Antonio Navalón
In the campaign of the so-called “spurious” candidate, which was marked by theft and national humiliation as he was prevented from reaching the National Palace, one of the central themes was the security proposal. At that time, specifically in 2006, during the campaign that would bring López Obrador to power, the objective was to reissue the policy of strengthening municipalities and applying confidence tests to local bodies. Almost twenty years have passed, and we are still in the same situation. They failed. We failed.
Over the past two decades, despite numerous tests and programs, we have not managed to establish trustworthy municipal police forces capable of confronting the expansion of organized crime, which is primarily sustained by their control of local governments. After months in office, President Sheinbaum rectified and presented a plan. Essentially, she is right: the key lies with the municipalities. Crime knows this and acts accordingly: controlling the first instance of civic power often means threatening and killing those who oppose it.
We have wasted resources—hundreds of millions on evaluations, equipment, and training—and yet the results are insufficient. We concentrated our forces on federal structures: first the Federal Investigation Agency, then the Federal Police, and today the National Guard, which in practice often seems like an extension of the country’s own armed forces. They tried. And boy, did they try hard. However, this attempt to “move up” and escalate security did not solve the underlying problem. The failure is complete because we forgot the priority: to strengthen from the bottom up. Governing is done from the bottom up. If we do not guarantee the institutional integrity of municipalities—resources, training, supervision, and control of the local budget—organized crime will continue to find spaces to operate.
In these times of total uncertainty and defenselessness, every time an uncomfortable municipal figure emerges, the signal is clear: attack them. Every time a Carlos Manzo appears on the scene, it seems that the same structure acts automatically to simply wipe them off the map. We must not continue like this. We cannot continue like this. However, we lack sufficient resources and a sustained strategy to professionalize and effectively control municipal and local police forces. We have left the fundamental task—the management of local public order—in the attic of priorities.
This is not a fate exclusive to us: other countries have undergone similar processes. In Italy, for example, organized crime got involved in illicit activities—extortion, drug trafficking, and control of territory—and, over time, some criminals converted their illicit capital into political or business power. The Italian “solution” is not complete; the Camorra, the ‘Ndrangheta, and other mafias are still present, but there have been decades of investigations and public policies aimed at recovering spaces.
I don’t know who advised the president to prioritize the control and demonization of social media and those whom the regime labels as “commentocrats” rather than a comprehensive recalibration of municipal security. It is worth reminding her—and ourselves—that major changes are not always planned in offices. The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, took many by surprise. There were also moments when the forces of law and order were unsure whether to shoot or not, and the established power ultimately collapsed under popular pressure. Revolutions and socially relevant transformations often arise from a confluence of frustration, citizen organization, and unpredictable circumstances.
If we want to reduce violence, we must rebuild the first line of defense of the state. We must professionalize and control municipal police forces, make the use of local budgets transparent and auditable, strengthen law enforcement and the administration of justice at the municipal level, and discourage the seizure of power by criminals. Until we do so, we will continue to repeat the same formula that has led us to failure for almost twenty years.
History teaches us that its evolution is systemic: events accumulate, like bricks, until they form a wall that ultimately breaks the patience, fear, or endurance of the people. But the explosion is always unpredictable. You never know behind which window, with which child, which mayor, building, or which dead person will be the one to make everything explode finally.
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