Highlights on Mexico’s responsibility on the Final Report.
In February 2022, the Commission published this report. While the reader can find much precious information in its 148 pages, here is a summary of the main issues attributable to Mexican criminal organizations and the Mexican government’s actions -or lack of-. The full report is accessible for free at the following link: https://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP68838.html.
“The”United States is facing a cross-border illicit drug trade that contributes to the premature death of tens of thousands of Americans each year. Some 100,000 Americans overdosed and died -the majority due to a synthetic opioid such as fentanyl on one of its analogues- over the most recent 12-month period…
“Mexico is the principal source of this illicit fentanyl and its analogues today. In Mexico, cartels manufacture these poisons in clandestine laboratories with ingredients—precursor chemicals—mainly sourced from the People’s Republic of China (PRC)… In Mexico, two cartels dominate the drug trade. Their financial prowess and extensive use of weapons, bribery, threats, and murders of politicians and members of the public—very few of which are ever solved—significantly impede the state’s capacity to control them.
“Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who began his presidency publicly committed to ” policy of “hugs, not bullets” for the cartels, despite the continued rise of violence, must do more in the months and years ahead to more directly address the threat that cartels pose to the health and safety of people in both Mexico and the United States. The flow of precursors from the PRC to Mexico remains almost unabated.
“The Commission used the fundamental concepts of supply and demand to evaluate the most- effective means of achieving its statutory mission of combating the flow of synthetic opioids into the United States and, more broadly and importantly, reducing the number of overdose deaths. Through its work, the Commission came to recognize the impossibility of reducing the availability of illegal synthetic opioids through efforts focused on supply alone.
“Among the factors considered were the Mexican drug cartels’ financial strength, weaponry, the ability to influence political entities, and use of violence against those who stand in their way; the ease of manufacturing and transporting synthetic opioids; the ability to evade law enforcement; and high profitability. These factors make solving the problem with an exclusively supply side –focused effort an impossible task.
“A broader anticorruption or antiviolence strategy’could reduce Transnational CriminalMexico’sations (TCOs’) influence. Still, the government of Mexico’s existing policy toward the cartels —and mid- and high-level leaders within TCOs who often operate with impunity —must adapt to address t”e magnitude of the security challenges that they present.
“Absent definitive action, the TCOsystem’sontinue to thrive and expand. More will need to be done to improve the international system’s ability to detect and respond to changes in new drug production that currently fall outside international controls. In executing this recommendation, the United States must recognize the challenges created by the significant levels of corruption within Mexico’s government.
“Historically, Mexican traffickers have played an important role in supplying drugs consumed in the United States, though this has changed over time. In the past two decades, Mexican TCOs ―particularly the Cártel de Sinaloa and the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación―have moved from plant-based drugs into synthetic drug production, starting with methamphetamine. Since 2014, traffickers have increasingly entered the illegal supply chain for fentanyl and, to a much lesser extent, for fentanyl analogues. Overall, fentanyl trafficking from Mexico is largely not based on diverted pharmaceutical products but instead involves fentanyl illegally manufactured using imported precursors, some of which were only recently controlled in Mexico… according to several experts, fentanyl production capacity appears to be increasing, illegal producers could be seeking to diversify sources from which to obtain the primary materials.
“The precursor chemicals largely imported from Asia, sometimes legally at maritime or air points of entry, are turned into finished fentanyl products—primarily powders and pressed counterfeit tablets. Many of these products are made in small, clandestine labs in Mexico and then trafficked to the northern border, where they are smuggled into the United States on foot or by personal vehicle. The emergence of counterfeit tablets that contain minute quantities of synthetic opioids is particularly troubling. Drug traffickers in Mexico produce most of these tablets, but illegal pill pressing does occur to a lesser extent in the United States and Canada.
“The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has reported that the number of counterfeit pills seized in the United States increased more than seven times, from 2.6 million in fiscal year (FY) 2019 to more than 20 million in FY2021. DEA has concluded that the vast majority of these counterfeit pills originate in Mexico and have been manufactured by TCOs. According to DEA, 71 percent of counterfeit tablets seized and analyzed in the United States in 2019 had fentanyl production techniques consistent with manufacture by Mexican TCOs. In 2021, DEA reported that Mexican TCOs would “remain the primary source of supply and [finished] fentanyl smuggled into the United States, using precursors primarily sourced from China.” Additionally, Mexican authorities have reported a continued rise in domestic fentanyl seizures, both powders, and counterfeit tablets. Seizures through August 2021 amount to nearly 1,200kg of fentanyl.
“Although Mexico is a primary source of illegally manufactured fentanyl, Mexico’s pharmaceutical and chemical sectors are not currently suspected to be the major sources of fentanyl precursors or diverted pharmaceutical fentanyl (although that does not mean diversion has not occurred). Several fentanyl precursors (including several chemicals not controlled in the PRC) are regulated in Mexico, as are tableting machines. Instead, TCOs in Mexico are importing primary materials, including substantial amounts of precursor chemicals. These buyers, who are sometimes linked to criminal groups in the PRC, are using shell companies in Mexico’s chemical sector to conceal their identity and the shipments of precursors. Stopping this illegal activity will be difficult. Although President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has publicly pledged to fight systemic corruption, Mexico’s austerity measures have further constrained the country’s institutional capacity. Mexico spends less than 1 percent of its gross domestic product on security, much less than the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development average of 3 percent, which presents a unique challenge for both Mexico and the United States, given their geographic proximity.
“Part of the difficulty for Mexico can be explained by corruption, threats from violent TCOs, and, until recently, Mexican authorities’ reluctance to acknowledge the growing illegal fentanyl synthesis problem. In the Commission’s view, the Mexican government should exercise greater security-related functions or control across parts of the national territory where TCOs have a stronghold. Lack of institutional resources, limited activity by regulatory agencies, and inadequate involvement by local law enforcement have led to the insufficient screening of commerce at points of entry where fentanyl precursor chemicals enter the country. Although the security posture in Mexico could reduce direct conflicts with TCOs, the long-term erosion of Mexico’s security will ultimately diminish the ability to reduce the TCOs’ strength and freedom of movement. The Commission suggests that more needs to be done.
“In addition to drug-related crimes and corruption, Mexican criminal groups are involved in other functions that enable or are related to drug-trafficking operations. Many of these other functions, such as the illegal importation of military-grade weapons or corrupting public officials, make it easier for TCOs to challenge authorities and support other operations. Both the core functions of the illegal drug trade and other functions that facilitate TCOs will need to be targeted to degrade TCOs’ centers of gravity.
“Recent estimates of drug- or crime-related revenues for Mexico are difficult to determine and largely predate illegal fentanyl production. The U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) National Drug Intelligence Center estimated in 2008 that Mexican and Colombian TCOs earned between $18 billion and $39 billion a year from wholesale drug sales. In 2010, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimated bulk cash smuggling to Mexico at between $19 billion and $29 billion annually. Other estimates from international bodies, research organizations, and news media have published drug export revenue for Mexico in the range of $6 billion to $21billion a year between 2010 and 2018. One estimate of the retail revenues for drug sales in the United States arrived at close to $150 billion for the combined sales of cocaine, cannabis, heroin, and methamphetamine in 2016. Yet, only a portion of that money returns to Mexico, depending on how far TCOs operate in the drug market supply chain.
“Although credible estimates for total export earnings in recent years are not available, these figures would suggest that drug export sales in Mexico are in the low tens of billions of dollars. Of course, these are just revenues from the illegal sale of drugs, and many TCOs in Mexico conduct other illegal activities, which increase their earnings. Thus, expanded targeting of illegal proceeds, beyond those only from drugs, would benefit anticrime efforts more broadly.
“Mexico and the United States have engaged—with varying levels of cooperation and success—on joint security issues. The U.S. government and the government of Mexico recently entered into a high-level security dialogue to support cooperative efforts. Through the U.S.–Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities, the United States and Mexico have pledged greater coordination to address crime (including drug trafficking and arms smuggling) and public health issues (such as drug use). Mexican officials that spoke with the Commission hope a cooperative partnership on several of these fronts can yield results. To that end, some officials in Mexico are working to tackle various illegal operations of drug-trafficking groups. However, the overall cooperation with foreign law enforcement officials in Mexico to eradicate the fentanyl threat has been insufficient to date.
The government of Mexico shifted seaport authority to the Mexican Navy (Secretaría de Marina, or SEMAR) in 2016, and the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA; the Secretariat of National Defense) continues to exercise checkpoint authority on land points of entry. Additionally, Mexican authorities have been updating fentanyl-specific seizure data more regularly and systematically and promoting government coordination to update precursor chemical legislation (the latest of which occurred in May 2021 through the scheduling of four new chemicals, including fentanyl precursors). The long-term effects of handing over port inspection roles to SEMAR are unknown at this point. The Commission was told that this step might not be temporary and that the Mexican government was looking for ways to improve SEMAR’s capacity to continue fulfilling this role. Further, authorities in Mexico are seeking to improve efforts to target criminal networks, although U.S. support might be needed to facilitate greater technical assistance.
“Presently, the Mexican government recognizes the growing problem of illegal synthetic opioid manufacturing in the country and has expressed interest in working collaboratively with the United States on improving the security situation and the rule of law.”
We encourage our readers to access the full report at this link: https://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP68838.html