Ricardo Pascoe Pierce
Morena’s recent National Council meeting revealed the party’s internal political situation. Its various factions are locked in a fierce power struggle ahead of the upcoming elections. Tensions escalated after the PT and the Green Party decided not to support President Sheinbaum’s political reform proposal. The “4T” coalition is mired in a dynamic of division and fragmentation that bodes ill for the coalition’s political future. The positions of the political groups operating within Morena, though not publicly declared, were laid bare by the decisions made over the weekend.
The Council’s key decision was to ratify the coordinators for the country’s five electoral constituencies. Along with this announcement, the appointment of the “coordinators” for the campaigns for the 17 governorships was also moved up to June. In both cases—whether for electoral constituencies or gubernatorial campaigns—these roles fall to political operatives whose defining trait is their loyalty to different leaders of the movement, who are often at odds with one another.
The constituency coordinators will be the ones who, to a large extent, determine the 300 candidates for federal congressional seats. Unlike them, the “coordinators” for the governorships will, in reality, be the candidates for those positions. In the case of these state “coordinators,” Morena’s appointments are an attempt to deceive the electoral authority to avoid being accused of early campaigning, even though that is exactly what they will be doing starting in June. Neither the INE nor the Federal Electoral Tribunal dared to punish Morena for its contempt of electoral law, which already foreshadows a highly flawed, unequal 2027 electoral process marked by frequent legal violations.
Morena’s Council concluded with a result favorable to Andrés Manuel López Obrador and confirmed the political weakness of the President. Morena’s most radical wing was able to impose much of its agenda. The appointment of district coordinators reveals this situation, though it shows a certain deference to Sheinbaum. Ricardo Monreal was appointed head of the First Constituency. The importance of this constituency lies in its role in selecting six gubernatorial candidates (Baja California, Baja California Sur, Sonora, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Nayarit). Monreal will wield significant influence over these appointments, as well as over selecting the congressional candidates in the eight states that make up this constituency. It is assumed to be an area with deep roots, allowing her to appoint a significant number of her candidates.
In the Second Constituency, Alejandro Peña Villa, a federal deputy from Morena, was appointed as the head; he is an electoral operator aligned with Sheinbaum but with roots in López Obrador’s campaign brigades. That constituency will nominate five gubernatorial candidates (Nuevo León, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, Aguascalientes, and Querétaro), including Zacatecas, where Monreal is very strong. So, despite not being the coordinator, Monreal will wield significant political clout and influence in the Second Constituency. Peña will have to share decision-making on candidate nominations with Monreal.
In the Third Constituency, Sergio Salomón Peregrina Céspedes, who is also close to the president, was appointed coordinator. That constituency covers southeastern Mexico, from Veracruz to Chiapas, including Oaxaca. Adán Augusto López Hernández and the so-called Tabasco Group wield significant influence in that area, so that an outsider coordinator will have limited political clout in decision-making regarding gubernatorial and congressional candidates. Two gubernatorial candidates are elected in that constituency: one for Campeche and one for Yucatán.
In the Fourth Constituency, which includes Mexico City, Morena’s coordination was led by López Obrador’s “brother,” Adán Augusto López Hernández. Here, two gubernatorial candidates are nominated (for Guerrero and Tlaxcala), as well as candidates for deputies, mayors, and local deputies. Considered the president’s stronghold, Morena appointed a clear rival of hers as coordinator, who will also exert decisive influence in the Third Constituency. In a distribution of positions, Sheinbaum’s operatives were isolated in constituencies where their influence would be diminished. Mexico City, the birthplace of Morena, is home to two notable conflicting factions: the president and the head of the Mexico City government.
In the Fifth Constituency, Mario Delgado was named coordinator; he is the current Secretary of Education and one of the main figures identified by the United States as a politician linked to drug trafficking. The two candidates for governor of Colima and Michoacán will be named. He holds a seat in the presidential cabinet under an agreement between López Obrador and Sheinbaum. It is one of the preferred territories for operations by the Michoacán Family, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, and the Chapitos of the Sinaloa Cartel.
Two districts, the first and the fourth, where the president might have greater political clout of her own. There, Morena appointed heavyweights (Monreal and Adán Augusto) who do not operate in accordance with the presidential directive, though they avoid contradicting her as much as possible. Furthermore, Morena placed the two operatives representing Sheinbaum as coordinators precisely in the constituencies (2 and 3) where they will carry the least weight in determining candidates, and where both Monreal and Adán Augusto enjoy significant strength and influence of their own.
Mario Delgado is a coordinator who basically lives on the run, hoping the DEA doesn’t put a price on his head. Politically, he depends on everyone and no one. His situation remains uncertain, and his appointment may well be the president’s way of getting rid of him. In that constituency, the fundamental political agreement lies between López Obrador’s supporters and the Texcoco Group. Drug trafficking operates in the State of Mexico, Michoacán, and Colima, acting as a decisive force across large swaths of their territory.
Monreal and Adán Augusto appear as leaders of groups that operate and make decisions within the traditional territorial areas that López Obradorism consolidated during the former president’s tenure. The operatives appointed by Sheinbaum appear in places where their control will be mediated by the groups entrenched in the party’s control posts. And in all cases, there will be the presence, involvement, and influence of organized crime factions, accustomed to being taken into account for certain elected positions and for electoral operations that ensure the victory of their candidates.
While the president seeks to influence the majority of nominations for gubernatorial and federal deputy candidates, traditionalist forces within Morena have a contrary view. The historical López Obrador faction wants to maintain control of the Chamber of Deputies, with an eye toward nominating Morena’s presidential candidate in 2030 and to limit current presidential power. Their achievement in Morena’s National Council was to consolidate their position and decisively influence the nomination of candidates in their favor.
This process necessitates assessing whether there are, in reality, three forces within Morena, not just the undisputed leader and the president. Adán Augusto is the operator of former President López Obrador. That is indisputable. As for the coordinators of districts 2 and 3, they are the conduits for the president’s opinions and wishes. Monreal remains a potential balancing factor, in part because he has territorial influence and has negotiated with both AMLO and Sheinbaum. This framework suggests three centers of power—with varying strength and reach but relative autonomy—operating within Morena’s internal dynamics. López Obrador, with his internal moral authority; the president, with the legitimacy conferred by her office; and Ricardo Monreal, with the power of his position, his negotiating skills with both forces, and his territorial presence.
Morena’s National Council strengthened the López Obrador faction (with the anticlimactic final chorus of “it is an honor to be with Obrador”), while the president was respected but elegantly sidelined. And Monreal’s negotiating skills stood out.
@rpascoep
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