Luis Rubio
In Solidarity with Angel Verdugo
Two visions of the Mexican political transition characterize observers and scholars of the subject: one sustains that the transition ended the day that there were clean and contested elections allowing for a peaceful change of power. The other argues that the nature of the political system has not changed in nature despite the government’s alternation of political parties. Beyond the details, perhaps the pertinent question would be, What should have been done differently to put in a better port? The response to this would permit a keener diagnosis of the current situation and, feasibly, in an exercise of idyllic statesmanship, starting over.
My perception is that the 1996 electoral reform was a great accomplishment of Mexican upper-tier politics. The president and the task-force groups, above all the academicians and the leaders of the diverse political parties, bore down on and exerted pressure to achieve the course of action that, from 1997, made possible for Mexico free, clean, competitive, and professionally administered elections. Given the prior history of electoral fraud and abuse, no one can underestimate the achievement there.
It also seems to me that, with the perspective and arrogance made possible by the rear-view mirror, there was more hope and jubilation among those who procured that reform than there were depth and foresight. The election of 2000 was applauded inside and outside of Mexico because it effected party alternation in the presidency peacefully. Still, the reality is that the applause referred more to the fact that the party that had been in power for decades had lost an election than to a true transformation of the Mexican State. The key factor was that the politically correct candidate won, which gave all the actors the go-ahead to congratulate themselves for the milestone this represented. However, the subsequent presidential election events in 2006 demonstrated that Mexico was far from having achieved democracy.
The hard and simple reality is that the old system’s real powers (not only in the PRI) desired changes that would facilitate their own triumph, but they were not disposed to a genuine opening or to an unabridged transformation of the political system or the governmental structure. The electoral system was radically transfigured, creating an unusually structured apparatus (with respect to the world) and also costly in that, as José Woldenberg, the first, non-partisan president of the INE (Federal Electoral Institute), would have said at the time, that was the price of the mistrust. Mexicans ended up with an exceptionally powerful instrument to guarantee that the votes would decide who would govern them. Still, they have not been able to come by a better result regarding how they are governed.
Mexicans can be proud of having resolved the problem of access to power, which renders the INE criticisms unjust and absurd. The problem to be resolved in 1996 and the ensuing reforms were totally worked out. The matter lies in what was not settled there, the manner in which Mexicans should be governed, which entails attending to the way the government functions and the rights of the citizenry.
The key promoters and actors of the 1996 reform were convinced that the impediment hindering the sea change in the political system was the electoral order-of-things. Their expectations were such that, once presidential party alternation was obtained, the pieces would automatically fall into place, opening new political participation opportunities. No one foresaw that the old system embodied such robust anchors that it has been able to remain practically untouched for a quarter-century. To that must be added, the tragedy represented by the fact that the winner in 2000, Vicente Fox, had no idea of the responsibility that fell into his hands nor the golden opportunity it denoted. The unfinished work of some and the ignorance and apathy of the other countenanced the victory’s being one of inertia and of the de facto powers.
Truth to tell, no one should have been surprised at the result, in that much of it is part of the national DNA. When NAFTA was negotiated, three agricultural products (corn, beans, and powdered milk) were granted 17 years of adjustment before imports would be liberalized. After 16 years and in the face of the imminence of the opening, the interest groups began to rant that “they didn’t give us enough time.” In the end, the bell saved them because prices went up exactly at that moment, allowing for a smooth transition. But the example illustrates the way Mexicans proceed: instead of anticipating and acting opportunely, they always find themselves running to catch up after something has already turned out badly.
The inordinate unfinished business of Mexican politics is that of the thorough reform of the government. The Mexican government is opaque, intrinsically corrupt, is not accountable, and it does not adhere to any legal framework. How today’s president has been able to dismantle the institutional structure evidence that it did not possess the strength and legitimacy that many assumed it did. Whosoever aspires to return to a path of stability, growth, and development will have no remedy other than to embark on a far-reaching transformation without which the mistrust of the citizens as well as of the business community and investors is going to be permanent, impeding the prosperity and well-being of the population.
@lrubiof