



## Special report

Claudia Sheinbaum's first  
year in office

October 3rd, 2025

## CONTENTS

### I. Overview

#### A. Five main achievements

1. **Bilateral relation with the US and allegiance to the USMCA**
2. **Security strategy**
3. **Commitment to stability and dialogue with the private sector**
4. **More and better planning**
5. **Special attention to women**

#### B. Five major setbacks

1. **Democratic setback**
2. **Opacity and weak fight against corruption**
3. **Economic performance and fiscal deficit**
4. **Minimizing problems or using dubious data**
5. **Environmental issues**

### I. Data: continuity or change

1. **Politics and government**
2. **Society and development**
3. **Economy and finance**
4. **Security, justice, and human rights**

## Appendix: another year of morning press conferences

# I. OVERVIEW: MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS AND SETBACKS

## A. Five main achievements

- 1. Bilateral relation with the US and allegiance to the USMCA:** Trump's return to the White House brought enormous challenges for Mexico, to which the president has responded with relative effectiveness and prudence. Although the business environment still faces challenges and uncertainty, the Mexican government managed to mitigate some risks in bilateral relations.


During her first year in office, Sheinbaum showed that her foreign policy priority is to preserve North American trade integration. She strengthened cooperation with the US on security, containing China, and migration, and sought to address several trade and sectoral complaints. In addition, the president avoided entering into rhetorical confrontations with Trump and opted for an institutional approach. Mexico also reestablished its relationship with Canada, which could be a valuable ally in the review of the USMCA.

With regard to organized crime, Sheinbaum responded to pressure from Trump by aligning Mexican security policy priorities with those of the US in order to mitigate the possibility of unilateral actions on Mexican territory. While greater cooperation has led to positive results, pressure from Trump is unlikely to ease in the coming years.

With these actions, and leveraging the resilience of the Mexican export sector, the president has managed to moderate the political risk environment and reduce uncertainty in one of the strategic areas for the country's economic future. Marcelo Ebrard's work at the helm of the Ministry of Economy has been meticulous and effective, maintaining a constant channel of negotiation with Washington and containing tensions.

In her second year in office, she will face a complex review of the treaty, in which Mexico is likely to be forced to make costly concessions but, in the end, retain a privileged position of access to the US market.

**Figure 1. Key issues ahead of the USMCA review**



Source: Integralia

2. **Security strategy:** a significant shift in the security policy—partly out of conviction, partly due to pressure from Washington—allowed Sheinbaum to skillfully distance herself from her predecessor and offer some positive figures on crime rates, even though violent incidents persist in different areas of the country (e.g., in Sinaloa) and there are legitimate doubts about certain relevant crime figures (e.g., homicides).

Some positive changes that have taken place since the beginning of the administration include: (i) the inclusion of Omar García Harfuch, an official with proven experience, in the security cabinet; (ii) an increase in drug seizures (especially fentanyl), arrests of priority targets, the dismantling of laboratories, and the seizure of weapons of all kinds; and (iii) the drafting, presentation, and approval of a legal framework that included constitutional amendments to strengthen the National Guard, the Ministry of Security and Citizen Protection (SSPC), the National Intelligence Center (CNI), and other institutions with the aim of creating a platform capable of providing real-time information to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of crimes.

**Table 1. High-impact crimes on the decline under the current administration**

| Crime                          | Rate 2024 | Rate 2025 | Var%  |
|--------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-------|
| Total crime rate               | 212.9     | 190.3     | -10.6 |
| Intentional homicide           | 12.9      | 10.6      | -18.3 |
| Femicide                       | 0.4       | 0.3       | -21.3 |
| Intentional injury             | 84.6      | 78.5      | -7.1  |
| Business robbery               | 37.6      | 33.8      | -10.0 |
| Robbery of transport operators | 4.0       | 3.0       | -24.7 |
| Vehicle theft                  | 59.1      | 42.4      | -28.3 |
| Total thefts                   | 190.4     | 162.9     | -14.4 |

Source: own calculations based on public data.

The situation remains complex in terms of organized crime, given the economic power and territorial presence of some criminal organizations throughout most of the country (according to the [DEA](#)). In addition, the budget allocated to security tasks remains well below the levels observed in other countries, and budgetary constraints are increasing. Furthermore, although Sheinbaum will have a more robust legal and operational framework in place for her second year, the institutional and operational capacity of the SSPC remains fragile.

3. **Commitment to stability and dialogue with the private sector:** Sheinbaum maintains—in a complex context—her commitment to macroeconomic stability. She has also committed to improving relations and opening up to private initiative (PI), with less polarization.

Unlike his predecessor, he is committed to greater collaboration through new public-private partnership schemes. *Plan Mexico* includes projects of this type in various strategic sectors, such as road infrastructure, energy, petrochemicals, the circular economy, and logistics, among others.

In terms of the budget, Sheinbaum has fulfilled her commitment to reduce the high fiscal deficit she inherited from her predecessor, despite the undeniable social cost of cutting spending on priority activities. This has allowed the three main rating agencies to maintain the country's credit rating, with no changes on the horizon in the immediate future.

4. **More and better planning:** Sheinbaum has distinguished herself by her strong focus on planning and structuring public policy, which represents a significant change from the previous administration. Unlike a model of government based on improvised and unilateral decisions, she has shown a tendency toward institutionalizing her projects, with the development of key documents such as the National Development Plan (PND) and *Plan Mexico*, which incorporate goals and guiding principles aligned with legal rules and strategic priorities.

Greater order in government plans provides the private sector with a more predictable framework. For example, *Plan Mexico* not only articulates a long-term development vision, but also breaks down strategies into concrete projects, such as investment in energy and connectivity infrastructure, implying a shift toward a somewhat more technical and less ideological management model. Improved planning is also evident in the formalization of more realistic and achievable sectoral programs that complement the PND guidelines.

However, good planning and greater government organization do not guarantee economic success. That is, although they can contribute to better government results and make it easier to evaluate progress, ultimately, achievements depend on good planning being accompanied by sufficient budget, political will, leadership, supervision, technical capacity of civil servants, and, above all, an environment of certainty for private investment. In her first year in office, several of these factors have been absent.

5. **Special attention to women:** Claudia Sheinbaum's arrival to the presidency resulted in a greater emphasis on gender issues. At the beginning of her six year presidential term, CSP sent reforms and additions, approved by Congress, to improve substantive equality and prevent violence against women; she also elevated the government body dedicated to women's issues to the level of a ministry, creating the Ministry for Women.

In addition, the president launched policies to reverse gender inequality. She implemented the Women's Welfare Pension, which offers bimonthly financial support of \$3,000 (pesos) to women aged 60 to 64. The Rita Cetina Scholarship, in turn, helps girls and boys study on equal terms.

It also reversed the previous administration's closure of daycare centers with the announcement of the construction of Child Care and Education Centers (CECI), as part of the National Care System, which will be aimed at the children of women working in maquiladoras.

Finally, initiatives such as Financial Support for Indigenous and Afro-Mexican Women Artisans stand out. This initiative provides direct support, training, technical assistance, and strengthening of the marketing of handicrafts, with the aim of helping women become economically independent.

Despite these actions, the official pro-gender equality narrative is limited by budget constraints. For example, the resources earmarked in the 2026 Federal Expenditure Budget Project in Annex 13: Expenditures for Equality between Women and Men, are limited in their ability to address the gender agenda as they focus on cash transfer programs. In addition, Annex 31: Consolidation of a Care Society repeats many of the programs in Annex 13, without additional resources.

Therefore, while it is positive that women and some of the issues that affect them are named and addressed by the president, actions are still needed to build the framework for the gender agenda so that the policies adopted do not end up being an empty shell.

**1. Democratic setback:** during President Sheinbaum's first year in office, the country underwent a profound institutional change that will have implications for the country's economic, social, and political life for many years to come. Although the so-called "Plan C" was proposed by her predecessor, the president did not hesitate to champion most of the [18 original initiatives](#). In short, these constitutional changes dismantled, in just one year, the system of vertical and horizontal checks and balances that the country had built over the last three decades (Judiciary, Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE), Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT), Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE), National Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH), National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Personal Data Protection (INAI), National Commission for Regulatory Improvement (CONAMER), National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), and National Commission for the Continuous Improvement of Education (MEJOREDU).

On the other hand, Sheinbaum's government chose to close the spaces for political deliberation in the government/legislative agenda and has continued to discredit the opposition parties. Another element to highlight is the increase in (indirect) attacks on journalists and attempts at censorship.

**Table 2. Autonomy of checks and balances on the federal executive branch (2024 vs. 2025)**

High ● Medium ● Low ●

| Authority/Actor  | 2024 | 2025 |
|--|------|------|
| Federal legislature                                      | ●    | ●    |
| Local Congresses   | ●    | ●    |
| Federal Judiciary, including the Supreme Court           | ●    | ●    |
| Governors  | ●    | ●    |
| National Human Rights Commission (CNDH)                  | ●    | ●    |
| Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF)                       | ●    | ●    |
| National Electoral Institute (INE)                       | ●    | ●    |
| Bank of Mexico   | ●    | ●    |
| Other OCAs and regulators (Inai, IFT, Cofece, CRE, CNH)* | ●    | ●    |
| Media  | ●    | ●    |

**Source:** own elaboration. \* Decentralized or decentralized agencies of the APF were eliminated and created.

**2. Opacity and weak fight against corruption:** the current administration continued the process initiated by the former president López Obrador to dismantle anti-corruption institutions. The INAI disappeared and most of its functions were transferred to the Anti-Corruption and Good Governance Ministry (SABG, formerly the Public Service Secretariat), which represents a severe setback in terms of independence. In other cases, it was not dismantling but continuity in terms of capture and marginalization that keeps anti-corruption efforts irrelevant, as in the case of the National Anti-Corruption System (SNA) and the Superior Audit Office of the Federation.

Claudia Sheinbaum's administration shares another similarity with that of her predecessor: the issuance of legal instruments for the protection of priority projects, which in the previous administration contributed to opacity. On August 4<sup>th</sup>, a decree was published in the [Federal Official Gazette \(DOF\)](#) declaring various public works projects to be associated with priority programs or strategic projects. The infrastructure considered a priority is that related to health, housing, rail transport, roads, ports, education, and water infrastructure. This is a special scheme that the former president AMLO initiated and that CSP is perfecting: any request for information can be rejected on the ambiguous grounds that it "jeopardizes the functioning or integrity of strategic, priority, or defense facilities, infrastructure, projects, plans, or protection services."

On the other hand, Sheinbaum's first year in office has been marked by public knowledge of alleged acts of corruption, mainly inherited from the previous administration. So far, corruption cases are being dismissed or downplayed. It remains to be seen in the coming years of her administration whether Sheinbaum will be able to tackle the visible problem of corruption in her political coalition or whether she will eventually take more decisive action to combat corruption.


**Table 3. Cases of alleged corruption revealed since October 2024**

| Alleged individuals involved  |  | Issue  |
|---|--|--|
|  | Representative of Baja California, Araceli Brown (Morena)    | Accusations from the US of supporting the CDS since she was mayor of Playas de Rosarito (2019-2024)  |
|  | Relatives of former Navy Minister Rafael Ojeda               | Alleged fuel smuggling network (huachicol fiscal)  |
|  | Senator Adán Augusto López Hernández                         | Alleged criminal links between the former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador's former Minister of the Interior and the criminal group "La Barredora," following detection by his former Minister of Public Security (Tabasco) |
|  | Various officials from Birmex, a Mexican state-owned company | Allegations of possible irregular acquisition of medicines at inflated prices.   |
|  | Children of former President López Obrador                   | Allegations of dubious business dealings   |

**Source:** Interlalia, based on newspaper review.

3. **Economic performance and fiscal deficit:** Sheinbaum's administration has had an unfavorable start in economic terms. A combination of domestic factors—reforms that are negative for investment and a severe contraction in public spending—and external factors—tariffs—have brought the economy close to recession.

The domestic economy is weakened: private consumption—which accounts for more than 70% of GDP—is in negative territory for the first time in a year without crisis. On the investment side, there has been an even more marked decline. In this context, the only engine showing solid growth is the export sector.



**Source:** Integralia, with data from INEGI.

The labor market is also showing significant weakness, with a loss of more than 100,000 jobs in the IMSS between September 2024 and August 2025 (excluding the artificial increase due to the incorporation of workers from digital platforms).

In terms of public finances, 2025 has been a year of fiscal adjustment, marked by an 8% drop in programmable spending and a 34% drop in public investment (January-August 2025).

Meanwhile, although there is greater dialogue with the private sector, the business environment has deteriorated due to aggressive reforms that undermine the rule of law or increase the costs of doing business, while the structural problems of the economy remain unresolved. Alongside the aforementioned constitutional amendments in the areas of the judiciary, energy, and autonomous bodies (referred to in setback 1, "democratic setback"), disruptive reforms for the private sector are currently under discussion in Congress: injunction, labor, customs, health, water, and, soon, the circular economy.


In short, although the government blames external factors for the poor economic performance, the evidence suggests that domestic factors are weighing more heavily in President Sheinbaum's first year.

4. **Minimizing problems or using dubious data:** Sheinbaum has chosen to ignore or dismiss important problems the country is facing. Her style is, in large part, similar to that of her predecessor: offering dubious figures, minimizing problems, and diverting attention from thorny issues. We consider this a step backward across the board. There are several examples of this.

The notorious increase in disappearances during her first year in office has been ignored. At the same time, the president downplays or dismisses important acts of violence at the national level, framing them as isolated incidents or emphasizing crime reduction statistics. Instead of acknowledging the deterioration in specific regions, the president has chosen to project a narrative of control and security that seeks to bolster the progress of her strategy, but which calls into question the seriousness of the violence that thousands of families face on a daily basis in the country.

In this regard, the official strategy and discourse on security continue to focus on highlighting the reduction in homicides, which contrasts with the behavior of other categories—such as other crimes against life, disappearances, and missing persons—that show a different reality and raise doubts about the consistency and reliability of official figures.

**Graph 2. Evolution of figures for intentional homicides, disappearances and missing persons, and other crimes against life**



**Source:** own elaboration with data from SESNSP and RNPDO

Other relevant issues that the president has chosen to ignore or downplay include (some of which are mentioned in previous setbacks):

- The sharp economic slowdown experienced by the country in her first year in office,
- The unusual weakness in the creation of formal jobs in the country,
- The corruption issues within her political coalition,
- The still delicate situation of Pemex despite government support,
- The very fragile budgetary balance, and
- The situation in the health sector.

**5. Environmental issues:** Claudia Sheinbaum's first year in office has revealed significant tensions between environmental objectives and budgetary and energy decisions. On the one hand, funding for the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (Semarnat) has declined: since 2018, its budget has fallen by around 20%, and a further reduction of 4% is projected for the period 2025-2026. This trend contradicts commitments to strengthen environmental policy, as it limits the institutional capacity to implement conservation, mitigation, and adaptation programs in the face of climate change.

**Table 4. Budget of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (2026 pesos)**

|  | 2018   | 2024   | 2025   | 2026   | Real Var<br>2026<br>vs 2018 | Real Var<br>2026<br>vs 2025 |
|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Environment<br>and<br>Natural<br>Resources | 55,502 | 76,760 | 45,884 | 44,064 | -20.6%                      | -4.0                        |

**Source:** Approved expenditure budgets from 2018 to 2025. For 2026, data is taken from the bill sent by Sheinbaum to the Chamber of Deputies in early September.

In the energy sector, the policies and legal adjustments promoted during this first year seem to weaken the emission reduction targets. Restrictions on private participation in electricity generation slow down the possibility of rapidly expanding the installed capacity of clean energy, while favoring the expansion of activities in the hydrocarbons sector. In addition, the absence of stricter regulations on greenhouse gas emissions in this sector poses risks to the fulfillment of national and international climate commitments.

Finally, the experience of the previous six year presidential term warns of the impacts that infrastructure megaprojects can have on the environment, as was the case with the Maya Train, whose implementation was marked by deficiencies in the Environmental Impact Statement processes. If evaluation and regulation in this area are not strengthened, current and future federal government projects could reproduce these same impacts.

Overall, the balance sheet for the first year shows that environmental policy is in a vulnerable position: there are ambitious goals in the discourse, but structural contradictions persist between the budget, the energy model, and the management of large projects.

### III. DATA: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE

#### 1. Politics and government

| Category  | Indicators   | Base data             | Latest data             | Change |
|---|--|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------|
| Performance evaluation of Mayor Claudia Sheinbaum | Approves Sheinbaum's work<br>( <i>El Financiero</i> )                  | October 2024<br>(70%) | September 2025<br>(74%) | 4 pp   |
|   | Disapproves of her work<br>( <i>El Financiero</i> )                    | October 2024<br>(19%) | September 2025<br>(26%) | 7 pp   |
| Happiness or subjective well-being                | Mental health balance of the adult population<br>(Inegi)               | July 2024<br>(6.2/10) | June 2025<br>(5.4/10)   | -0.8   |
|   | Social mood - The country is heading in the right direction<br>(Ipsos) | 58<br>(July 2024)     | 40<br>(September 2025)  | -18 pp |

#### 2. Society and development

| Category        | Indicator   | Base data           | Latest data         | Variation |
|-----------------|---|---------------------|---------------------|-----------|
| Social programs | Social protection spending<br>(constant billion pesos)<br>(Ministry of Economy, SHCP)             | 1,001<br>(IIT-2024) | 1,061<br>(IIT-2025) | 6.0       |
|                 | Annual budget for the Pension Program for the Welfare of Older Adults<br>(constant mdp)<br>(SHCP) | 508,176<br>(2024)   | 526,508<br>(2026)   | 3.6       |
|                 | Annual budget for the Youth Building the Future program<br>(constant mdp)<br>(SHCP)               | 26,450<br>(2024)    | 25,173<br>(2026)    | -4.8      |
| Health          | Public health expenditure<br>(% of GDP)<br>(SHCP)   | 2.8<br>(2024)       | 2.5<br>(2025)       | -0.3pp    |

### 3. Economy and finance

| Category                          | Indicator   | Base data (2024)          | Latest data (2025)     | Variation            |
|-----------------------------------|---|---------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Occupation, employment, and wages | Unemployment rate (Inegi)                             | 2.7<br>(September)        | 2.6<br>(July)          | -0.1 pp              |
|                                   | Economically active population (INEGI)                | 61,370,334<br>(Q3)        | 61,065,005<br>(Q2)     | -305,329<br>(-0.50%) |
|                                   | Jobs affiliated with the IMSS (IMSS)                  | 22,480,803<br>(September) | 22,454,917<br>(August) | -25,886<br>(-0.12%)  |
|                                   | Minimum wage (pesos per day) (Conasami)               | 248.93                    | 278.30                 | 12                   |
|                                   | Total payroll (constant million pesos) (IMSS)         | 13,526<br>(September)     | 14,163<br>(August)     | 636.34<br>(4.7%)     |
|                                   | Labor productivity (Banxico)                          | 98.98<br>(Q3)             | 99.<br>(Q2)            | 0.02                 |
|                                   | Unit labor cost (Banxico)                             | 120.91<br>(September)     | 124.39<br>(July)       | 3                    |
|                                   | Working poverty (% of the population) (Coneval/INEGI) | 35.1<br>(Q3)              | 35.1%<br>(Q2)          | n.a.                 |
| BMV Price and Quotation Index     | CPI (Banxico)   | 52,477<br>(September)     | 58,709<br>(August)     | 12                   |
| Gross Domestic Product (GDP)      | GDP (2018 bdp, seasonally adjusted figures) (Inegi)   | 25.5<br>(Q3)              | 25.64<br>(Q2)          | 0.3                  |
| Consumer inflation                | Annual variation in the INPC (Inegi)                  | 4.58<br>(September)       | 3.57<br>(August)       | -1.01 pp             |
| Core inflation                    | Annual core inflation rate (Inegi)                    | 3.91<br>(September)       | 4.23<br>(August)       | 0.31 pp              |

### 3. Economy and finance

| Category                   | Indicator   | Base data (2024)   | Latest data (2025) | Change                      |
|----------------------------|---|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| Investment                 | Public GFCF (mmdp at 2018 prices) (Inegi)             | 685.8 (Q3)         | 569.5 (Q2)         | -17                         |
|                            | Private GFCF (mmdp at 2018 prices) (Inegi)            | 5,660 (Q3)         | 5,380 (Q2)         | -5                          |
|                            | Foreign direct investment (USD) (Ministry of Economy) | 33,519 (Q2)        | 34,264 (Q2)        | 2                           |
| Regional economic activity | Quarterly indicator (Base index, 2018=100) (Banxico)  | North              |                    | 0.8%                        |
|                            |   | 104.7 (Q3)         | 105.6 (Q2)         |                             |
|                            |   | Central-North      |                    | 0.4                         |
|                            |   | 103.1 (Q3)         | 103.5 (Q2)         |                             |
|                            |   | Central            |                    | 0.4                         |
|                            |   | 102.3 (Q3)         | 102.8 (Q2)         |                             |
|                            |   | South              |                    | 0.1                         |
| 109.3 (Q3)                 | 109.5 (Q2)  |                    |                    |                             |
| Reference rate             | Target rate (Banxico)                                 | 10.75 (September)  | 7.75 (September)   | -3 pp                       |
| Country risk               | Credit rating of sovereign debt in foreign currency   | Moody's            |                    | Outlook changed to negative |
|                            |   | Baa2 (stable)      | Baa2 (negative)    |                             |
|                            |   | S&P Global Ratings |                    | No change                   |
|                            |   | BBB (stable)       | BBB (stable)       |                             |
|                            |   | Fitch Ratings      |                    | No change                   |
| BBB- (stable)              | BBB- (stable)   |                    |                    |                             |

| Category                                 | Indicator   | Base data (2024)    | Latest data (2025)  | Change     |
|--|---|---------------------|---------------------|------------|
| Reserves                                 | Banxico reserves (USD million) (Banxico)                    | 226,845 (September) | 246,528 (September) | 9          |
| Public debt                              | SHRFSP (% of GDP) (SHCP/INEGI)                              | 48.5 (June)         | 50.5 (June)         | +2.04 pp   |
| Revenue collection                       | Tax revenue (% of GDP) (SHCP/INEGI)                         | 7.64 (January-June) | 8.06% (Jan-June)    | 0.41 pp    |
| Revenue collection and budget priorities | Public sector budget revenue (mmdp) (SHCP)                  | <b>Totals</b>       |                     | 26% real   |
|  |   | 5,049 (Jan-Aug)     | 5,380 (Jan-Aug)     |            |
|  |   | <b>Oil</b>          |                     | -16% real  |
|  |   | 685 (Jan-Aug)       | 599 (Jan-Aug)       |            |
|  |   | <b>Taxpayers</b>    |                     | 6.5% real  |
|  |   | 3,340 (Jan-Aug)     | 3,695 (Jan-Aug)     |            |
|  |   | <b>Income tax</b>   |                     | 7% real    |
|  |   | 1,835 (Jan-Aug)     | 2,038 (Jan-Aug)     |            |
|  |   | <b>VAT</b>          |                     | 6% actual  |
|  |   | 932 (Jan-Aug)       | 1,028 (Jan-Aug)     |            |
|  |   | <b>IEPS</b>         |                     | -0.5% real |
|  |   | 422 (Jan-Aug)       | 436 (Jan-Aug)       |            |
|  | <b>Total public sector budget expenditure (mmdp) (SHCP)</b> | 5,952 (Jan-Aug)     | 5,961 (Jan-Aug)     | -3.6% real |
|  | <b>Contributions (mmdp) (SHCP)</b>                          | 664 (Jan-Aug)       | 689 (Jan-Aug)       | -0.1% real |

### 3. Economy and finance

| Category                            | Indicator                              | Base data (2024)  | Latest data (2025) | Variation |
|-------------------------------------|--|-------------------|--------------------|-----------|
| Revenue and budget priorities       | Shares (mmdp) (SHCP)                   | 895 (Jan-Aug)     | 966 (Jan-Aug)      | 3.9% real |
| Pemex liquid hydrocarbon production | Thousands of barrels per day (Pemex)   | 1,749 (September) | 1,645 (August)     | -6        |
| Pemex natural gas production        | Millions of cubic feet per day (Pemex) | 4,515 (September) | 4,609 (August)     | 2         |
| Pemex domestic oil production       | Thousands of barrels per day (Pemex)   | 984 (September)   | 1,074 (August)     | 9         |

### 4. Security, justice, and human rights

| Category  | Indicator   | Base data (2024) | Latest data (2025) | Change |
|---|---|------------------|--------------------|--------|
| High-impact crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants (January-August) | Intentional homicide (SESNSP victims)                                   | 15.2             | 12.5               | -18.2  |
|   | Disappearances (RNPDO victims)  | 6.65             | 7.4                | 11.9   |
|   | Extortion (SESNSP victims)  | 5.49             | 5.8                | 5.3    |
|   | Drug dealing (SESNSP files)   | 47.05            | 53.1               | 12.8   |
|   | Total robberies (SESNSP files)  | 190.4            | 162.9              | -14.4  |
|   | Business theft (SESNSP files)   | 37.6             | 33.8               | -10.0  |
|   | Robbery of transport operators (SESNSP files)                           | 4.0              | 3.0                | -24.7  |
|   | Vehicle theft (SESNSP stolen vehicles)                                  | 68.2             | 58.7               | -14.1  |
| Perception of insecurity*                                       | Population aged 18 and over who consider their city unsafe (ENSU Inegi) | 59.4             | 63.2               | 6.4    |

\*The latest available data is from the second quarter of 2025.

## IV. APPENDIX: ANOTHER YEAR OF MORNING ROUTINES

### Most frequent participants in morning conferences

Table 5. Appearances by main guests

| Actor                  | Appearances | % of total morning press conferences |
|------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------|
| Rosa Icela Rodríguez   | 30          | 13.7                                 |
| David Kershenobich     | 26          | 11.9                                 |
| Ernestina Godoy        | 21          | 9.6                                  |
| Iván Escalante         | 21          | 9.6                                  |
| Ariadna Montiel        | 19          | 8.7                                  |
| Omar García Harfuch    | 19          | 8.7                                  |
| Zoé Robledo            | 19          | 8.7                                  |
| Marcelo Ebrard         | 18          | 8.2                                  |
| Mario Delgado          | 18          | 8.2                                  |
| Alejandro Gertz Manero | 17          | 7.8%                                 |

### The three actors with the most appearances



#### Number of morning briefings (2024–2025)

2024: 54  
2025: 167  
Total: 221



#### Average duration

**Overall (2024–2025): 1h48**  
2024: 1h41 ·  
2025: 1h50




#### Main locations

Mexico City: 97.3% (215 out of 221)  
Los Cabos, BC South: 0.5% (1)  
Chetumal: 0.5% (1)  
Others: 1.8% (4)

### Key topics covered in the morning conferences

**Graph 3. Number of times each topic was mentioned in the morning conferences, 2024–2025 (N=221)**



#### Morning briefings in which López Obrador was mentioned

With mention: 134 (60.6%)  
 No mention: 87 (39.4%)



#### Main targets of reputational attacks

**Actors (individuals):** Felipe Calderón, Ricardo Salinas Pliego, Ernesto Zedillo, Lorenzo Córdova, Carlos Loret de Mola, Marko Cortés, Vicente Fox, and Alejandro Moreno

**Institutions/companies/media:** SCJN, Reforma, PAN, PJF, INAI, and IFT.

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