Luis Rubio
No one can doubt that justice in Mexico is practically nonexistent. The average Mexican lives in a sea of permanent abuse without having any recourse to protect their interests. Most of the issues -contracts, services, defective products- that involve the average citizen are local, unlike the federal jurisdiction, which is the one that involves matters linked to the federal government and that, at the pinnacle of the structure, refer to the Supreme Court of Justice. The former affects 99% of Mexicans; the latter engages the remaining 1%. One would think -it would be common sense- that any reform to the justice system would focus on the problems faced by the 99%.
However, the bill being discussed and feared so much is not aimed at improving justice or creating mechanisms to resolve conflicts or disputes that affect citizens but rather at establishing tight control over the members of the Supreme Court of Justice. In a word, the objective is strictly political, derived more from a spirit of revenge than from a constructive goal of solving real and tangible problems afflicting the population.
The challenge that the outgoing president’s project represents for the judiciary is but one component of the broader framework that integrates the set of constitutional amendments that, like poison, he is trying to inherit to Dr. Sheinbaum. The repercussions of the proposed changes to the Supreme Court structure are multiple and have consequences in many more areas than its promoter probably imagines. However, in terms of political power, they go hand in hand with the proposed elimination of the members of Congress by proportional representation, the incorporation of the Electoral Institute (INE) and the Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE) into the federal government, and the dismantling of the few remaining independent regulatory bodies, including Transparency and Access to Information (INAI).
The nodal point is that the proposed reforms are not a matter of laws but of power. Much of the discussion that has taken place in the media, periodicals, and academic debates has revolved around the powers of the various entities and branches of the government, that is, their constitutional attributes. However, this approach seems misguided because the outgoing government has shown its unwillingness to abide by the laws or powers of the presidency, whether derived from the Constitution or other laws. For President López Obrador, what is relevant is not the law but the power that the presidency can wield without check, and his mantra throughout his term has been to increase those powers systematically, first de facto and now in the Constitution.
There is no doubt that the checks and balances that were created with the reform of the Supreme Court in 1994 and after that turned out to be weaker than their authors intended, perhaps mainly because they were never explained and socialized among the population and, therefore, they did not acquire the legitimacy that is, in the end, the factor that determines the strength of an institution. It is no coincidence that the two most disputed institutions -by attackers and defenders alike- are the best known: the Supreme Court and the INE, where citizens are duly invested. Their legitimacy provides credibility, and consequently, their elimination would have enormous costs for the government and the country in general.
The current moment will end up being crucial, whatever the outcome. The notion that it is possible to recreate the old presidency at no cost is laughable. The size, diversity, and dispersion of the population bear no resemblance to the idyllic era that the president seems to want to recreate (the 1970s); the structure of the economy in the globalized world has nothing to do with that of the period known as “stabilizing development” (1950s and 1960s) nor can the country return to that era. Morena, in addition to not being a political party in shape, does not have the tentacles that the PRI of yesteryear had nor the control of social structures such as the Labor Congress, the peasant’s organizations (CNC), or the popular organizations (CNOP). Opium dreams can end up being extraordinarily expensive.
The big battle being played at this moment (the so-called “Plan C”) aims to recreate the authoritarian regime of yesteryear. However, the “small” battle is crucial at this juncture because it will determine the possibility of the total control project being consolidated. This “small” battle has to do with the overrepresentation that Morena aspires to in the two legislative chambers, for which the certification of the election is the central factor. The president, a calculating politician, intends to control the process that leads to overrepresentation and, from there, to the qualified majority by his party through the judges of the electoral tribunal, whose current number, by the actions of the president himself, is insufficient to produce the certification of the June 2 election. It is not a conspiracy, but the attitude should deceive nobody.
The underlying point is what is crucial: how would these constitutional and political games affect the future president? After an overwhelming victory, one would think the smoothest possible transition would be the logical goal, but the president seems bent on creating the conditions for a potential Waterloo.
@lrubiof
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