Ricardo Pascoe Pierce
On September 30, 1938, Britain’s Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, returned to London from a meeting in Munich, Germany, with Adolf Hitler and announced an agreement which, in his opinion, ensured “peace in our time. At that historic meeting, Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier agreed to Hitler’s demand for German occupation of a portion of Czechoslovakia called the Sudetenland in exchange for a promise not to pursue or seek further territorial occupations in Europe. However, on March 15, 1939, less than a year after Hitler’s promise in Munich, the German army occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia, thus initiating the dynamic that made World War II inevitable.
Today, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Putin’s recent use of a supersonic missile against the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, there is talk that the world is on the verge of World War III. That missile, it is speculated, will start an escalation of confrontations leading to a nuclear holocaust.
If this is true, what lessons can be drawn from the Chamberlainian policy of “appeasement” as a way to avoid a future global war? Is it feasible to think of the use of reason to curb the warlike impulses of certain leaders and their nations?
One of the seminal ideas that emerged from Chamberlain’s mistake is that reason can prevail only if accompanied by a solid show of force by the opposing powers. Throughout the so-called Cold War, the prevailing conception was that no leader “in his right mind” would initiate an atomic war that would inevitably end in the annihilation of all humanity—a war without victors but with universal losers.
Another idea that emerged from the Munich negotiations of 1938 is that leaders are unpredictable, especially when their political power may be in doubt, or they will be questioned if they deviate from their warlike course. Today, we have two examples that illustrate this: Putin and Netanyahu. The only language that can subjugate them to return to rationality is that of power emanating from democratic but militarily strong societies.
A third insight provided by the lessons of Munich is that the anti-annexationist powers must be relentless in their defense of the principle that annexations lead to war in some form and do not appease the appetite of the perpetrators. And that international law must prevail over national annexationist theses.
Trump said he would end the war in Ukraine “in a day.” Apparently, his idea has been that Ukraine should be resigned to the idea of losing its territories currently occupied by Russian troops, in addition to pledging never to join NATO. In return, Putin would presumably agree to give up the annexation of more Ukrainian territories in the future. In Trump’s proposal, there is no mention of the prevalence of international order and law.
Trump’s proposal is strikingly similar to Chamberlain’s statement about “peace in our age.” It combines candor, naiveté, and mental laziness to address the issues in all their immediate and historical complexity. Immediacy consumes the guts of the leader who does not accept the challenge of long-term problems. He is not tempted to look for in-depth solutions. He seeks to attend to an immediate political expedient.
Is a nuclear war likely as a consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine? Given Putin’s threats, it is not probable, but it cannot be ruled out either. However, the world is mistaken if it thinks giving in to Putin’s territorial claims will end the conflict. Chamberlain’s negotiation did not quell the possibility of war but merely postponed the outbreak of World War II.
For true peace in our time, territorial annexations, wherever they may come from, must be avoided. A world order based on respect for nations’ territorial integrity must also be re-established. Peace in our time will be based on respect for international laws to solve conflicts between nations.
Let us learn from Chamberlain’s mistakes to avoid making the same mistakes in our era.
@rpascoep
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