Otto Granados Roldán
Shortly after Nicolás Maduro’s arrest, Google’s search engine returned nearly 23 million results on the subject. The media continues to report on the action on their front pages and websites as some of its effects unfold. One might think that, until that day, the outlook was idyllic and that the world would be preoccupied with fundamental issues: from the uses of artificial intelligence, autonomous mobility, and cybersecurity to advances in therapies for incurable diseases, quantum computing, and discoveries in our understanding of the solar system.
But since memory, in addition to being fragile, tends to accommodate to everyone’s interests, we thought that 2026 would be just another year and forgot that the water in the international cauldron had already reached 100 degrees Celsius, its usual boiling point. The stalled invasion of Ukraine, the conflict in Gaza, the civil wars in Sudan and Myanmar, the mass crimes in Darfur, the tensions with Taiwan or between India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, the border instability between Cambodia and Thailand, the military escalation in the South China Sea, the demonstrations in Iran, and the growing militarization of the Arctic are just a minimal accountthat graphically portrays the global canvas.
It seems that, given this uncertain, volatile, and bleak scenario, the relative international order established since the end of World War II has come to an end. And now, like a kind of funeral prayer, the Trump administration has announced the withdrawal of the United States from 66 international organizations, some of which have been part of the United Nations system and others that operate separately, claiming that they are “redundant, unnecessary, wasteful, poorly managed, captured by the interests of actors promoting their own agendas contrary to ours.”
On the one hand, we have a panoply of real conflicts of varying intensity. On the other hand, there is a risk that the institutional architecture that helped to channel, moderate, and regulate those conflicts will become part of yesterday’s world. Is this a fatalistic prognosis? If international cooperation and organizations do not survive, what will replace them?
With the intensification of political polarization in much of the Western world, the arrival of the new Trump administration, and reduced budgetary space for governments, resulting from greater spending pressures and lower public revenues, it seems clear that the principles, foundations, and ways of managing funds, or rather, international cooperation policies, are changing as rapidly as they are unpredictably, and decision makers will be forced to choose between different priorities. However, if it were merely a matter of selecting and allocating resources, it might be manageable in the short term; however, the issue goes beyond that.
The current circumstances pose additional complex challenges for the future of what we have known since the postwar period as cooperation and international organizations, and there will likely be a change in how these terms are interpreted and practiced in international relations and the multilateral system.
The origin and evolution of cooperation are well known, both from the emergence of the United Nations system and its various agencies and, subsequently, from the various international organizations, multilateral financial institutions (World Bank, IDB, IMF, CAF), and other specialized entities such as the OECD and the WTO.
The sequence of its emergence can be observed in at least three clear moments. One is the period after World War II, marked by the creation of the UN, the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the establishment of specialized agencies such as UNESCO. Another was the beginning of international cooperation policies as a means of exercising what some academics, decades ago, called “soft power,” when it seemed that the era of the bipolar world, the tensions of the Cold War, and the decolonization processes that began in the 1960s were coming to an end. And a third moment came with the so-called latest “wave of democratization” after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the USSR, and the configuration of an apparent new world order with a hegemonic superpower, the United States, and other powers represented by the European Union, Russia, China, India, and Japan. A world that was both unipolar and multipolar at the same time.
The paradox of international cooperation
It is in this context that the work of international organizations intensified in order to contribute to a more or less stable, peaceful, and equitable world order. However, almost eighty years have passed, and the world has changed in various conflicting and uncertain directions.
While most indicators of human progress are substantially better, as exemplified by the decline in the proportion of people living in extreme poverty or the growth of the middle classes, when comparing the period between the 1980s and the second decade of the 21st century with the current discussion about equity, human rights, or inclusion, there appears to be a contradiction: average living conditions have improved, but at the same time, disenchantment and polarization have deepened, weakening confidence in democracy, institutions, and politics, creating powerful and inexplicable incentives to return to an era of isolationism, nationalism, and autocracy, which have nothing to do with the policies of globalization, openness, or open markets, that is, the atmosphere that favored international cooperation. And it seems clear that in the folds of this tension, questions have arisen about certain promises that anticipated the provision of global or shared public goods through such cooperation.
The answers lie along different lines: from the real and measurable effectiveness (or lack thereof) of organizations in solving enormous problems in the fields in which they operate (humanitarian crises, food security, democracy, human rights) to the efficiency and transparency of their execution and their cost-benefit ratio, including their adequate use in recipient countries, accountability, and the collective awareness that it is a moral and valuable policy for the world as a whole.
Some hypotheses
It is likely that some of these aspects explain what is happening in this field today and the outcomes it may have in the immediate future. On the one hand, critics of international organizations argue that at the heart of the problem lie unfulfilled material promises, increasing global conflicts, and inequality, and that their legitimacy is therefore “diminishing, if not already exhausted.” On the other hand, despite decades of mobilizing resources for poor countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, criteria for effectiveness, such as genuine ownership of interventions by recipient countries,results-based management, and accountability, do not seem to have been met. In fact, many of the countries that have been receiving support funds for years appear at the bottom of almost all indices (Somalia, Sudan, Nicaragua, Libya) and are classified as potential “failed States”.
It is also true that, both within and outside the United Nations, some of its agencies and international financial organizations have engaged in, and continue to engage in, undesirable and, in some cases, reprehensible practices. For example, the UN has had a highly bureaucratic and uncompetitive system for selecting and promoting staff, particularly at the middle and senior levels, that has been devoid of meritocracy and transparency. There has been corruption and collusion in agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNRWA) in refugee processing centers in African countries; alleged bribes by United Nations Development Program (UNDP) staff in exchange for helping businessmen obtain contracts for reconstruction projects in Iraq; opacity in the destination of resources that UNESCO granted to manage two World Heritage sites in Uzbekistan after documents suggesting corruption came to light, and systematic criticism ofalleged corruption orexcessive discretion in the management of the last two directors-general of UNESCO, or the scandalous or at least undignified departures of Dominique Strauss -Kahn from the IMF or Mauricio Claver-Carone from the IDB, later rescued by the Trump administration. In other cases, there are international organizations that function more as intermediaries, not always transparent, to circumvent national legislation on procurement and tendering.
It therefore seems logical that, between these two extremes—the value of cooperation and the controversial practices of some international organizations—conservative governments, taxpayers, and ordinary citizens are skeptical about the effectiveness of international cooperation, or at least that is what some surveys indicate. Moreover, regardless of whether cases such as those mentioned above were proven, they damage the credibility and reputation of the organizations and of cooperation as a whole. In the public arena, the line between perception and reality is extremely thin.
Before Trump came along, for example, the Pew Research Center found divided opinions in the U.S. about economic aid to “people in need around the world”: 35% of adults wanted to increase it, 33% wanted to keep it the same, and 28% wanted to decrease it. These percentages have likely moved upward following the Trump administration’s disclosure of USAID allocations that are questionable or at least debatable. In this context, the withdrawal of the 66 agencies will have consequences, in one way or another, on how other countries, agencies, and international organizations conduct their cooperation policies.
The case of USAID
The specific example of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which was dissolved in 2025, is revealing of the problems with cooperation policies that, in the extreme, lead to throwing the bathwater out along with the baby.
USAID was purportedly established in 1961 with the idea of instilling a more humanitarian outlook among young Americans by having them conduct fieldwork or social service in underdeveloped countries. Until its dissolution, it operated in 130 countries, with a budget of around $44.2 billion in fiscal year 2024, representing less than 1% of the federal budget. It had more than 10,000 employees, two-thirds of whom were based abroad. According to UN data, through its actions, the U.S. government financed nearly 47% of global humanitarian resources that year.
For much of its existence, USAID was viewed from opposing positions. Some said that the very idea of official development assistance was a waste of U.S. resources and that any development support from the world’s richest country should be channeled through private investment. Along the same lines, Trump criticized it for providing substantial funding to the media “to create stories favorable to the Democrats,” although in reality it has been used to purchase subscriptions, conduct studies, and similar products.
Less clear is why he gave $68 million to an elite private organization such as the World Economic Forum, whose founder and owner was also the subject of numerous accusations in 2024 that led to his departure from the institution.
Or a grant to “empower LGBTQIA+ refugees in Greece,” buy condoms in Afghanistan, or provide training for transgender people. From a health and inclusion perspective, this support is understandable, but not fromthe radicalism of the Republican administration. Consider how a hardline Republican voter, a WASP from states such as Wyoming or West Virginia, who may never have left the United States, might feel that their money is going to places they have never heard of. There were numerous examples of unclear, controversial, or unjustified allocations.
Others accused it, especially in Latin America, of being an instrument of the CIA and other agencies. In reality, the region received only about $1.7 billion in funding, the least of any region. These resources were used in the same areas of action mentioned above—democracy and human rights, among others—and five countries received approximately 70% of all aid: Colombia, Haiti, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Honduras.
For example, López Obrador fought and attacked USAID to the point of paroxysm and formally asked the U.S. embassy in Mexico to suspend its support for various NGOs, including a think tank dedicated to monitoring public corruption. Coincidentally, in Transparency International’s global corruption perception report (2024), Mexico ranked 140th (out of 180 countries), the worst in the years that this report has been produced. The paradox is that the Mexican government continued to accept USAID funds for the Mexican armed forces and did not prevent the UNHCR and IOM offices in Mexico from receiving them for the management of migrants. Maduro, for his part, accused it of financing Venezuelan journalists and opponents to “spread negative narratives” against his government. Evo Morales did the same in response to alleged statements by the U.S. Secretary of State. And Gustavo Petro rejected USAID paying the salaries of Colombian customs officials.
Some observers hypothesized that those whocould benefit most from the cut in cooperation funds would be precisely the dictatorships in the region. For example, in 2024, USAID allocated $211 million to Venezuela, of which only $33 million went to groups monitoring “democracy, human rights, and governance.” Several used these funds to observe the 2024 elections, organize an independent vote count, and collect copies of the vote tallies. This enabled verification and documentation of the opposition candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, as the election winner.
The end of cooperation?
The consequences for the actions of the 66 agencies will not only affect the system of international cooperation and official development assistance, but may also precipitate a far-reaching geopolitical redefinition in this field, and even encourage a conceptual rethinking, with profiles that are currently quite uncertain, of the strategic interests of the United States, including those of an economic nature such as access to vital components such as rare earths.
The first effect is that so-called “soft power” has become a relic, at least during the Trump administration. It seems clear that all international organizations must systematically review their practices and their levels of efficiency, transparency, and real impact, as must any government that has cooperation agencies, especially when assistance goes to countries with often weak institutions and corrupt governments, or inefficient policies.
On the other hand, properly implemented cooperation facilitates development, employment, and security, which benefits democracy, human rights, and institutions, as well as economic growth and the expansion of open markets. The combination of these factors made the United States, with all its nuances, a successful and, under certain parameters, benign hegemonic power.
“A world with more prosperous, healthy, and stable countries,” says Martin Wolf, “is a better place to live. The main instruments for achieving these ends are multilateral institutions. If the United States is going to turn its back on its past wisdom, it is up to the rest of us to create a multilateral path forward, while we wait for the U.S. to finally find its way back into the light.”
That is the second major challenge. In international politics, there are no vacuums. There are always those who fill them. Underlying this is a twofold, complex dilemma. On the one hand, the world is in a poor economic situation; according to World Bank analyses, not only is economic growth slowing, but the performance of low-income developing countries has become concerning due to stagnant per capita income, internal conflicts, and political and institutional uncertainty. On the other hand, if the U.S., under Trump, seeks to become a new empire at any cost, what other competing powers will fill the void left by cooperation in its current form, or in modalities such as “global alliances”?
Minouche Shafik, former president of Columbia University and the London School of Economics, who is leading a review of Britain’s cooperation policies, estimates that the flow of resources to developing countries is growing with new donors such as India, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, often withgeostrategic or commercial objectives and a new focus on spending on issues such as climate change, but to the detriment of poverty reduction.
Desirable and possible scenarios?
Numerous observers have raised questions and proposed options for the way forward if the international organization and cooperation system is seriously damaged. Almost all agree that the rest of the international community, i.e., developed countries that are committed and have resources available, could structure a new support network that would, to some extent, replace the eventual U.S. withdrawal and not destroy cooperation. The problem is that, in many of these countries, levels of political polarization are too high (including several in the European Union), and it will not be easy to assume a greater role in cooperation. Furthermore, they are not experiencing a period of rapid economic growth; rather, they are experiencing the opposite.
Secondly, we need to discuss the meaning and purpose of international cooperation in a much more complex world. In other words, what should it consist of today? What are the priorities and why? How can we improve the design, formulation, and implementation of policies in terms of concrete, tangible, measurable, and transparent results? How can we modernize the narrative about its importance? What should be done in and with failed states (Somalia, Haiti, among others) where, as recent history shows, no cooperation works?
The third point is to define the areas on which cooperation should focus. In this regard, it is essential to view it as a moral responsibility, especially of rich countries towards poor countries, but also as a productive investment that can help improve the living conditions of communities, health and education, the environment, security, democracy, human rights, and stability, all of which have economic and productive value and social returns. See cases such as Algeria, the Dominican Republic, or Vietnam, where a combination of factors has been relatively successful.
In any case, as Shafik says, perhaps “from the ashes of the Trump administration’s slash-and-burn policies, the phoenix of a new consensus on international development may rise. One that is more appropriate, fairer, and more effective.” Let’s hope so.
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