Luis Rubio
The context speaks for itself, but is not consistent. The country is experiencing a species of schizophrenia: on the one hand, it would be difficult to conceive of a higher popularity level for the President. On the other hand, the perception of risk reaches a good part of the population. The current government’s continuity regarding strategy and social programs may explain the former. At the same time, the latter is more challenging to elucidate. Still, the combination of both creates an environment of uncertainty that threatens the viability of the governmental programs and, thus, the President’s popularity.
The perception of risk emanates from two groups of factors: Internally, the pounding coming down from President Trump entails a complex and aggressive agenda that broad sectors of society perceive as ominous for the country’s stability and the viability of the economy. This perception is accentuated by the uncertainty that this implies and the lack of apparent alternatives. As always in the history of Mexico, aggressiveness on confronting the colossus of the North helps concerning popularity, but even those who are blindly loyal to the Morena party perceive the risk, which suggests that there is greater understanding than disposition for resorting to nationalist rhetoric.
Regarding the internal side, the risk perception derives from the fiscal deficit, the potential effects of the judicial reform, the “revision” of the” United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), and the concentration of power. Certainly, not all citizens think the same about these elements, but situated within the context of Trump, few feel at peace concerning the future, and there is no way that Mexico will emerge immune from this entire trail of factors. In any case, the gravity or profundity of the impact depends a great deal on the government itself, and it is there that the uncertainty begins.
The government is in control, or can be, concerning some of the risk factors, but its ability to influence those not under its control is, naturally, much less. What pertains to the economic and fiscal strategy is its own prerogative. However, it is similarly evident that how the public resources are employed can increase or mitigate risk perception. The case of the judicial reform is emblematic: the government has not only defended and driven the reform, it has also discredited any criticism or counterproposal, without recognizing that this constitutes an immense source of uncertainty.
Concerning the exterior, the government does indeed entertain the capacity for negotiation in the face of President Trump’s initiatives; it remains an open and risky process. Perhaps more importantly, the immense vulnerability characterizing Mexico for both the average Mexican and potential businesspeople and investors seems not to be recognized by the government. The insecurity, to which the government has certainly attempted to respond, is a fundamental component, but the end-of-2024 constitutional reforms package is not acknowledged as a factor of lack of confidence.
Additionally, all of this must be viewed within the context of the disappearance or destruction of any vestige of counterweight and regulatory autonomy, which is anathema for whosoever is preoccupied with or who has the responsibility to be preoccupied about the future. The beneficiaries of the governmental programs may applaud the recreation of the power monopoly in the Presidency, but it eliminates all recourse against the authority. If to this are added laws such as that relative to preventive imprisonment without a judicial decision, it is impossible for the government to try to aspire to attract investment to the country. On persevering in those mechanisms, the potential of achieving high growth rates is null. Therefore, more uncertainty.
For a long time, the problem in Mexico has been power. For years, after the dissipation of the PRI-government alliance that typified the political system during the past century, the problem was the lack of decision- and action-making capacity, the absence of institutional structure for the relationship among the federal branches of government (Judicial, Legislative and Executive) and among those powers and the state governors. From AMLO on, the reality, and, consequently, the discussion, must be different. Mexico’s political system is no longer debility among the branches of government but of submission to the Executive; thus, the risk arises from the lack of the institutionalization of power. This circumstance obviously does not worry those holding it, but it should concern them if they wish to be successful in their economic programs and, therefore, in their popularity.
In the old system, a “strong” president constituted a source of certainty, even if they lasted only a single six-year term in power. The institutions created, with greater or lesser clairvoyance, during the democratic period had as their objective conferring permanence to certainty. Now, the challenge is to find a way to re-institutionalize the political system, an objective that would not only require enlightened leadership but also an equivalent capacity of and proclivity for negotiation both with society and with the organized political forces—an enormous challenge in this era of monopolies and inward-looking governments.
@lrubiof
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