Ricardo Pascoe Pierce
Mexico has suffered from insecurity for a long time. One need only read the book by Guillermo Valdés Castellanos (La Historia del Narcotráfico en México, 2013), former director of the Center for National Security Research (CISEN) during the Felipe Calderón administration, to learn that multiple state and federal governments have been driving the drug trade to the United States since the 19th century. And those same governments have found loyal allies in those responsible for the production and distribution of drugs. All of this is documented in Valdés Castellanos’ book.
The book describes the history of drug trafficking in Mexico and provides an overview of the alliances between politics and drug trafficking. But this periodization of the relationship between politics and drug trafficking needs to be clarified and explained further so that we can understand current events and, especially, new trends in public security, national security, and the violence of the irregular armies that populate the country.
An important first question to answer is when the war on drug trafficking really began. It is commonplace to talk about “Calderón’s war.” But why don’t we talk about Peña Nieto’s wars or López Obrador’s? During the two six-year terms of these former presidents, violence grew exponentially, especially during the 2018-2024 term. Much more so, even, than during Calderón’s term.
The rhetoric about “Calderón’s war” helped the PRD-Morena finally come to power. But the “left’s” proposal on drug trafficking, “hugs, not bullets,” was actually an olive branch to the drug traffickers, inviting them to join a new dominant political class in Mexico. Their offer involved turning their proposal to promote drugs into a conciliatory step toward its conversion into public policy.
In the last century, various ideas have evolved regarding the relationship between organized crime and politics, often used to justify it. The idea prevailed that the relationship between crime and politics was shameful and reprehensible, yet acceptable because it was entirely functional to the economic and political interests of the various regimes in power. For that reason, the relationship between politicians and drug traffickers was usually distant, through intermediaries, and confined to the political domain. It was a closed, secret, discreet, and never public relationship.
Those were the conditions and rules of conduct until the end of Peña Nieto’s six-year term.
In each six-year term, there was a “raison d’être” for these relationships. During Miguel de la Madrid’s term, there were reasons of State that justified this rapprochement. The United States used drug trafficking through Mexico, in direct relation with the leaders of the Guadalajara Cartel, to finance its wars in Central America. The CIA exchanged weapons for drugs and transportation.
At other times, the US government asked Mexico and its drug producers to mass-produce the morphine it needed for its soldiers in the two World Wars. Opium was also produced for the consumption of thousands of Chinese workers brought to the California coast to work on the construction of railroads throughout the western United States. Mexican families became involved in this production process, learning the trade of opium production and export to the north. Several governors of Mexican states bordering the United States became involved in this lucrative activity. The business flourished, and eventually both the authorities and the Mexican families involved in the production of opium and marijuana sought rather hostile ways to expel the Chinese from the country to keep the business for themselves.
Eventually, the drug trafficking business became mainly Mexican-owned. Regional cartels organized their businesses in each area. Thus, the Pacific and Atlantic coasts became geographical landmarks for the production and export of narcotics. Export to the United States was essential and was the most coveted market.
Starting in the 1980s, the transnationalization of Mexican drug trafficking began in earnest. The relationship between the authorities and the producers started to fracture. The business began to produce significant dividends, and the producers no longer wanted to be subordinate to a relationship where the politician gave the orders and the producer obeyed. The power relationship was fundamentally disrupted.
Salinas, Zedillo, and Fox sought to maintain a semblance of control over a situation that was clearly out of control. The violence perpetrated by the cartels was expressed, for example, in the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio in 1994. That was the sign that the government no longer controlled drug trafficking, even though the order to assassinate the PRI candidate may have come from a government office. The clash of powers was beginning in earnest.
Calderón’s six-year term was the Mexican government’s last attempt to halt the decline of the state’s power over the cartels. It sought to consolidate the power of the armed forces over the cartels, but without success. This gave rise to the concept of “Calderón’s war.”
Peña Nieto hesitated and ceded ground to drug trafficking. He fought it, but without conviction or direction. He never had a narrative on Mexico’s policy toward criminals. And the growth of criminal violence accelerated during his six-year term, which is noticeable when compared to Calderón’s six-year term.
López Obrador did the most audacious thing imaginable: he openly allied himself with the cartels. He called on all members and candidates of his party to ally themselves with organized crime in their respective localities. He claimed that this was the most effective way to win elections and achieve total political power in Mexico. Instead of negotiating with crime being shameful, as it had been before, today it was exalted, and López Obrador embraced the idea of forming a new ruling bloc in the country, with the support of the cartels, his Morena party, the federal government, and the Armed Forces.
At the same time, drug traffickers, emboldened by the power they had gained through their alliance with López Obrador, unleashed violence throughout the country to consolidate their position and prevent the always-present possibility of betrayal. To avoid setbacks, they accelerated their operations in different areas of the country to ensure their territorial control.
Finally, the question remains: when was the State overtaken by drug trafficking? The State has not yet been completely overtaken, but neither does it have control over the country. Harfuch’s operations are symptoms of an attempt to bring order, but the assassination of Clara Brugada’s collaborators and the killing of soldiers in Jalisco and Michoacán belie some positive steps in that direction.
The alliance between cartels and the political class remains strong. Until that bond is broken, the State will always be cornered, if not overtaken.
@rpascoep
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