx/segob/prensa/secretaria-de-gobernacion-privilegia-union-y-esfuerzo-coordinado-para-la-prevencion-del-delito-y-reconstruccion-del-tejido-social>.
- 9 Castillo García, G. (2022). 'Crean coordinación antihomicidios con

elementos de élite'. La Jornada. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.jornada.com.mx/notas/2022/03/20/politica/crean-coordinacion-antihomicidios-con-elementos-de-elite/>.

- 10 Castillo García, G. (2022). 'Va el gobierno federal contra homicidios; crea coordinación nacional'. La Jornada. Retrieved April 7, 2022, from: <https://www.jornada.com.mx/notas/2022/03/20/politica/va-el-gobierno-federal-contra-homicidios-crea-coordinacion-nacional/>.

SECTION 6: METHODOLOGY

- 1 INEGI. 2021. Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE). Retrieved from: < <https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/envipe/2021/>>. (Accessed 21 March 2022)
- 2 Brauer, J. & Marlin, J. (2009). "Defining Peace Industries and Calculating the Potential Size of a Gross World Product by Country and by Economic Sector". Institute for Economics and Peace, Sydney.

Our research analyses peace and its economic value.



We develop global and national indices, calculate the economic impact of violence, analyse country level risk and have developed an empirical framework for Positive Peace that provides a roadmap to overcome adversity and conflict, helping to build and sustain lasting peace.

Download our latest reports and research briefs for free at:
visionofhumanity.org/resources





FOR MORE INFORMATION

INFO@ECONOMICSANDPEACE.ORG

EXPLORE OUR WORK

WWW.ECONOMICSANDPEACE.ORG AND

WWW.VISIONOFHUMANITY.ORG



GlobalPeaceIndex



@GlobPeaceIndex

@IndicedePaz

IEP is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the world's focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress.

IEP is headquartered in Sydney, with offices in New York, The Hague, Mexico City, Harare and Brussels. It works with a wide range of partners internationally and collaborates with intergovernmental organizations on measuring and communicating the economic value of peace.

The Institute for Economics & Peace is a registered charitable research institute in Australia as a Deductible Gift Recipient. IEP USA is a 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization.

MAY 2022 / IEP REPORT 85

ISBN 978-0-6451494-7-0



9 780645 149470 >