Ricardo Pascoe Pierce
Putin made the mistake of thinking that he would get Ukraine to turn its gaze towards Russia and forget about the West by massing troops on the Ukrainian border. In his gamble, he considered that he had more time to pressure the neighboring country’s government to renounce any intention of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) before a situation was created where a political-military intervention of Europe and the United States could take place on the ground.
Several variables probably intersected in his reasoning. In the first place, he felt strengthened by the successful invasion he had in the Crimean peninsula, surprising the West and leaving it stunned while his tanks occupied the whole area. The West finally limited itself to condemning the event and applied some sanctions to Russia.
Secondly, he must think that the response of Europe, especially Germany and France, would be exclusively diplomatic in nature, excluding military pretensions, because of their dependence on gas supplies from Russia, especially in the deep European winter.
Thirdly, he apparently considers that President Biden is caught up in his internal problems with the Republicans, his falling popularity in the polls, and the disastrous exit from the war in Afghanistan. This set of entanglements would hold the U.S. President hostage and render him ineffective, inefficient, and weakened in a scenario of a possible armed confrontation or even a war in the central plain of Eurasia.
Lastly, he must have thought that a significant part of the Ukrainian population would welcome a government directly appointed by the Russian central power, as was the case with the Czars and later with the leaders of the Soviet Union. Putin had every intention of rebuilding his idea of the Russian empire, now in its post-Soviet version. And he is undoubtedly correct in his assessment that the populations of both nations have historical, economic, and family ties.
In that tenor, Russia has been arming and financing Ukrainian separatists in the Donbas region, in eastern Ukraine, and on the border with Russia since 2014, which has left more than 14 thousand dead and the destruction of more than 50 thousand homes and countless businesses closed or ruined. But in the face of the threat of a generalized Russian invasion of their country, the turnaround in the mood of the Ukrainian people has been remarkable. It has awakened an anti-Russian nationalism that turns Ukrainian eyes to the West and NATO as never before.
The effect of the Russian threat to Ukraine has made it prefer to consolidate its relationship with the West to defend itself against the Russian threat better. Putin got it wrong.
And the West, neither slow nor lazy, has noticed this change in the public opinion of the Ukrainians towards its interests and intervenes with more determination in favor of the government of the country, with the provisioning of high range and sophisticated weaponry, as well as better intelligence on Russian military movements, besides providing direct advice from military personnel of NATO member countries. And all this is happening because Putin finally hesitated about his next move in the region. He was unable to decide what to do.
Putin received public support from Chinese President Xi Jinping, who demanded that the United States give a “serious” response to Russia’s demands that Ukraine commits itself to remain loyal to Russia and never join NATO. Although late and not forcefully, China finally supported Russia in its dispute with the West. It seemed to be a significant diplomatic and political victory for Putin against the United States and Europe. A tremendous Eastern bloc against the West.
But what did China get in return for its public support for Russia? Something vital for that country: Russia would not start a global war while the Winter Olympics took place on its territory. That is, until at least February 20. In the meantime, Russian troops will remain stationed, menacingly, on the Ukrainian border while the West strengthens its economic, political, and military alliances with the Ukrainian government and people. It is undoubtedly an uncomfortable situation for Putin. It will indeed have caused discontent on his home front, among military and economic sectors that resent the increasing economic sanctions that the West is applying to his country, the product not of some decisive action but the threat of action. So far, he is a leader bluffing his foreign policy chess.
The military situation in the region has already stalled. Putin succeeded in annexing Crimea because of the surprise factor. The West was stunned, among other things, by the surprising speed with which Putin moved his troops in the seizure of that Ukrainian region. Today the surprise factor has evaporated, and now time is working against Putin and his intentions to shape the border separating him from Europe and his Russian imperial dreams. The Russian ambassador to the United Nations Security Council had to say that Russia had no intention of invading Ukraine. Meanwhile, the United States reported that the Russian secret services were planning to falsify an alleged Ukrainian invasion of its territory to justify aggression against that country. Whether the U.S. accusation is true or not, the fact is that the whole political-military scenario has changed for Putin and his pretensions to succeed in putting a check dam against the West on its eastern border.
Now the scenario is that Ukraine wants to join NATO to defend itself against the neighbor that has attacked it on two fronts: Crimea and Donbas, and who, it considers, does not honor his word anymore. To lower the tension in the region, it would be well worth the effort to offer Putin a dignified exit. He had already been provided the West’s promise not to insist on Ukraine’s inclusion in NATO in exchange for Russian respect for that country’s neutrality. Putin did not accept. He wanted more.
Putin’s case and handling of the situation in Ukraine reveal how authoritarian leaders think they can impose their methods and ideologies on countries they consider inferior. There are lessons to be learned from this. Panama Dixit.
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