Ricardo Pascoe Pierce
These days, it is commonplace for Morena leaders to ask each other if they are on the list of those whose US visas have been revoked. And they are right to do so: the list must be long. There is an explanation, although they probably don’t want to hear it.
The origin of the current situation of Morena party members is the result of Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s strategy to become president in 2018, no matter what. In his 2006 presidential campaign, López Obrador lost because he refused to make political commitments to Elba Esther Gordillo, leader of the national teachers’ union and holder of enough votes to win the election. In 2018, however, López Obrador established alliances with anyone who would have him, most notably with factions of the drug trade, and more specifically with the Sinaloa Cartel.
The strategy was to get into power, whatever the cost. The cost was to embrace and promote the slogan “hugs, not bullets.” The consequence of this policy toward drug trafficking was that the relationship between drug trafficking and politics was no longer a secret, as it had been with the PRI and the PAN. Now, it was Mexican State policy, and it was public and well known that it was mandatory.
And boy, did Morena’s cadres enthusiastically embrace this new “public policy.” If we ask ourselves how Morena has achieved its historic and unprecedented exponential growth, winning governorships, senate seats, congressional seats, and municipalities throughout the country, we need only study the DEA’s map of cartel presence throughout the country. The Sinaloa cartel is established in 30 states of the Republic, the Jalisco CJNG in 22, and so on, with smaller but very active cartels in the center and south of the country.
Want to know how Bedolla won the governorship in Michoacán? Silvano Aureoles knows, and he explained it at the time: his agreements with the Michoacán Family and the CJNG to win enough votes, despite losing the state’s majority. Or the “royal” family in Guerrero, where Salgado is the drug lord, along with his daughter. And they intend to continue ruling, despite the supposed “new ethics” of Morenismo. Sinaloa, Colima, Nayarit, Quintana Roo, Baja California, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas, Sinaloa, and a long list of others?
I insist that the DEA map describes it clearly.
What the map does not explain is how López Obrador introduced and legitimized within the ranks of his party the right to use drug trafficking as an unquestionable ally to win elections and, later, the obligation to share government power.
The PRI and PAN negotiated with drug traffickers in the domes of power, always in secret and behind the scenes. Few people had access to these negotiations, except the President of the Republic, the Attorney General, the Secretaries of Defense and the Navy, and the Secretary of the Interior. That is why it is claimed that the Secretaries of Defense and the Interior (Bartlett) were at the meeting with Caro Quintero and a CIA agent when they agreed to kill Enrique Camarena, the DEA agent who uncovered the plot to exchange weapons for drugs with the Contras in Central America.
With López Obrador, the relationship changed radically. He legitimized and popularized the narco-political alliance. It was also a way of trying to wash his hands and distance himself from the Frankenstein he had created, promoting his current narrative: “It wasn’t me, it was them (his party comrades) who made a deal with the bad guys.” The phrase “hugs, not bullets” was a call for alliance. What’s more, it was a call for co-government. And that’s how Morena’s people understood it when they sought out the drug traffickers in their neighborhoods to receive economic and social support (including coercion at the polls and the collection of protection money) during their campaigns.
During López Obrador’s six years in office, the relationship between the drug traffickers and the government grew, refined, and consolidated. The feast went on with presidential approval. In the corridors of Morena, the relationship milestones were discussed to explain events and developments.
A significant event was when López Obrador handed Ovidio Guzmán over to the US government as a sacrificial lamb ahead of Biden’s imminent visit to Mexico. “A gesture had to be made,” it was said. However, the important thing was that López Obrador sent Adán López to Badiraguato to explain that it was a gesture made under pressure from the United States, but the “political agreement” remained in place. Mission accomplished.
Other Morena officials gave that explanation to their local narco allies so that no one would think that the “essential agreement” had been broken. Not at all. Everything remained the same, except that Biden had to be appeased. From those mouths came the story about Adán and Badiraguato: the Morena officials repeated it like a litany.
Mexico went from having a shameful and discreet relationship between government officials and drug traffickers during the PRI and PAN administrations to a public, widespread, and popular relationship with the López Obrador administration.
Then, Claudia Sheinbaum became president of Mexico, and Donald Trump became president of the United States.
Sheinbaum is bound by former President López Obrador’s mandate to defend the “hugs, not bullets policy,” making the minimum gestures necessary to Washington to appease the wolves in that forest. Trump, on the other hand, comes with a national security mandate that involves completely eradicating the alliance between drug trafficking and politics in Mexico. Two mandates that are clearly contradictory and in conflict.
The previous ambassador, Ken Salazar, was a gentleman of dialogue, yet Biden grew tired of Mexico’s inaction and kidnapped Mayo Zambada. The new ambassador, Ron Johnson, is not known as a gentleman of dialogue, and he comes from Trump’s great anger with Mexico. What can we expect?
The clash will inevitably come and catch the weaker country at a disadvantage. The problems are multiplying: Mexico’s economic situation is precarious. Pemex is a heavy burden on public finances, as are the Maya Train, Dos Bocas, and Mexicana de Aviación. Foreign investment is slowing down, and we are waiting for news. If the renegotiation of the USMCA is brought forward, this will also further slow down domestic and foreign investment. The absurdity of the judicial election vote will discredit the country, because the result will be confirmation of the failed State: Morenistas and drug traffickers will win as judges. And without legitimacy and with little legality.
When Morenistas ask who has had their US visa revoked, they should look to Palenque for answers. There they are: enjoying six years of impunity granted by López Obrador, without realizing that after his term in office, accountability will come, relentlessly. And it will not be pretty.
@rpascoep
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