Luis Rubio
The U.S. establishment achieved converting the pandemic into another point of contention and polarization. The matter adds to an infinity of factors that divides Americans, and that produced, during the last decade and a half, three polar-opposite administrations: Obama, Trump, and now Biden’s. Where there are practically no differences is with respect to the relationship between the United States and China. There the unity is nearly absolute, reaching obsessive levels.
There is hardly an issue on which Americans are not divided or used to divide to have another factor of controversy: of course, Trump and Obama remain as points of contention, and Biden is yet to define himself. There is division about everything: from the most intimate of life’s affairs -such as abortion and marriage- to geopolitical topics –such as Russia and Europe-, moving past economic subjects including commerce, migration, and the very function of government in society. Even the most trifling of issues end up being a cause for dispute, all of which explains the tardiness in acting against the coronavirus, a circumstance that even became a major issue when naming the director of the most prestigious institution in health matters, the CDC. The U.S. society of today cannot agree on practically anything. Except for China.
The friction with China entertains many levels and facets. In the first place, the trade war that Trump initiated but ensued from the loss of industrial jobs. In contrast with Mexico, China articulated a strategy to transform the plants installed on its soil into a trigger of the nation’s development. From thence stemmed all types of grievances, real and imagined: the obligatory transfer of technology, subsidies to private-sector enterprises, and an anti-foreign bias. In the second place, Americans blame China for stealing via hacking, technology, information, and secrets through the internet. In third place, and perhaps central to the entire perceived insult, the Americans feel betrayed -and, more than that, deceived- in that China has not evolved according to their expectations toward becoming a democracy. According to the prevailing American mantra (about which, paradoxically, Mexico had a great deal to do because it did, in this reading, follow the expected course, despite the result…), that as the economy opened and incomes increased, China would advance toward democracy. Although surely the Chinese leaders never promised such an evolution, there is no question that this was the West’s expectation when China was accepted as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.
The extraordinary impact of China’s growth during the past decades unleashed all species of passions among admirers as well as among detractors. Some see China as the sign of the future and extol its authoritarian government as the solution to the problems of nations as well as of the globe: instead of debating within a democratic context, dreams Thomas Friedman, the New York Times columnist, if the U.S. had a government like that of China, it could confront its problems (and those worldwide, such as the climate) expeditiously and with determination. Others, like Minxin Pei*, estimate that the Chinese system is unsustainable, while George Magnus** analyzes the unwillingness of Xi Jinping to come to grips with the dilemmas that nation is faced with, now complicated by the coronavirus and the wake of internal anger that it engendered. Dexter Roberts*** observes the weaknesses of the system. Obviously, no one knows what will happen, but bets are being placed in all directions.
The summation of all these disputes, misunderstandings, and clashes of expectations has translated into a virtual consensus concerning China as a geopolitical threat. Innumerable publications and political positions argue the pros and cons and the implications of the new reality, reduced in essence to two: those who anticipate a growing confrontation and those who consider a possible arrangement. The leader of the first band Graham Allison**** placed on the table the notion that the U.S. and China are face to face with what he denominates a “Thucydides Trap,” a confrontation that is generated when the decadent power attempts to thwart the rise of the new one. The other side, always headed by Henry Kissinger, poses not only the possibility but the necessity of an arrangement.***** This group argues that the relationship with China has nothing to do with the old USSR due to the multiplicity of interactions that exist; thus, it proposes that it is perfectly compatible to work where there are common interests and to compete where there are differences and to refuse unequivocally that the Thucydides Trap is in force. The work of Kishore Mahbubani****** is hardly analytical and is arrogant, but it nonetheless constitutes a form of what such an arrangement might look like.
Americans, wrote Kissinger years ago, play chess, where the objective is to wind up with the king as soon as possible; on their part, the Chinese play wei qi, the nature of which is to patiently build positions until overwhelming the enemy, never directly confronting the latter. It is not obvious to me who will win this game, but two things are clear: first, the result will inexorably affect Mexico, and second, Americans have shown to be quite meagerly strategic and deliberate in this fight.
It is a shame that Mexicans are today so lost that they fail to grasp the enormous opportunity implicit in this war. Another one that goes by.
* China’s Crony Capitalism; ** Red Flags; *** The Myth of Chinese Capitalism; ****Destined For War; ***** On China; ******Has China Won?
@lrubiof