Ricardo Pascoe Pierce
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the tip of the iceberg of a new global Cold War that confronts humanity with the dilemma between democracy and authoritarianism. It confronts the construction of societies of dialogue and tolerance to others that promote intolerance and imposition.
In the first Cold War (1945-1990), the world was the battlefield of great contenders who used different countries as a space to settle their differences. In that war, two political-economic models were in dispute: capitalism or socialism. Vietnam, Korea, Cuba, the South American guerrillas, the wars of national liberation in Africa and Asia, Central Europe: all these territories staged, in one way or another, the confrontation between capitalist and socialist forces.
Today, as we witness the beginning of the Second Cold War, the dispute is taking place in a different context, even if it has remnants of the previous war. Today capitalism, in its various forms, prevails in all countries of the world. Russia, China, and their new partners are all market economies, although some have more state dominance than others in regulating their economic policies. Some countries have more political bureaucracy than others, which prevails over economic agents. Only two cases remain in the failed past of socialism: Cuba and North Korea.
The current war is for the contenders’ economic, financial, and commercial hegemony. And this hegemony is also defined in political terms. The liberal conception of capitalism, as interpreted by the European and American bloc, is that societies must be free and democratic to prosper, to protect the individual incentive to create wealth and, therefore, the option to vote in open elections for their rulers. According to this conception, there is a direct correlation between economic freedom and political freedom. Therefore, democracy is the value that serves as the foundation stone and foundation for the possible success of the system created and defended by this bloc of nations.
On the other hand, the opposing bloc, led by China and Russia, considers that its economic success is directly linked to centralization at the helm of the nation-state, where market decisions, and therefore also political decisions, are made. From political centralism emanates its strength, the system philosophers would say. And from that strength comes its capacity to defeat its opponents in the markets, the economists of its governments would say. And from that economic strength will come, in direct proportion, its capacity to defeat its opponents in the political-military field, would say the politicians and strategists. In all this process of linking the State, the economy, and the force of imposition, individual freedom in society is more a hindrance than a useful issue. Democracy, all its philosophers, economists, politicians, and strategists would say, weakens and renders the State incapable of designing and implementing policies against its enemies in time and form. Democracy hinders state effectiveness in times of global Cold War.
So why invade Ukraine? Because of its enormous economic, mineral, and agricultural wealth. Also, its strategic geographic location in the central European plain offered it a neuralgic point to see all of Europe defend itself or go on the offensive. And because Putin perceived that he could invade because the opposing side was weakened, divided, and indecisive. The West was embroiled in endless internal “democratic” disputes, with no seemingly possible consensus. Europe and the United States were behaving like democracies in the process of unraveling. It was the perfect time to invade Ukraine, with Biden near political collapse and the prospect of Trumpism returning to power in the United States. With this analysis, Putin was not acting irrationally, as there was a strategic calculation that could be confirmed.
And the Russian leader firmly believed in his own diagnosis of Ukraine. He stated that it is not a real country, it has no internal social cohesion, and a majority of Ukrainians identify more with Russia than with the West. Putin despised President Zelensky, among other things, because he is a Jew. How was it possible, he must have reasoned, that a Jew could lead a majority Catholic country of Rome or the Russian Orthodox Church?
What he did not consider was that the European world, and beyond, was not in appetite for a turn of the regime’s screw, nor was it willing to enter into a model of tsarist authoritarianism. That was where he was wrong.
The internal divisions within the U.S. establishment were, and are, real. But as was seen with Biden’s State of the Union Address, when it comes to identifying a common enemy, Republicans and Democrats agree to point to Putin as the enemy. Even Trump had to moderate his pro-Putin discourse. Putin achieved what he did not want: unify American political power against him.
Something similar is happening with Europe. Even though the British exit from the European Union showed weakness, they have all united as a bloc against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, understanding that it represents a direct threat to their countries. The “pro-European” spirit is reborn in Europe, with the threat of Russian troops on its borders. The memory of the Berlin Wall is reborn. The millions of Europeans who have expressed their rejection of the Russian advance is a rejection of the Russian authoritarian model of governance. Defending Ukraine is, in fact, an act of defending democratic freedoms in Europe.
Again, Putin achieved what he did not want. He unified Europe politically and economically against him. And he achieved another feat: he unified and rearmed NATO, that instrument of military defense that Trump wanted to bury. The mobilizations in Europe and the United States had their own achievements. They forced U.S. and European politicians to deepen and accelerate economic sanctions against Russia more than planned. Canceling the Russian gas pipeline to Germany seemed politically impossible until public opinion in that country turned in favor of Ukraine and the defense of democracy.
Putin never contemplated or calculated that the Ukrainians would defend themselves militarily and politically as they have done. He never imagined that the Ukrainian people aspired to freedom above the comfort of a peace surrendered to the feet of a conqueror. He never imagined that this Jewish President would become a symbol of Ukrainian resistance, unity, and dignity. He is even an international symbol of the fierce struggle for democracy and self-determination of the peoples resisting the onslaught of authoritarian and anti-democratic tsarism.
Putin’s military and nuclear presence and threats frighten everyone and inflame people against that country and its ruler.
What’s next? Understand, first of all, that defending Ukraine is defending democracy against authoritarianism. Hesitant rulers are so because they have been touched by authoritarian temptation. But a large part of society favors democracy and against tyrannical rulers. Time and history will judge them.
It is necessary to offer all kinds of support to Ukraine, with material, military, and financial resources, but also moral support is very important. The world is debating between democracy and authoritarianism. It is imperative to win the ongoing hot (and cold) war and the war of ideas, which is as vital and essential as the war of arms.
We do not know if, as in so many other cases of the previous cold war, when the world saw countries divided between North and South, East and West (Germany and Berlin, Vietnam, Korea, etc.), we will see when the fighting between the armies ends, a Ukraine divided in two between East and West. Or a Russian occupation of the whole country or a military defeat of Putin. But one thing is clear: Ukraine is the staging of the trench of the first hot war of the Second Cold War, confronting freedom with authoritarianism.
[email protected]
@rpascoep