Ricardo Pascoe Pierce
Fidel Castro made a surprising confession to me, given that he was a dictator: he admitted he had made a serious mistake in his negotiations with President Clinton. He explained that he had had a conversation with the US president in which he promised not to shoot down the planes flown by Cuban exiles organized in the group Brothers to the Rescue. The planes flew over Havana, especially over its seawall, dropping leaflets urging people to rise against the island’s government. Clinton’s reasoning, as Fidel explained to me, was that he did not want to face too much opposition from the Cuban exile community when announcing the agreement between his government and the Cuban government.
After accepting Clinton’s condition to respect the Brothers to Rescue planes’ flights, Fidel made a mistake. Instead of immediately giving that instruction to the head of the Cuban air force, he took a nap. He was awakened from his nap with the news that the Cuban air force had shot down two planes and that their four pilots had been killed. Following that incident, the US Congress passed the harsh, anti-Cuban Helms-Burton Act, effectively precluding any agreement between the two countries. That happened in February 1996. Fidel confessed to me that he was responsible for the failure of the agreement he wanted with Clinton.
Twenty years later, in 2016, Raúl Castro reached an agreement with President Obama that would open the Cuban domestic market to foreign private investment and provide the Cuban economy access to the global market. The agreement did not appear to imply that Cuba had immediately committed to any internal democratic reform. However, according to some Obama administration spokespeople, such reform was implicit in the agreement. And that it had been discussed with the Cuban leaders, led by Raúl Castro.
To express the US government’s commitment to the agreement, President Obama made a formal visit to Cuba from March 20 to 22, 2016. The purpose of the visit was to finalize the agreement and for Obama to personally address criticism from some leading sectors of the Cuban Communist Party about its content.
The leaders of the Communist Party of Vietnam had urged the Cubans to accept the agreement with the United States. At that juncture, Vietnam had joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership, promoted by Obama as a means of countering China’s growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The Vietnamese even sought Cuba’s accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
With that conviction, Raúl Castro convened a Cuban Communist Party (PCC) Congress in April 2016 to ratify the agreement he had made with Obama. Fidel arrived at the event and called on the PCC to reject the agreement Raúl had reached with Obama. Despite no longer being the head of government, Fidel’s orders carried weight above all else. The Congress rejected the agreement proposal presented by Raúl. Thus, Fidel managed to humiliate his brother in front of the entire country and consolidate his position as the supreme leader of the Cuban Revolution. In November of that same year, Fidel died, leaving Cuba with no options and a destiny dependent on external support, mainly from Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, Russia.
It is possible to think that Fidel, in a fit of jealousy, could not tolerate the idea that his younger brother had reached an agreement with Obama that he had so eagerly sought with Clinton.
What do these two episodes in the history of Cuba and the United States tell us? Several lessons can be drawn from the actions of the Castro brothers. First, there is a significant desire for dialogue among a segment of the Cuban elite, as evidenced by the negotiations between Fidel and Raúl and various US presidents. Second, there is also a significant sector within the Cuban elite that feels threatened by the effects that economic openness could have. Some leaders and their families have become wealthy by managing state-owned companies, and the idea of free market competition does not suit them, as they are accustomed to monopolistic control over their productive sectors. They do not want to open up the market because it threatens their profits and their control over the sectors. It also threatens their political power. The party’s so-called “hardliners” are most threatened by the loss of privileges.
Thirdly, strong leadership is crucial for making the right decisions. Beyond their family conflicts reminiscent of Cain and Abel, both Fidel and Raúl had the political and moral authority to negotiate with the US president in office. Today, there is no leadership with that political authority in Cuba. President Díaz-Canel is seen as a puppet of others, lacking strength and a political project of his own. Who could take the lead in negotiating with Washington under these conditions? It is unclear. Who is Cuba’s Delcy Rodríguez?
Finally, given prior experience negotiating with the United States, it can be assumed that the two blocs within the Cuban elite persist: those in favor of dialogue and those opposed to it. If there is anything to be learned from the US incursion into Venezuela, it is that Washington has surely already sought out and found those within the Cuban elite with whom to dialogue about the steps toward a transitional pact on the island.
If so, the internal debate within the Cuban elite will be fierce because the “revolutionary” reference point, Fidel’s voice, no longer exists. There is a certain ideological orphanhood within the Cuban leadership. What should be defended and what should be conceded, and to what extent? How much pressure is there to reach an agreement?
Economic and social conditions on the island are deplorable. The humanitarian crisis is real. The lack of oil exacerbates a pre-existing crisis. And the party’s and the state’s political leadership are not in a position to offer a way out, unless it is once again dependent on external support or aid. Once it was the USSR, then Venezuela. Mexico’s aid is symbolic but does not address fundamental issues. So, what can be done?
There is Trump, with the advice of Marco Rubio, pushing to impose a new economic and social model on Cuba—tariffs against those who try to supply Cuba with oil close the door to other external proposals. Mexico provides humanitarian aid, including food, medicine, and moral support. But Mexico cannot risk its negotiations with the United States.
Fidel had advanced an agreement with Clinton that contained, among other things, an amnesty for the Cuban leadership. Raúl did the same with Obama. Will the Trump-Rubio agreement with the Cuban elite be generous enough to offer a general amnesty? Will the Cuban community in Miami, so eager for revenge, accept an amnesty? These are no longer the days of Clinton or Obama, both Democrats. We are in times of ideological hardness and hemispheric security issues. Overthrowing Venezuela and Cuba, containing Nicaragua, and subordinating Mexico are the new coordinates of US national security.
From Washington’s perspective, everything must happen before the midterm elections in November 2026. Time is short, and there is much to be done.
@rpascoep
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